“Trump and Peace in Sudan: An Ongoing Assessment”
Recent remarkable statements from the Trump administration—committing itself to bringing peace to Sudan—are both unexpected and inevitably occasion skepticism, given past Trump priorities. Assessing this commitment and what it yields should be continuous—the goal of this ongoing chronicle
“An Assessment: Trump and Peace in Sudan” | Part 6, December 22, 2025
On November 12: U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio declared in Canada:
“I think something needs to be done to cut off the weapons and the support that the RSF is getting as they continue with their advances.”
[no mention of UAE]
On November 19: Trump himself made various comments about Sudan at the apparent behest of visiting Prince Mohamed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia:
“[bin Salman] mentioned Sudan yesterday, and he said, ‘Sir, you’re talking about a lot of wars, but there’s a place on Earth called Sudan, and it’s horrible what’s happening.'”
[no mention of UAE]
**********
What difference have these statements made? Certainly none in the level or brutality of violence: the violence that the RSF are able to inflict on civilians in Sudan continues to be sustained on a massive basis by the UAE:
Al Jazeera (December 7): “A drone attack by the RSF and its allied al-Hilou group on a preschool in Kalogi in Sudan has killed more than 100 people, dozens of whom were children. It sparked international condemnation amid worsening violence as the RSF fights Sudan’s Armed Forces in South Kordofan state.”
Sudan Tribune (December 6): “A drone fired three missiles at the town in the eastern part of the state on Thursday. The first missile struck a kindergarten, causing initial casualties, Angalo said. A second missile was fired as residents gathered to rescue the wounded. A third strike hit the rural hospital where victims were being transported, killing and wounding more people and destroying large sections of the facility.
Because of insecurity created by the RSF (as well as by SAF), UAE military equipment supplies have the effect of creating security conditions that make it impossible for humanitarian organizations to reach desperately needy civilians, particularly in Darfur and the Kordofans.
Nothing has been achieved since the overview of the diplomatic standstill described by The Guardian (Dec. 7). The supposed “Roadmap for Peace” is accepted by neither the RSF nor the SAF; negotiations are being overseen by Trump’s “Special Advisor for Africa” Massad Boulos, a man without any diplomatic experience (although he is married to one of Trump’s daughters). He has no serious knowledge of Africa, especially not Sudan. He is far, far out of his depth in his present role.
The state of affairs was captured well by Al Jazeera in a recent dispatch (December 20, 2025), which included words by Rubio which make clear that he is quite unprepared (presumably on Trump’s orders) to call out the UAE. Instead, he merely rehearses his words from November:
“The top US diplomat [Rubio] pointed to external weapons supplies as a critical factor sustaining the war between the government-aligned Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which is now deep into its third brutal year.
“All these weapons are acquired from abroad. They have to come from somewhere else and they have to come through somewhere else,” Rubio said, adding that outside actors possess the leverage needed to bring both parties to the negotiating table.”
Presumably Rubio does understand what is at stake in halting the conflict:
“What’s happening there is horrifying, it’s atrocious,” Rubio said, adding that “one day the story of what’s actually happened there is going to be known, and everyone involved is going to look bad.”
But these words bespeak an impotent diplomat, unable to do what is most essential in ending the horrors: holding the UAE responsible for its massive support of a genocidal militia that enjoys no real popular support in Sudan.
