I offer here a brief overview of the conflict in Sudan and vast humanitarian crisis that has overtaken the country. I focus sharply on the role of the United Arab Emirates in sustaining both—Eric Reeves | January 28, 2025
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Sudan, Genocide, and a Nexus of Evil
Fighting in Sudan has created the world’s largest humanitarian crisis—a crisis that is rapidly getting worse. The political and military situation on the ground is exceedingly complex, and this has perversely limited news coverage of what every day becomes a greater catastrophe of suffering and death. Compounding the problem is Sudan’s vast size, tumultuous recent history, and the absence of a significant international reporting presence on the ground, especially in the ravaged Darfur region. There are notable exceptions, but in the main, Americans, Europeans, Asians, and even Africans remain profoundly ignorant of the most significant causes and consequences—and the actors external to Sudan who are deliberately exacerbating this crisis.
The primary combatants are the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a genocidal militia created by former president Omar al-Bashir in 2013 out of the infamous Janjaweed, who were responsible for the first years of the Darfur genocide, beginning in 2003 and continuing to the present. This large militia force is led by a brutal veteran of that genocide, Hamdan Dagalo, better known as “Hemedti.” On the other side of the conflict is the regular army, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Tragically, as the conflict continues, more and more armed actors are emerging.
Both men joined in an uneasy alliance in the face of a remarkable and enormously popular 2019 civilian uprising in Sudan; and with the power they arrogated to themselves, they easily toppled the titular civilian “prime minister” by military coup in late 2021. This in itself was disastrous for Sudan’s political future, but by April 2023 the two men were fully at odds with one another, each lusting for power and thus control over Sudan’s vast national wealth. An explosive war began in April 2023—first in the capital city of Khartoum, but quickly metastasizing throughout other regions of the country.
Neither side is supported by anything like a majority of Sudanese civilians, and both military leaders are guilty of barbaric atrocity crimes. But on this latter score there is a clear asymmetry: the RSF has been guilty of many more crimes, and indeed its actions were belatedly recognized as genocidal by the Biden administration. Moreover, there is a deep hatred of the RSF by an overwhelming percentage of Sudanese. This should not be surprising since the RSF comprises fighters—overwhelmingly mercenaries—from some of the Arab tribes of Darfur and from countries like Chad, Central African Republic, Niger, Mali, and others. The SAF is truly Sudanese, if far from innocent or committed to civilian governance. But it has nonetheless been greeted rapturously by a number of the areas liberated from RSF control. Forgotten for the moment is the role the SAF and General al-Burhan played in crippling of the opportunity for democratic rule in 2019, even as he has recently proposed “constitutional amendments” that would give him the same tyrannical powers that al-Bashir wielded for 30 years (1989 – 2019).
One might imagine that a large regular army could easily overwhelm even a powerful militia: it has combat aircraft (the RSF does not); it has an officer corps (though one largely purged of non-Islamists by al-Bashir), and hence a chain of command; and it has had much more heavy military ground equipment (tanks, long-range artillery). But the inability of the SAF to overcome the RSF in nearly two years of fighting reflects poor leadership, low morale, and a cowardly willingness to engage only in “stand-off” tactics (artillery and aircraft strikes), even in the densely populated greater Khartoum urban area. Still, the SAF at the moment seems on the verge of taking control of Khartoum, but at horrific cost in lives and physical destruction of one of the great cities in Africa.
The failure of the international community to negotiate an end to the war—or even a cease-fire to allow for humanitarian relief—derives mainly from actions of a single external actor: the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have given a vast amount of assistance to the RSF, and that assistance is now the primary reason the war continues. For a range of ruthlessly self-interested reasons, the Emirates have provided them with a great many weapons, massive quantities of ammunition, logistics, large amounts of cash, even public relations advice and a Star Link phone network. All this has convinced Hemedti and his family that they can somehow wrest control of Sudan from the SAF—without a political platform, or even an ideological commitment (other than a blind hatred of non-Arabs). They fight for wealth and power, long interchangeable commodities in Sudan; they enjoy no support from any but the most opportunistic Sudanese. Indeed, given the international make-up of its militia forces, the RSF is regarded by most as a non-Sudanese entity.
Yet even without any popular support, the RSF is on the verge of capturing the fifth of the five capital cities of the Darfur states: the biggest prize outside Khartoum, El Fasher, capital of North Darfur. And just fifteen kilometers southwest of El Fasher lies Zamzam, the largest camp in all of Darfur for internally displaced persons (IDPs), with a population that has grown to perhaps a million human beings. And it has the grim distinction of being the epicenter of the UN-declared famine that is now spreading rapidly across Sudan, endangering many millions of lives.
And yet extreme malnutrition, which the UN has belatedly determined to be famine, is spreading because insecurity on the ground prevents humanitarian convoys from reaching those most desperately in need—in Darfur and other regions. And that insecurity persists because the unconstrained and brutal violence of the RSF only grows with the aid from the UAE: high-tech artillery, powerful drones, a very large numbers of four-wheel vehicles mounted with machine guns, logistical assistance, and a great deal if cash for mercenary salaries and for bribing border officials in Libya and Chad. For it is through the borders of these two countries with Sudan that the overwhelming amount of UAE military assistance flows, with little if any effort by these two countries to seal the border. There is overwhelming evidence that the UAE has airlifted much of its military assistance to the Amdjerass airport in remote northeastern Chad near the border with Darfur, mendaciously claiming the flights are providing medical assistance.
For all the complexity of the situation on the ground, the logic of the vast humanitarian crisis in Sudan is in the end not so complicated: the Rapid Support Forces become only more brutal because they feel they will continue to be supported by the UAE. Without the security that will come from an end of RSF violence, humanitarian operations cannot begin. Mountains of food, medicine, equipment for water and sanitation—nearly all are bottled up in Port Sudan on the Red Sea (far to the east of Darfur) or in the Chadian border town of Ádre, which lies just across the border from El Geneina, capital of West Darfur. (Here the SAF has controlled entry by virtue of its putative sovereignty, compounding the challenges of humanitarian movement.)
A genocidal assault on the non-Arab Masalit in West Darfur occurred in the early months of the conflict, killing or displacing many tens of thousands. Watching this sobering event across the border in Chad were UN and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations. They saw no reason to believe that the murderous RSF militiamen would respect international humanitarian law. More recently, a signature atrocity occurred on January 24 when the RSF mounted a sophisticated drone attack on the Saudi Teaching Maternal Hospital in El Fasher—the last functioning hospital in the city. More than 70 people in the hospital were killed and dozens wounded. There could not be a more blatant violation of international humanitarian and human rights law. The targeting of the hospital was deliberate (as were previous assaults on medical facilities) and made use of a powerful, sophisticated drone of Chinese manufacture, many of which have been funneled by the UAE to the RSF. The RSF also directs heavy artillery fire directly into Zamzam IDP camp—killing and wounding scores of residents, and terrifying all.
This is what the RSF does; such actions define these brutal génocidaires. Until sufficient pressure is brought to bear on the UAE, holding them accountable for their role in sustaining conflict that has been defined by repeated RSF atrocity crimes, neither peace nor humanitarian aid will come to Sudan. The greatest famine in decades will continue to rage. Millions of Sudanese will be at risk, primarily women and children. If the international community continues in its refusal to pressure the UAE to end their deep complicity in these horrors, that community, too, is complicit in the destruction of Sudan.
The aftermath of RSF shelling of Zamzam IDP camp; artillery fire has become another grim fact of life in Zamzam.
