“President George Bush on Wednesday said that ‘genocide has to be stopped’ in western Sudan, and that involvement by NATO should send a ‘clear signal'”
March 30, 2006
In remarks that do far more to highlight US impotence and lack of resolve, President Bush went on to declare that, “‘this is serious business. This is not playing a diplomatic holding game…. When we say genocide, that means genocide has to be stopped'” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, South African Press Agency [dateline: Washington, DC], March 29, 2006).
Perhaps President Bush has forgotten that his administration made a formal genocide determination over a year and a half ago: on September 9, 2004 then-Secretary of State Colin Powell testified to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “genocide has been committed in Darfur, and the government of Sudan and the Janjawid bear responsibility.” The many hundreds of thousands of Darfuris who have subsequently perished, experienced violent displacement, rape, torture, and the misery of lives defined by fear and deprivation provide gruesomely abundant evidence that the genocide continues. These victims also make clear that the Bush administration does not really regard genocide in Darfur—and increasingly eastern Chad—as urgent or “serious business.” In fact, all evidence suggests that the administration is indeed playing precisely a “diplomatic holding game.”
Certainly if the President and his State Department think that a highly limited, finally nebulous commitment from NATO to provide transport and minimal logistics to an overwhelmed African Union force somehow sends “a clear signal” to Khartoum’s genocidaires, then we can be in no doubt that disingenuousness and expediency continue to rule US policy on Darfur. And there should be no mistake about the highly limited nature of NATO’s commitment. The word from NATO headquarters in Brussels yesterday was a strong re-assertion of previous declarations by NATO Secretary-general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer:
“NATO said it had agreed to a request by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to look at how it could provide support to troops there, but said there was no question of it intervening on the ground. ‘No one is discussing, planning or considering a NATO force on the ground in Darfur. That is not one of the options,’ NATO spokesman James Appathurai told a regular briefing. ‘We should look at this in the context of what NATO is already providing.'” (Reuters [dateline: Brussels], March 29, 2006)
What NATO is “already providing” consists entirely of transport lift capacity, as well as very limited logistics and training. This is certainly nothing that will change the calculations in Khartoum about how to continue with its genocidal counter-insurgency strategy, or how the regime might politically consolidate the effects of previous genocidal actions. It sends no “clear signal” to Khartoum that it must halt the genocide, but only confirms the regime in its belief that the Western powers are content to substitute words for meaningful action.
Moreover, de Hoop Scheffer has made it clear that NATO will not act without UN authority, precisely the authority that the African Union has recently refused to request. Instead, the AU (at its March 10 Peace and Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa) spoke only of a future handover to the UN—in six months—and this only “in principle.” Further, the just concluded Arab League summit (revealingly held in Khartoum) pointedly rejected any UN authorization or deployment unless requested by the genocidaires who make up the National Islamic Front regime. This is the context in which to understand NATO’s position on Darfur:
“[De Hoop Scheffer] ruled out [ ] sending troops from the western military alliance to Sudan’s strife-torn Darfur province. De Hoop Scheffer said he believed that NATO could help in the region during the transition phase from an African Union operation to one led by the UN but only with a clear UN mandate. ‘Then we can discuss a NATO role, which I do see in the enabling sphere and not the boots of troops on the ground,’ he told reporters on the sidelines of a meeting of EU defence ministers in Innsbruck, Austria.” (Agence France Presse, March 6, 2006)
President Bush’s assertion that the “involvement by NATO should send a ‘clear signal'” to Khartoum, like his previous declaration that there should be “NATO stewardship” for the Darfur protection mission, is mere political expediency:
“President Bush declared this past Friday [February 17, 2006] that a security force for Darfur will require ‘NATO stewardship, planning, facilitating, organizing, probably double the number of peacekeepers that are there now, in order to start bringing some sense of security.'” (New York Times, February 17, 2006)
A month and a half later, and after thousands of additional genocidal deaths, there is no sign of meaningful “NATO stewardship.” Again, NATO itself has offered only minimal assistance, and anything more is contingent upon a UN takeover in Darfur that evidently won’t occur for almost half a year—and which Khartoum is already actively working to forestall. The AU force currently on the ground in Darfur, desperately outmanned and outgunned, is overwhelmed by the violence, and daily finds itself less and less able to respond to the insecurity that continues to attenuate the humanitarian lifeline upon which millions of human beings depend.
Nonetheless, the most recent African Union Peace and Security Council Communiqu (March 10, 2006) failed to acknowledge these weaknesses, and refused to move toward an immediate UN handover. Moreover, the AU Communiqu is not only hedged by various contingencies and qualifications—so many as to make the document largely meaningless beyond a vague gesture toward a terminus date of September 30, 2006—it refuses to acknowledge the central shortcoming of the AU mission: that it has no useful mandate to protect civilians or humanitarian operations.
This refusal is simultaneously a function of sheer inability (the AU has neither the manpower nor resources to fulfill such a mandate) as well as the AU’s continued deference to Khartoum, which has allowed the AU force to increase in Darfur only on condition that the mandate not change. The official AU task remains the futile one of monitoring a non-existent cease-fire (one that, significantly, does not include the brutal Janjaweed militia forces). De facto expansion of the mandate by some AU commanders on the ground has made only marginal difference in the protection of civilians and humanitarians; the overall and rapid deterioration of security is obvious to all observers.
Humanitarian workers speaking (necessarily on condition of anonymity) to this writer and to a wide range of journalists, UN officials, and representatives of donor countries paint a terrifying picture of violent threats against themselves and their operations. Many thousands of square kilometers within Darfur (especially West Darfur and the Jebel Marra area) and in eastern Chad are completely inaccessible to humanitarian operations. And the size of these areas only grows. UNICEF reports that “increased insecurity has already prevented humanitarian agencies from reaching over half a million people [in Darfur]; if funding shortages continue, that number will only grow” (UN News Center, March 17, 2006). Insecurity in eastern Chad is too great to permit meaningful assessment, but at least 100,000 conflict-affected civilians—and very likely a great many more—are also beyond humanitarian reach.
Jan Egeland, the conscience of the UN, has also spoken explicitly about the humanitarian realities following from growing insecurity:
“As a result of [deteriorating insecurity], Egeland said, UN relief officials and relief organizations cannot reach more than 300,000 people on the Chad border in western Darfur and the central mountainous region of Jebal Marra because they are too dangerous. These unreachable areas, he said, ‘will soon get massively increased mortality because there is nothing else but international assistance.’ He expected deaths to increase markedly within weeks.” (Associated Press [dateline: United Nations], March 13, 2006)
Additional hundreds of thousands of civilians are inaccessible in South Darfur and North Darfur states. Egeland went on to declare that “Darfur is returning to ‘the abyss’ of early 2004 when the region was ‘the killing fields of this world.’ ‘We’re losing ground every day in the humanitarian operation which is the lifeline for more than 3 million people.'” Again, in aggregate, UN figures—including those from the UN High Commission for Refugees—suggest a total population in need of approximately 4 million people throughout the greater humanitarian theater of Darfur and eastern Chad.
BUSH ADMINISTRATION POLITICKING ON DARFUR
This is the horrific context in which President Bush has chosen to posture about a NATO role in Darfur, evidently in response to the burgeoning civil society movement in the US. This dishonesty works in effect to politicize the Darfur crisis—taking it from the realm of a moral imperative, accepted as such across the political spectrum, into the arena in which partisan “management” becomes the chief consideration. Comments from NATO officials in Brussels make the point clearly, if not quite explicitly:
“Speaking on condition of anonymity, a NATO official told United Press International that the idea of the alliance dispatching ground troops to the troubled province was a ‘non-starter with the Africans, a non-starter with the United Nations and a non-starter with NATO.’ Officials in Brussels also criticized the US president for sending out confused messages about what he expects from the alliance. ‘Bush has been a little bit unclear in his language,’ said one, referring to the president’s call for 20,000 peacekeepers to be sent to Darfur under NATO`s command.” (UPI [dateline Brussels], March 30, 2006)
In fact, even when Bush spoke of “NATO stewardship” for a Darfur mission last month, it was far from clear that there was any real commitment from within the administration (see my “What Does President Bush Mean by ‘NATO stewardship’ of Darfur Crisis?” February 22, 2006 at http://www.sudanreeves.org/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=93). Notably, after the President spoke in February, Pentagon spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Joe Carpenter declared it was “‘premature to speculate’ on potential increases in US troops” (Washington Post, February 17, 2006). Privately, Bush administration officials make clear there is no intention of sending US troops to Darfur. The Pentagon comment comported precisely with a statement by US State Department spokesman Sean McCormack following a meeting several days earlier between Bush and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan: “‘It’s really premature to speculate about what the needs would be in terms of logistics, in terms of airlift, in terms of actual troops. And certainly in that regard, premature to speculate on what the US contribution might be'” (Reuters [Washington, DC], February 13, 2006).
“Premature” would seem a terrifyingly inappropriate adjective three years into the first great episode of genocide in the 21st century.
During the month of February 2006, when the US was President of the Security Council, Bush’s ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, was unable to garner support for even a provisional resolution authorizing a UN peace support operation in Darfur. This US inability was certainly not lost on the African Union during its deliberations in Addis Ababa prior to the crafting of its March 10, 2006 Peace and Security Council Communiqu, which simply reiterated its previous (January 2006) commitment—“in principle”—to a UN handover, though with a time-frame that now extends to the end of September.
Nor does President Bush give any signs of appreciating the significance of Arab League support for Khartoum’s continuing obduracy. Leaders gathered at the Arab League summit in Khartoum yesterday,
“affirmed their support for the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur and underlined their rejection of deploying other troops there without permission of the Sudanese government, a reference to UN peacekeepers.” (Associated Press [dateline: Khartoum], March 29, 2006)
Emboldened by Arab League support, by AU deference, and by political support from China and Russia on the UN Security Council, Khartoum will not be made to change its genocidal ways by vague threats of a NATO role, threats that prove vacuous when examined with any specificity.
WHAT MUST BE DONE
All evidence and analysis clearly suggest that, despite an increase in posturing by the US President, Khartoum feels unconstrained in its actions. As the International Crisis Group notes in an important new report, the National Islamic Front regime remains committed to a policy of “strategic chaos:”
“Low-level violence remains the norm for much of Darfur and is spilling over into eastern Chad. It continues to be caused primarily by Khartoum’s unwillingness to rein in the militias on which it relies for its counter-insurgency campaign. The rebel SLA shares responsibility for deteriorating security, however, as it seeks to consolidate its military position in South Darfur in blatant contravention of the ceasefire. Meanwhile, civilians—particularly women, children and the elderly—bear the brunt of the war, and the region’s social fabric is in ruins.”
“The destruction of rebel support bases, both villages in Darfur and those provided by the regime of President Deby in Chad, remains central to the government’s counter-insurgency strategy. Militias allied to Khartoum attack civilians and deny the rebels villages from which to operate, while Chadian rebels based in West Darfur carry out operations against Deby. Khartoum seeks to stoke the tribal dimensions of the conflict and transform what was once a politically-based insurgency into an increasingly tribal war.” (“To Save Darfur,” March 17, 2006 at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4027)
The key recommendation from the ICG report appropriately focuses on the immediate security needs of civilians and humanitarians:
“The US, the EU and others need, therefore, to act without delay on three fronts to:
 provide the necessary financial and technical assistance to the AU through at least September 2006, and to help AMIS implement the key recommendations for internal improvements outlined in the December 2005 Joint Assessment Mission report and affirmed by the AU on 10 March ;
 do the heavy diplomatic lifting to persuade the AU and the UN Security Council to authorise the immediate deployment of a stabilisation force, ideally some 5,000-strong, as part of a phased transition to a UN mission to be completed in October 2006, to focus on monitoring the Chad-Sudan border and deterring major cross-border attacks, and on bolstering AU Mission’s ability to protect civilians in the Tawila-Graida corridor [a highly populated corridor running down the center of Darfur from North Darfur State to south of Nyala, capital of South Darfur State]; and
 persuade the Security Council to authorise immediate planning for a UN peacekeeping force of at least double the present size of AMIS, equipped to fulfil a more serious military mission, provided with an appropriately stronger mandate, and ready to take over full responsibility on 1 October 2006.” (from the Executive Summary)
As ICG well realizes, this proposal is far from ideal:
“This is not ideal. Crisis Group has long contended that because the African Union Mission in Sudan [AMIS] has reached the outer limits of its competence, and a UN mission authorised today would not be fully ready to take over from it for some six months, a distinct and separate multinational force should be sent to Darfur to bridge that gap and help stabilise the immediate situation. We have argued, and continue to believe, that NATO would be best from a practical military point of view. Unfortunately, political opposition to this in Khartoum, within the AU and even perhaps within the Atlantic Alliance itself, means it is not achievable at this time.”
“What we now propose, therefore, is a compromise driven by the urgent need for a more robust force in Darfur. A militarily capable UN member state—France seems most promising since it already has troops and aircraft in the area—should offer to the Security Council to go now to Darfur, wearing blue helmets, as the lead nation in the first phase of the incoming UN mission. It could be joined from the outset by forces from one or two other militarily capable UN members (and would probably need to be if the desirable target of around 5,000 personnel for this force is to be achieved).”
“This stabilisation force would be a self-contained, separately commanded UN mission with identified functional or geographic divisions of responsibility that would work beside AMIS and through a liaison unit at its headquarters until arrangements were in place for a 1 October  transition to the full UN mission. That full mission would need to be recruited from the best AMIS elements as well as a wider circle of Asian and other member states—no easy task at a time when several large UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and elsewhere have exhausted the capabilities of many contribution candidates.”
“The US and other NATO states should respond generously and quickly to requests from it or AMIS to provide logistical help as well as regular access to satellite imagery, air mobility and close air support, especially to deter or react to egregious movements of men or heavy weapons in the border area.” (from the Executive Summary)
If the Bush administration is at all serious about halting genocide in Darfur, it will accept the ICG proposal as, at the very least, a highly credible starting point in deliberations and planning. The proposal is tough-minded, both politically and militarily, even as it recognizes its limitations and the difficulties at the UN. Ultimately, if the UN Security Council insists on securing from Khartoum permission for deployment—permission that will never be granted—then the UN, or individual members states, must make the extraordinarily difficult decision to enter Darfur as a “non-permissive environment.” The obligations under the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide give clear moral and compelling legal justification for such action; so, too, does the key paragraph from the UN World Summit document, unanimously adopted in September 2005:
“[all countries should be] prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII [peacemaking authority], on a case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and its implications.” (Paragraph 139)
If the Security Council refuses to accept these obligations, despite findings by multiple UN investigative bodies that confirm both that these crimes are occurring and the defenselessness of Darfur’s civilian populations, then there is still certainly overwhelming moral justification, and finally obligation, for humanitarian intervention. As Jan Egeland, head of UN humanitarian operations, has rightly declared: Darfur is the “test case for the world for having no more Rwandas and no more massive loss of innocent lives.” The world continues to fail the “Rwanda test,” and that failure is only compounded by the disingenuousness of the Bush administration
REALITIES IN THE ABSENCE OF CIVILIAN AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION
As ongoing “strategic chaos” proves a devastatingly effective weapon in the Darfur genocide, humanitarian organizations continue to provide us some of the means by which we can measure the ghastly human costs. The number of conflicted-affect persons in Darfur and eastern Chad is now approximately 4 million. UN Darfur Humanitarian Profile No. 22, reflecting conditions as of January 1, 2006, presents a figure of 3.6 million conflicted-affected persons in Darfur—a figure that has grown by at least 50,000 since the beginning of the year; at least another 220,000 Darfuris have fled to increasingly threatened refugee camps in eastern Chad; and the effects of genocidal warfare against the non-Arab or African tribal populations indigenous to eastern Chad further raises the total, almost certainly by well over 100,000.
In short, 4 million people have now been affected by Khartoum’s genocidal campaign (the total pre-war population of Darfur was likely between 6 million and 6.5 million). This population is various in its humanitarian needs, but these needs grow relentlessly, even as humanitarian funding and access continue to diminish. These people are badly weakened in a great many cases by the cumulative effects of three years of annihilating war. UNICEF recently warned that 2 million children are imperiled by insecurity, funding cuts (often a result of insecurity), and the general decline in humanitarian operating capacity:
“Nearly 2 million children in Sudan’s war-torn Darfur region are threatened by severe funding shortfalls, with only 11 per cent of the urgently needed $89 million either committed or pledged, the United Nations Children’s Fund reported today. ‘Without significant and immediate funding, and given existing problems with security and access, the humanitarian crisis that was averted only last year will return,’ [Sudan] country representative Ted Chaiban said.” (UN News Center, March 16, 2006)
Some of the specific threats to children are articulated by UNICEF:
“UNICEF and its partners in Darfur are working to immunize half a million children still vulnerable to disease. But without additional resources to maintain cold chain systems and fund special campaigns, fewer children will be vaccinated, greatly increasing the threat to their health.”
“If maintenance and expansion of water and sanitation infrastructures in rural areas were halted, millions of people could have limited or total lack of access to safe water and sanitation, leading to water-borne diseases that spread rapidly and lethally in close quarters.”
“Lack of resources will force schools to close and leave hundreds of thousands of children without access to education. Approximately 382,000 children have benefited from UNICEF education support, including the provision of education supplies and teacher salaries.” (UNICEF press release, March 17, 2006)
And this grim assessment does not take into consideration the threats to refugee children in eastern Chad or the Chadian children from the targeted non-Arab tribal populations.
The UN World Food Program, for its part, is explicit about the threat to civilian populations in Chad, where the humanitarian crisis grows rapidly by the day:
“Mounting violence in eastern Chad, which aid workers say has forced thousands of Chadians from their homes, ‘could seriously impede’ humanitarian relief efforts in the region, where aid groups are assisting nearly a quarter-million refugees from Sudan’s Darfur conflict, the UN food aid agency said on Friday. The World Food Programme said in a communiqu that unrest is hindering efforts to evaluate how dire the situation is for families recently displaced by violence. ‘We are at an extremely delicate stage in Chad—right on the edge,’ said Stefano Porretti, Chad country director for WFP.”
“Violence from the Darfur conflict has repeatedly spilled over into eastern Chad, but the instability has increased in recent months with incursions by various armed groups [ ]. One aid worker said at least 25,000 Chadians have been displaced by the latest unrest. And the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, said late last month that some Chadians were fleeing over the border into Darfur. WFP called the fresh population movements ‘worrying.'”
While the most recent harvest was a good one in this part of Chad, “‘there are very real fears that people would soon require essential humanitarian assistance,’ WFP says, adding, ‘it is difficult to assess the magnitude of needs because of current insecurity.’ ‘The longer the insecurity in the area persists, the more serious the situation will become,’ Porretti said in the WFP statement. ‘Most people affected by the recent violence have enough food for another month or two, but after that, things are far less certain.'” (UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, March 24, 2006)
In two months, the rainy season will have begun (coinciding with the traditional “hunger gap” between spring planting and fall harvest), and overland movement of humanitarian assistance into eastern Chad will come to a halt because of impassable roads.
The security crisis that is at the center of the humanitarian crisis was very recently framed in blunt terms by John O’Shea, head of the Irish humanitarian organization GOAL, which has worked in Darfur for almost three years. Invoking the specter of Rwanda-like human destruction, O’Shea declared:
“‘It is clear that the International Community has been unable to stem the flow of deaths—and the aid community realises the time is fast approaching when the region may be deemed too insecure for relief activity.’ GOAL [ ] was recently forced to abandon one of its major health programmes in the Jebel Mara district, due to fighting between rebels and Janjaweed militia. ‘We knew from day one that protection was needed in Darfur. But the International Community has failed to do its job.’ ‘The Security Council has not found the courage to take on the Sudanese Government nor face objections from Russia and China to deploy UN peacekeepers.'” (GOAL press release, March 22, 2006)
This is the perspective of many within the UN, as well: Juan Mendez, special advisor on the prevention of genocide, declared recently that “‘no one disputes that the situation on the ground is unraveling, it’s getting worse,’ [Mendez said]. ‘The almost two million Darfurians who were vulnerable to human rights violations are more vulnerable now than they were a year ago” (South African Press Association [dateline: Brussels] March 23, 2006).
Mendez went on to identify the primary source of insecurity for civilians and humanitarian operations:
“[Mendez] said the main problem was that the government in Khartoum had refused to respect a UN Security Council resolution demanding that it disarm local militiamen known as the Janjaweed. ‘If [the Janjaweed] are not armed, they are incorporated into the security forces to the point where you don’t know whether they act as Janjaweed, or police, or military.'” (South African Press Association [dateline: Brussels] March 23, 2006)
WILL THERE BE AN END TO BUSH ADMINISTRATION POSTURING?
There are no signs that any of this matters enough to the Bush administration to commit more than words and humanitarian dollars. The latter are, to be sure, critical and reflect deeply meaningful national generosity. But the substitution of words for action is a pattern disturbingly long in evidence: though Colin Powell declared forthrightly (if belatedly) that “genocide has been committed in Darfur, and the government of Sudan and the Janjawid bear responsibility” (September 9, 2004), he immediately went on to declare that “nothing new” in the way of US policy “followed” from this determination. In short, having referred a genocide determination to an obviously paralyzed UN Security Council (which has yet to impose a single sanction on any of the genocidaires indicted by Powell), the US asserted that it had fully discharged its responsibilities as a contracting party to the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
But Article 1 of the Convention declares that, “the Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish.” We must conclude that the US was and is prepared to take a minimalist view of its obligations to “undertake to prevent genocide.” And it is in this context that we must understand the implications of President Bush’s tough-sounding but ultimately hollow words of yesterday: “‘this is serious business. This is not playing a diplomatic holding game…. When we say genocide, that means genocide has to be stopped.'”
How will “we” stop genocide in Darfur, Mr. Bush? How? It is not enough to gesture vaguely toward NATO. It is not enough to invoke “NATO stewardship” or some unspecified “involvement by NATO”—the more so when NATO officials clearly have no intention of moving beyond present severely constrained assistance. What diplomatic and political capital have you expended, Mr. Bush, in securing NATO consensus for a more vigorous role in protecting civilians and humanitarians in Darfur? To date, there is no evidence of any meaningful such expenditure. What prevents you, Mr. Bush, from high-profile public diplomacy, laying out the case for international involvement of the sort outlined by the International Crisis Group? And if the ICG proposal is unsatisfactory, what prevents you from articulating your own detailed plan?
You are trying to respond to genocide in Darfur on the cheap, Mr. Bush—and the effect is only to make any meaningful response less likely. For your expediency is easily sniffed out not only in Brussels, but in Khartoum.
The National Islamic Front genocidaires have seen your Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs publicly refuse to confirm your genocide determination; they have seen your senior State Department official working on Darfur lie conspicuously about the level of civilian destruction in Darfur; they have noted with pleasure the State Department website that continues to grossly underestimate human mortality in Darfur; they have heard your Deputy Secretary of State describe genocide in Darfur as “tribal warfare” (Khartoum’s own preferred characterization); they have seen your Secretary of State recently testify to Congress that while genocide continues in Darfur, there is—remarkably—no longer a nameable genocidal agent; and they have seen the blustery impotence of your UN Ambassador, who failed to secure any meaningful resolution on Darfur during the entire month the US held the Presidency of the Security Council.
Darfur must not become a partisan or political cause, or any hope for effective and widely supported US action is doomed. And yet the political expediency that so obviously governs your actions, Mr. Bush—and those of your State Department—works relentlessly to politicize; and partisans on both sides of the aisle are all too ready either to seize advantage or to become protectively defensive of your inaction.
There is no further room for bluster, disingenuousness, or expediency, Mr. Bush. Khartoum has taken your measure and found you wanting; if this is to change, only deliberate, forceful actions—diplomatic, economic, and military—can effect the change.
You once declared that genocide in Africa would not occur on “your watch.” It is your “watch”; genocide is occurring in Africa; it continues on a massive scale; and you have done nothing meaningful to stop it. History’s judgment of your failure will be savage.
Northampton, MA 01063