We have no reliable figures for the number of people killed in the assault on Zamzam IDP camp by the Rapid Support Forces (April 11 – 15)—or the number who were displaced not only from Zamzam but Abu Shouk camp and the city of El Fasher. People desperately fled in all directions, though most toward the west (Tawila and the area known as East Jebel Marra). One informed estimate puts the figure at between 700,000 and 800,000—a staggering number of human beings forced from their homes.
Thousands have died from the violence of the initial RSF assault and while subsequently struggling to reach safety without carrying food or water. It is a difficult two-day walk—at least—from Zamzam to Tawila, some 60 kilometers to the west. Gaffar has received many reports of people dying from thirst or malnutrition, especially young children. Deferred mortality in such a situation may be enormous (deferred mortality refers to deaths that occur later than immediately after the crisis, often due to long-term health system disruptions, delayed onset of diseases, or the physical effects of mental health problems).
Violence continues to take many lives and the presence of the RSF on most of the one main road leading to the Tawila area from Zamzam is deeply threatening to all. Murder, rape, other forms of violence, abuse and harassment—and asset stripping—continue to define the journey by road. Many, however—especially men—are very likely to be killed on the spot. As a consequence, despite the arduous nature of the trek, many have chosen to try to make the journey off road, through the bush. Satellite imagery makes clear that many have not survived.
Even those who arrive in the Tawila area find very little awaits them. This is a Fur-dominated area—controlled by the forces if Abdel Wahid al-Nur’s faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement, and there are significant ethnic tensions between the Fur and other non-Arab tribal groups, perhaps especially the Zaghawa, who are heavily represented in the populations fleeing Zamzam and El Fasher.
I. Looking forward:
Despite the brutality and cruelty of the RSF assault on Zamzam, Gaffar—who is in constant touch with those on the ground—has found that a large majority of those who fled Zamzam want to return if they can do so with some assurance of security. The camp is more than 20 years old and feels more like home to most than the villages they have fled—villages that have typically been completely destroyed by the Janjaweed and their successors, the RSF. As much destruction as the RSF wrought on Zamzam, with large sections of the camp torched, it is simply too large to burn in its entirety, especially mud/brick dwellings.
I must confess that I find this willingness to return astonishing, a reflection of how much these people have invested of themselves and their families in the camp. There can be no predicting the economic viability of a revitalized camp; but these people deserve every chance possible to remake their lives—and at the forefront of these efforts will be the surviving members of Team Zamzam who are able to return to the camp. This will give new meaning to the Arabic name “Zamzam,” explained here in brief:
The Zamzam Well (Arabic: بئر زمزم,) is a well located within the Masjid al-Haram in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. It is located 20 meters east of the Kaaba the holiest place in Islam.
According to Islamic legend, the well is a miraculously generated source of water, which opened up thousands of years ago when the son of Ibrahim (Abraham), Ismaʿil (Ishmael), was left with his mother Hajar (Hagar) in the desert. It is stated to have dried up during the settlement of the Jurhum in the area and to have been rediscovered in the 6th century by Abd al-Muttalib, grandfather of Muhammad.
We must hope that Zamzam IDP camp in Darfur similarly comes to abound in water and sustenance for its survivors.
II. What is happening now:
The ruthless yearlong siege of El Fasher by the RSF has at times seemed perilously close to success, a fearsome prospect that would fully preclude the re-establishment of Zamzam. But here is a classic case of the more motivated military forces prevailing: as Gaffar has constantly reminded me, the resisting troops are prepared to fight to the death. Protection of the city depends for now on three elements: the 6th Infantry Division of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF); the “Joint Forces,” comprising contingents from several former rebel groups in Darfur; and a “citizens’ militia,” which has been substanially armed and constitutes the most motivated part of the resistance. Gaffar estimates that there is over a year’s supply of ammunition, although the inability to access food and water is taking a terrible toll on the remaining population.
Even as El Fasher remains in such dire straits, there are currently—according to a highly reliable source—some fifteen SAF brigades coming together in the Kordofans to the immediate east of Darfur. Having taken control of Khartoum, the SAF is now evidently prepared to break the siege of El Fasher, which would likely be followed by seizing back other of the Darfur state capitals (Ed Daien, Nyala, Zalingei—and eventually El Geneina (near the Chad/Darfur border.
It is difficult to celebrate any victories by the SAF: during—and before—the present conflict they have a terrible record of human rights abuses, war crimes, even crimes against humanity. We must hope they are not the face of a new governance in Sudan. But the SAF is—when compared with the RSF—distinctly the lesser of two evils. And if the RSF is driven from El Fasher and the other state capitals, we can expect a surge in humanitarian relief efforts, from both Port Sudan to the east and Ádre near the Chad/Darfur border to the east.
Even so, it is an ominous sign that General al-Burhan has used his position as commander of the SAF and leader of a de facto government to obstruct entry into Darfur from the Ádre region and has evidently blocked the use of humanitarian airdrops to provide some of the desperately needed food, medicine, even water. (In a recently published article in Radio Dabanga, I make the case for such airdrops and the need of the international community to pressure both al-Burhan and President Déby of Chad to cooperate fully.)
III. Going forward:
The counselors and two security personnel who make up Team Zamzam will be paid their May salaries, which will enable them (and their families) to survive. Their salaries will also be paid for June, even if the siege of El Fasher is not broken (the evidence at this point is strongly that it will be broken).
Once Team Zamzam, or a significant part of it, has reassembled in Zamzam, they will be a critical part of camp reconstruction and re-settlement. This will be an enormous task, and highly demanding of more financial resources. The sheer physical scale of Zamzam and the number of people returning in a relatively short period of time, if they are able, will present daunting challenges. But if the past record of Team Zamzam’s successes is any guide, we can be sure that they will succeed again in some remarkable ways.
Zamzam IDP camp circa 2020
I hope that all who wish to be part of the success of a reconstituted Zamzam camp for displaced persons will give generously to help in this enormous task. We are not powerless to help.
It is now possible to make a tax-deductible contribution to our project, using a portal on the website of a 501/c/3 organization operating in Sudan. Operation Broken Silence, working primarily on health and education issues in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan, has created a special site for tax-deductible contributions to our project, and we hope this makes contributing to the health and well-being of the people of Zamzam easier for donors.
Those wishing to assist in funding the work of Team Zamzam may also send a check directly to Eric (Eric Reeves, 31 Franklin St., Northampton, MA 01060).
OR
Purchase one of his woodturnings: https://www.ericreeves-woodturner.com/collections/all
All proceeds from all woodturning sales go directly to sustaining our work in Zamzam