Biographical Notes on Lt. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, aka Hemeti: Leader of the Rapid Support Forces, Deputy Military Council Leader…Génocidaire in Darfur
Eric Reeves | April 29, 2019 | https://wp.me/p45rOG-2pA
What appears below is not a biography of Lt. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (hereafter referred to by the common nickname “Hemeti,” a name variously transliterated from Arabic, including as “Hemmeti”). Rather it is a collection of highly informed biographical details from two of the most significant reports on the situation in Darfur and the genocidal campaign of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF, al-Quwat al-Da’m al-Sari’ in Arabic) that Hemeti leads; the focus is particularly on the years 2013 – 2016. Additionally, there is a short bibliography of RSF actions in Darfur during these years—a chronicling of the truly staggering ethnic destruction wrought upon non-Arab villages and people in this period.
I post this document because of what one woman in Sudan speaks of as her “terror at the halo that has come to surround Hemeti.” Perhaps not a “halo,” but there is an extraordinarily widespread ignorance of his background, or a willingness to let his record of savagery be a thing of the past. But as Deputy Head of the Military Council (MC), Hemeti is wielding outsize influence on the deliberations between the representatives of the uprising—the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) and the Forces for the Declaration of Freedom and Change (FDFC)—and the MC.
Among the many motives Hemeti has for pushing for a “transitional council” that is dominated by the military is that it protects him from scrutiny and being held accountable for his massive crimes in Darfur, crimes that will certainly result in an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court if Sudan becomes truly free and just, and unburdened by the control of a military junta. Without the protection of the MC, Hemeti is vulnerable in ways he is of course well aware of—and the people of Darfur even more fully aware.
So even in the absence of a full biographical sketch, I think it is important for people to understand more of Hemeti, as revealed in these excerpts from two key reports.
The first report, from Human Rights Watch, looks with great particularity at the actual character and defining events in that have made the Rapid Support Forces a terrible instrument of human destruction, in Darfur but also increasingly in the Kordofans. The man most responsible for the crimes chronicled in the report is of course Hemeti. While not as detailed in giving tribal and historical background as the second set of excerpts, the report is a devastating indictment of Hemeti:
“‘Men With No Mercy’: Rapid Support Forces Attacks Against Civilians in Darfur, Sudan,” Human Rights Watch, September 9, 2015 | https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/09/men-no-mercy/rapid-support-forces-attacks-against-civilians-darfur-sudan
The second set of excerpts offers an extraordinarily detailed and nuanced account of Hemeti’s development as a militia actor on behalf of the al-Bashir regime. The absence of elided connecting material may make the narrative difficult to follow and I encourage a full reading of this remarkable study. It is our most impressive effort to date to make full sense of the myriad militia, tribal, and geographical facts that have created the vast panorama of destruction and displacement in Darfur:
“Remote-Control Breakdown: Sudanese paramilitary forces and pro-government militias,” Small Arms Survey (Switzerland), April 2017 | http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-27-Sudanese-paramilitary-forces.pdf
[1] From “‘Men With No Mercy’: Rapid Support Forces Attacks Against Civilians in Darfur, Sudan,” Human Rights Watch, September 9, 2015
The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), al-Quwat al-Da’m al-Sari’ in Arabic, are a Sudanese government force under the command of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS).24 The RSF was created in mid-2013 specifically to fight against rebel groups throughout Sudan. [All footnotes may be found at | https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/09/men-no-mercy/rapid-support-forces-attacks-against-civilians-darfur-sudan – All highlighting in bold has been added – ER]
Members of the RSF have been issued NISS identity cards.25 These IDs ensure them immunity under the National Security Services Act of 2010.26 In January 2014, a constitutional amendment gave NISS and the RSF “regular force” status.27
The force is commanded on the ground by Brig. Gen. Mohammed Hamdan Dagolo, commonly known as “Hemeti.” Hemeti is a former Border Guard commander and Janjaweed militia leader. He is the nephew of Juma Dongolo, the traditional chief of the Awlad Mansour section of the Mahariya clan of abbala (camel-herding) Riziegat Arabs.28 Hemeti reports to the NISS Maj. Gen. Abbas Abdul-Aziz, who is based in Khartoum.29
Overall command is said to reside with NISS Director General Al al-Nasih-Al-Galla.30 The members of the RSF have been drawn from paramilitary forces, notably the Border Guards, and other government-backed militia groups, including a variety of proxy militias, commonly known as Janjaweed.31 According to several sources, including General Abdul-Aziz, the majority of RSF members are Darfurians recruited by Hemeti.32 Many of the Darfurians come from Hemeti’s clan and other clans within the abbala Riziegat; however, they also come from other ethnic groups in Darfur. Ethnic Nuba have also reportedly been recruited into the RSF. Civilians who have heard members of the RSF speaking claim that some of the fighters speak foreign dialects of Arabic, which they believe to be Chadian and Nigerien.33
The RSF is reported to be better equipped than other paramilitary and militia groups in Sudan. At the time of their arrival in Darfur in February 2014, the RSF was reported to consist of 5,000 to 6,000 troops with 600 to 750 vehicles.34 However, this number is widely believed to have grown during the past year.
Attacks in South Darfur: February 27 to early March 2014
Between February 11 and 19, 2014, several thousand RSF troops under the command of General Hemeti arrived in East Darfur from North Kordofan.52 During the following week they deployed in different locations in the area south of the railway that runs between Nyala, the capital of South Darfur State, and Ed Daein, the capital of East Darfur State.
Beginning on February 27, the RSF, often with Sudanese air support, attacked and burned a large number of undefended villages throughout South Darfur. The RSF attacked the towns Hijer Tunjo, Um Gunya, Marla, Thani Deleba, Tukumari, Himeda, Barkatulie, Afouna, Donkey Dereisa, and Sani Deleba. Several of these towns were attacked multiple times.
They also attacked and burned scores of villages or hamlets on the outskirts of these towns.53
Most of these attacks took place within a 48-hour period beginning on February 27. However, some RSF soldiers remained in the area for at least two more days, perhaps as long as one week, during which time they burned towns and villages, including several of those attacked during the initial 48 hours. According to the UN Panel, “Analysis of the [RSF’s] operation in South Darfur suggests that they were initially deployed in four major axes: (a) Nyala-Um Gun[ya]; (b) G[e]r[e]ida-Buram; (c) Labado-Muhajeria; and (d) Menawashie-Nitega.”54
Witness accounts gathered by Human Rights Watch also suggest that the force was divided into several different sub-groups as numerous villages were reportedly attacked simultaneously on February 27 and 28. OCHA found that 68,211 people were displaced from their homes as a result of the violence during the last two days of February and the first week of March.55 The vast majority of the individuals displaced fled either to IDP camps around Nyala or to the government- controlled town of Sani Deleba in South Darfur.
Human Rights Watch interviewed 28 victims and witnesses who had fled their homes in South Darfur because of RSF-led attacks. Nearly all had lost all of their belongings. Most had either witnessed or been informed of the complete destruction of their homes. Many had experienced severe physical violence. Almost all could identify multiple civilians from their villages who had been killed during the attacks. Several people told Human Rights Watch that RSF personnel or members of other government forces fighting alongside the RSF perpetrated rape and other acts of sexual violence.
Even before the RSF attacked, witnesses said that some villages were first bombed by Sudanese military Antonov aircraft.56 Those places attacked were primarily villages where there was very little to no permanent government presence. Many had previously been controlled or contested by the SLA/MM; however, the degree of control and the extent of the presence varied considerably.
During the days prior to the RSF attacks, there was still an SLA/MM presence in some areas, including in the areas around Um Gunya and Hijer Tunjo. According to UNAMID reports and journalist accounts, between February 19 and February 27, RSF contingents engaged in firefights with the SLA/MM and other rebel groups.57
Several witnesses told Human Rights Watch that SLA/MM forces disappeared from their towns and villages the day before the attack.58 Others said that rebels were either never present in their specific villages or had left days or weeks before the attacks took place.59 One former RSF soldier who participated in the attack on the town of Um Gunya in South Darfur conceded to Human Rights Watch that there were no rebels in the town when it was attacked.60
Attacks near Marla
On the afternoon of February 26, 2014, Khamis, a 35-year-old farmer from Marla, a village immediately south of the railway on the border between East Darfur and South Darfur, was visiting the neighboring town of Tortahan. While in Tortahan, Khamis saw General Hemeti eating at a restaurant in the center of town accompanied by several other military commanders.61 “I recognized [the commanders] because we grew up together,” he said. At the time Khamis saw the commanders he did not believe that his village was in danger of being attacked; he assumed that the commanders were searching for rebels, who had not passed through Marla for several weeks. Khamis returned to Marla that afternoon.
The next day at about 9 a.m., aerial bombs struck the well outside of Marla, which provides water for the entire village. Immediately after, a large military force attacked the town. Khamis said that the force included tanks, large numbers of “technical” (improvised fighting vehicles that in Darfur are normally a modified Toyota Hilux), and hundreds of soldiers, many of whom were on camels and horseback.62 Khamis was in the market when the attack began; his wife, Nadia, was at home with some of their children. They all ran for their lives. “When I heard the attack I took my children and started running without shoes,” said Nadia. “We left everything.” Three of their children were injured during the attack.63
Khamis returned to the village that evening, after the RSF had left, and found that his house had been burned to the ground and his livestock and food stores had all been stolen. He also saw eight bodies of men from Marla whom he knew personally. He provided the names of the dead to Human Rights Watch. According to Khamis and Nadia, on the same day that Marla was attacked, more than two dozen villages and hamlets in the surrounding area were also burned.64
Khamis, Nadia, and their children walked for seven days until they reached Al-Salam IDP camp on the outskirts of Nyala. “When we got to the entrance to [Al-Salam] camp, government soldiers stopped us and confiscated our phones and everything else we had left. Some people [who arrived at the camp] were stripped naked [by the soldiers].” Several days later, Khamis and his brother, who had also been displaced by the attack, went to the market in Nyala. In the market his brother recognized some of his animals that had been stolen in Marla, recognizable by the unique branding he had given them, up for sale. Khamis and his brother reported this to the Nyala police, who said they could do nothing.
Attacks near Hijer Tunjo
The RSF attacked the town of Hijer Tunjo on February 27.65 Several witnesses told Human Rights Watch that the ground attack began at about 10 or 11 a.m. Prior to the attack planes bombed near the south of the town.66
Hundreds of vehicles took part in the attack.67 Idriss, a traditional leader and teacher from Hijer Tunjo, was just outside the town early in the morning when he heard gunfire, on the way toward his school. He told Human Rights Watch: “When I reached the water point, about 200 meters north of the school, I saw about six men…All of them had been forced to lie down on the ground and then they had been shot in their head.” Armed soldiers then saw him and surrounded him. One of them appeared to be about to shoot him when he heard an officer tell the soldier not to. The officer instructed the soldier to search Idriss, take everything, and let him go. 68 Idriss provided Human Rights Watch with the names of the six men shot, along with the names of two women who were abducted, and the names of 10 villages and hamlets around Hijer Tunjo that the soldiers torched.69
Hamid, 35, said he immediately fled Hijer Tunjo when the attack started. He said he saw 10 bodies of local residents, six of whose names he provided to Human Rights Watch. Outside Hijer Tunjo, in an area between Marla and Nyala, Hamid saw a group of about 40 women with children accompanied by an elderly man also trying to flee. He said soldiers on land cruisers stopped the group and abused many of the women: “The armed men forced all the women to lie down on the ground… They beat them with sticks. Then they selected about 10 women and forced them to leave their babies with the old man. Then they took them to the bush for more than an hour. Something very bad happened to these women.”70
Mamdoun, a 54-year-old trader from the village of Um Daraba, near Hijer Tunjo, told Human Rights Watch that most village residents fled at about 7 a.m. after they witnessed an Antonov aircraft circling above the town. A few hours later the plane dropped approximately a dozen bombs in and around the village. Mamdoun said that SLA/MM fighters used to visit the village, but had not done so for several weeks.
Most villagers fled to the nearby Wadi, Wadi Hijer. Mamdoun said that after the bombing stopped, at about noon, he saw a huge dust cloud approaching and then “a hundred vehicles” and large numbers of men riding camels and horses:
I had put everything on our horse and carriage and taken it to the Wadi. … Then [the soldiers] came [to the Wadi]. They asked us where [the rebels] were. We said nothing. … They beat me with a stick. … Then they stole everything, even our water. … They went into the town and started looting and burning everything. … [After the soldiers left] we put the small children on top of [the few remaining donkeys] and walked for two days to Al-Salam [IDP] camp.71
According to Mamdoun, during the three days following the attack on Um Daraba, numerous villages and hamlets in the surrounding area were destroyed by government forces.72
Abdelbagy, a 43-year-old herder from Um Daraba, had been warned by neighbors that a military force was coming to the area. He said he had not been worried because he was a civilian, so he decided to remain with his animals outside the village. When the RSF arrived they took him into custody with several other herders and brought them to a commander. He said the soldiers severely beat them and killed two of the men:
They asked us where the rebels were. We said we didn’t know. … [I saw two men get] killed. They were shot by small boys. They [were shot while] sitting down. … After we were released we met up with other people who were fleeing the attack. … Then another group of RSF came and attacked us again. … They told us to lie down. Then they took one woman and raped her.73
Khalil, a 55-year-old farmer from the town of Hiraiga, told Human Rights Watch that he saw General Hemeti sitting inside a technical as the RSF entered the village. He fled the town during the attack but returned at night after the attackers had left to bury a 60-year-old man who had reportedly been shot by the RSF for refusing to give them his animals. Khalil gave Human Rights Watch the names of seven women who were raped either in Hiraiga or in the neighboring town of Afouna, which was also attacked on the same day.74
[2] From “Remote-Control Breakdown: Sudanese paramilitary forces and pro-government militias”:
While the creation of the RSF was largely a continuation of the government’s traditional militia strategy, the force first fell under NISS control, giving the security organ its own paramilitary force.23 [All footnotes may be found at | http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/issue-briefs/HSBA-IB-27-Sudanese-paramilitary-forces.pdf – All highlighting in bold has been added – ER]
The RSF was initially under the command of NISS major general Abbas Abdelaziz, with former Border Guards commander Hemmeti as operations commander. The latter appears to have gradually become more prominent, with some saying that the two men have authority over different parts of the force.24
Born around 1973, Hemmeti is the nephew of Juma’ Dagolo, the chief of an Awlad Mansour Mahariya Rizeigat community that was originally from Chad. He moved to North Darfur before settling in South Darfur in 1987.25 In 2003 he was appointed amir (war chief without a specific rank) of the Border Guards, then in 2008, after a six-month rebellion, security adviser to South Darfur’s governor.26 When the RSF was formed, Hemmeti was appointed a brigadier general, and several Rizeigat kinsmen, reputedly with closer links to him than to his rival, Musa Hilal, were given government posts.27
In April 2016 a presidential decree reportedly placed the RSF directly under the presidency’s control.28 In January 2017, with SAF support but against Hemmeti’s wishes, the Sudanese Parliament tried to pass an ‘RSF Act’ putting the RSF under SAF control. The proposed law was reportedly worded so that the RSF was ambiguously labelled an ‘autonomous’ force under the control of both SAF and the ‘supreme commander’ of the armed forces, that is, the president himself. Some members of Parliament (MPs) and SAF officers criticized this ‘ambiguity’, but Hemmeti welcomed the continuing ‘autonomy’ of the force.29 In the future, with the presidency becoming increasingly worried about losing control over key forces, the RSF may turn into a praetorian guard, protecting the president from a possible SAF coup and constituting a third pillar of military power distinct from both SAF and the NISS.30
Since 2013 army officials had warned that the RSF, like other paramilitary forces in the past, may turn against Khartoum. In a June 2015 parliamentary debate SAF general Adam Hamid Musa, although once considered a supporter of the militia strategy in Darfur, reportedly stated that ‘the use of militias comes at a high cost’.31 Another MP warned that Arab tribes in Darfur and Kordofan were better armed than state forces.32 The UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan found that 15 per cent of militia attacks in Darfur in 2015 targeted the government (UNSC, 2016, p. 13). By mid-2016 SAF forces operating in Jebel Marra with the RSF reportedly asked for the latter’s removal, accusing its members of committing abuses against civilians.33 In November 2016 RSF and SAF elements reportedly fought each other south of Khartoum.34 Also, the army was said to be reluctant to be deployed in Yemen as part of the Saudi-led ‘Islamic military alliance to fight terrorism’ (of which Sudan is a member) because this would imply abandoning some war theatres to the RSF. By early 2017 several thousand RSF troops had reportedly been sent to Yemen.35
Despite the warnings and abuses, it seems that Khartoum will continue to integrate former militias or recruit civilians into the RSF in various parts of Sudan, while expanding RSF operations to all conflict areas. The fact that Khartoum has been unusually aggressive towards those criticizing the new force encourages existing paramilitary forces to demand to be integrated into it.
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Since 2005 Hilal has gradually been distancing himself from Khartoum, and his troops have occasionally turned against SAF forces and rival militias.46 The government has reacted by sup- porting both splinter and rival group leaders, mainly Hemmeti, and offering Hilal various positions, including as a federal government adviser and an MP in Khartoum. Since 2014 Hilal has reportedly asked for Rizeigat men who were loyal to him to be integrated into the regular armed forces and the RSF, with limited success. In January 2015 the Sudanese government reportedly promised Hilal the rank of SAF major general and a large sum of money in exchange for recruiting some 10,000 Mahamid men, possibly as RSF forces.47 It is unclear whether this happened. By late 2016, despite continuous attempts at rapprochement, Hilal’s relations with Khartoum seemed to remain distrustful.48
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In North Darfur Hemmeti’s RSF encountered opposition notably from Hilal, but also from Hemmeti’s own Mahariya Rizeigat paramount chief nazir Mohammedein ad-Dud, who was reportedly arrested for a month in early 2017 after rejecting an offer of integrating 2,000 youths into the RSF. This conflict goes back to the 1980s, when Hemmeti’s Awlad Mansour clan migrated from North to South Darfur to escape Mohammedein’s leadership.52
In North Darfur Hemmeti’s RSF encountered opposition notably from Hilal, but also from Hemmeti’s own Mahariya Rizeigat paramount chief nazir Mohammedein ad-Dud, who was reportedly arrested for a month in early 2017 after rejecting an offer of integrating 2,000 youths into the RSF. This conflict goes back to the 1980s, when Hemmeti’s Awlad Mansour clan migrated from North to South Darfur to escape Mohammedein’s leadership.52
West Darfur
West Darfur militias have repeatedly intervened in North Darfur, either in tribal wars (such as the Rizeigat–Beni Hussein conflict in 2013), or on behalf of the government. By mid-2016 the RSF were said to be recruiting men in Al Geneina to fight the SLA-AW in Jebel Marra.56
South Darfur
In South Darfur the main paramilitary force currently appears to be the RSF’s first batch of recruits under Hemmeti. He reportedly controls at least 6,000 men who were recruited among Awlad Mansour and other Mahariya clans, as well as some Mahamid (in particular Awlad Zeid under a former Chadian rebel commander), Eregat, Awlad Rashid, other Arabs, and a growing number of non-Arabs such as Bergid and Tama.57
The RSF was created at the time when Arab militias and NISS forces were fighting in the centre of Nyala in mid-2013, after disputes related to the sharing of spoils from the war economy and the killing by NISS forces of Awlad Zeid militia leader Abdallah Sharara ‘Dakrom’.58 Initially it seems that Hemmeti and his forces were chosen as the RSF’s first recruits because they were the most loyal among the Darfur militias and had not joined the fighting in Nyala. Indeed, they seem to have remained more loyal to the government than many other paramilitary forces. Yet the government’s initial aim was to reassert control over this group, including by retraining its members and deploying them out- side their home areas. Since early 2014 the RSF has been operating in South Darfur, where it defeated a JEM column entering the state from South Sudan in April 2015.59
East Darfur
The new state of East Darfur is largely controlled by local baggara Rizeigat PDF, Border Guards, and the addition, another newer Rizeigat paramilitary force under former SLA-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) rebel Ali Rizeigallah ‘Savannah’ has been particularly active since 2013. Since then, Rizeigat militias have resumed their conflict with the Ma’aliya tribe, which has similarly mobilized its PDF against the Rizeigat. The third main community in the state, the non-Arab Bergid, also has PDF forces under former SLA commander Ibrahim Suleiman ‘Abu Dur’ and its tribal nazir, Musa Jalis. These forces have close links to the non-Arab militias of Osman Kibir in neighbouring North Darfur. Since 2013 East Darfur militias have largely been engaged in inter-tribal conflict and have not been under government control.
In April 2016 Savannah’s forces were ambushed by rival militias, which allegedly included Hemmeti’s Mahariya tribe.60 In retaliation, Savannah’s forces ransacked the house of East Darfur governor Anna’as Omar, who is a NISS colonel, killing two NISS agents. This incident is said to have increased tensions both between the Mahamid and Mahariya and, more generally, between militias and NISS forces in East Darfur.61
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South and West Kordofan
Paramilitary forces in South and West Kordofan have mostly been remobilized since 2011, when the war resumed. These forces appear to fall mostly under the PDF banner and largely recruit among local Arab pastoralists. By 2012 numbers for paramilitary forces in what was then South Kordofan (including what is now West Kordofan) ranged between 20,000 and 40,000, constituting roughly half of the SAF troops deployed in the state.63
There appears to be separate tribal PDF units for the two mains sections of the Missiriya (the Humur and Zurug, with some Humur sections also reportedly more autonomous than others) and for Hawazma sections. In West Kordofan the PDF coordinator (who recruits mostly among the Missiriya) is currently reported to be Issa Abdelmula from the Missiriya Ajayra Awlad Kamil. Another key figure responsible for the mobilization of irregular forces is the state’s security committee chairperson, Ali Ismail Hamoda, who is a Missiriya Falayta. Native administrators and politicians from the Missiriya and Hawazma tribes reportedly play a key role in mobilization at both the local and the national levels, as do SAF and military intelligence officers. Nuba paramilitary forces are also present, including an estimated 1,000 men under Nuba leader Kafi Tayara. Initially PDF, they are now said to be part of the RSF.64
Similar trends to those recently observed in Darfur have been reported in South and West Kordofan, including an upgrading of some PDF to RSF. In addition to the Darfur Rizeigat RSF who fought in South Kordofan in 2013–14, local RSF fighters have been recruited since 2014. An initial group of Missiriya, Nuba, and Darfur fighters was reportedly equipped with 60 vehicles under the command of former PDF leader at-Taj at-Tijani from the Missiriya Ajayra Awlad Kamil. This group falls under the joint command of the NISS, Hemmeti, and the West Kordofan state government.
With some groups reassigned to the RSF, other PDF fighters may simply demobilize. Missiriya PDF fighters in particular have long complained of unpaid salaries and lack of compensation for their ‘martyrs’. Some are increasingly refusing to mobilize and have even joined JEM and the SPLM-North (SPLM-N), as well as engaging in inter-tribal fighting. This has particularly been the case since 2013 as part of an underreported but vicious land dispute between the Awlad Umran and Zioud sections of the Missiriya. This dispute mirrors similar intra-Arab conflicts in Darfur and has triggered similar accusations against Khartoum of fuelling the conflict.
Relations between the Missiriya and Khartoum have also suffered due to abuses against Missiriya civilians perpetrated by Hemmeti’s Rizeigat troops in the Kharasana area of West Kordofan in January 2014, in addition to clashes between Rizeigat RSF and Missiriya PDF during the same period. As a result, key Missiriya militia mobilizers and leaders, such as Issa al-Bashari, now seem less active. Many other longstanding Missiriya PDF leaders seem to have been rewarded with positions in the local administration and are currently less directly involved in mobilization. Once a key mobilizer, former SAF major general, Keilak commissioner, and chairperson of the South Kordofan security committee Bandar Ibrahim Abu-al-Balul (of the Missiriya Falayta) even joined JEM in 2014 in protest against RSF abuses against Missiriya civilians. In sharp contrast with the growing Rizeigat representation in the government since the 2015 general elections, the Missiriya seem to be losing influence.
Khartoum-backed Nuer militias have been hosted in South and West Kordofan for a long time and are active against both South Sudan and the SPLM-N in the Nuba Mountains. Some of these militias are said to have been reactivated since 2013 after the start of the new civil war in South Sudan, and have been partly integrated into the SPLM in Opposition (SPLM-IO).6
Sudanese militias in the wider region
Sudanese militias, in particular those operating in Darfur, have always had international or cross-border dimensions. When the war in Darfur began in 2003 the first janjawid came from among Chadian Arabs and some non- Arab groups (Tama), including former Chadian rebels, who had fled wars and drought in Chad, and had arrived in Darfur between the 1960s and 1980s.
All of the significant Darfur Arab leaders, such as Musa Hilal, Hemmeti, and many West Darfur amirs, have roots among Chadian Arabs.106
These cross-border dynamics were a major factor in the violence that dis- placed some 200,000 non-Arab Chadian civilians in Dar Sila, southeast Chad, between 2003 and 2008.107 During this period many Dar Sila Arabs also fled, but to Darfur. They were welcomed by kinsmen who had arrived before them, some of whom had become powerful traditional chiefs and militia leaders in Darfur, often with the title of amir. These kinsmen offered Chadian Arabs access to Sudanese citizenship, land abandoned by displaced non-Arabs, and sometimes to similar positions, often in return for joining or recruiting for militias. In addition, from 2004 onwards some Chadian Arab and non-Arab youths—including both early arrivals and latecomers in Darfur—in addition to Sudanese janjawid joined newly formed Chadian rebel groups.108 Some of the Chadian rebel incursions from Darfur into Chad were accompanied by raids by Sudanese janjawid.
These cross-border dynamics are still important. Since 2003, conflicts between Masalit farmers and Arab pastoralists in West Darfur have regularly spread into the part of Chad immediately bordering Sudan. Chadian authorities have complained of incursions by RSF or other Sudanese militias.110 More recently, in particular since 2014, hundreds of Arab youths from Dar Sila have reportedly crossed the border into Darfur in order to join Sudanese militias, usually the RSF fighting in Jebel Marra. This is negatively impacting community relations in Dar Sila, where many non-Arabs believe that the janjawid still pose a threat.
| Box 2 The European Union and the RSF |
| By mid-2016, when the rainy season was limiting government operations against insurgents in Darfur and the Two Areas, Khartoum announced a unilateral truce. It then redeployed 400 RSF vehicles under Hemmeti’s command, as well as Border Guards, to Daba, south of Dongola, in Northern State. From there these forces made incursions westward toward the Libyan border and allegedly arrested more than 1,500 ‘illegal migrants’ (including Eritrean and Sudanese nationals) and ‘human traffickers’.121
This coincided with a European Union (EU) grant of EUR 45 million (USD 51 million) to Sudan as part of the EU’s ‘Khartoum Process’,122 which is designed to stop the movement of migrants from the Horn of Africa to Europe. Even if the funds were not given directly to the RSF, Hemmeti publicly presented himself as an enforcer of EU policy against human trafficking, and provocatively threatened to open the Sudanese–Libyan border if the EU did not sufficiently reward him for his efforts.123 It is clear that Khartoum is attempting to benefit from the EU’s strategy of preventing migrants fromreaching the Mediterranean coast, in order to improve Sudan’s relations with Europe. But the government is also placing the EU in the problematic position of being seen to legitimize a paramilitary force, namely the RSF, that is known for committing serious human rights violations. Meanwhile, the real objective behind the RSF deployment at the Libyan border remains unclear. It may be to fight SLA-MM rebels operating in the area and reportedly to receive money from migrants or various smugglers, as Hemmeti himself has alleged, rather than to stop the flow of migrants.124 |
Additional bibliography of violence in Darfur at the hands of the Rapid Support Forces:
[3] “Scorched Earth, Poisoned Air: Sudanese Government Forces Ravage Jebel Marra, Darfur,” Amnesty International,” September 2016 | https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/jebel_marra_report_c2.pdf
Like the two other reports cited here, the Amnesty International report on the ghastly 2016 Jebel Marra offensive, conducted primarily by Hemeti’s Rapid Support Forces, reveals actions that rise to the level of genocide: the deliberate ethnic targeting of the non-Arab tribal groups of the Jebel Marra area in central Darfur, primarily the Fur. The use of chemical weapons against civilians is authoritatively established, with massive photographic evidence of this barbaric tactic of human destruction.
[4] “‘Changing the Demography’: Violent Expropriation and Destruction of Farmlands in Darfur, November 2014 – November 2015,” Eric Reeves, author | Maya Baca, research and editing, December 1, 2015
[5] “Continuing Mass Rape of Girls in Darfur: The most heinous crime generates no international outrage,” Eric Reeves, author | Maya Baca, research and editing, January 2016
[Arabic translation of original report | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Rr ]
I wrote the two monographs noted above in order to provide as full an archival account as possible for a two-year period in which the Rapid Support Forces engaged in massive village and civilian destruction. Both contain data spreadsheets noting incidents (almost 1,000 altogether) of ethnically-targeted violence, including murder, rape, torture, violent displacement and land expropriation, and village destruction. They give a statistical sense of the scope of RSF violence for which Hemeti is largely—in some cases exclusively—responsible.