Analysis of the Minutes of Meeting of Senior NCP Officials (November 18, 2018): Part II, the imminent threat of renewed war in South Kordofan
Eric Reeves | December 3, 2018 | https://wp.me/p45rOG-2k2
The minutes of the November 18, 2018 meeting of senior officials of the National Congress Party (formerly the National Islamic Front) are tremendously revealing on a number of issues, particularly those concerning the NCP effort to settle the rebellion in the “Two Areas” (South Kordofan and Blue Nile). The focus is frequently on Abdel Aziz al-Hilu (he is referred to simply as Alhilu in the minutes), leader of the South Kordofan Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement-North (SPLA/M-N). Malik Agar, SPLA/M-N leader in Blue Nile, is regarded as much more pliant and responsive to Khartoum’s demands.
Notably, the SPLA-N in South Kordofan is much stronger militarily than its counterpart in Blue Nile. Prior to the current cease-fire, Abdel Aziz al-Hilu—a brilliant military strategist and tactician—had repeatedly defeated regular Sudan Armed Forces and its militia allies, sometimes smashingly and acquiring large quantities of abandoned supplies, including heavy weaponry and ammunition. But resistance during the last dry (fighting) season was severely tested, even as Khartoum continues to spend inordinate amounts of Sudan’s national budget on the military and security services—including now the officially incorporated Rapid Response Forces militia. Ominously, there are repeated references to the “end of this year” as marking the point at which Khartoum is prepared to resume military actions against the SPLA/M-N in South Kordofan.
This gives particular urgency to the need to make clear the implications of these extraordinary leaked minutes.
Accompanying these threats at various points are poisonous, racist, and typically dishonest depictions of Abdel Aziz Al-Hilu. Here it is important to recall that in the 1990s the Khartoum regime sought to annihilate the Nuba people, an effort unanimously characterized as genocide by researchers and analysts. Abdel Aziz succeeded the revered Yusef Kuwa, who confronted the threat of annihilation in the darkest hours of the genocide, and hand-picked Abdel Aziz as his successor. This tells us a great deal about Abdel Aziz’s stature among the Nuba people.
The conduct of war in South Kordofan since June 2011 has been similarly genocidal in character, although the military capacity of the SPLA-N in South Kordofan to defend what remains of the Nuba Mountains area after Khartoum’s massive land expropriations of the 1990s has been formidable. It is also of note that in the 2011 election for the position of governor of South Kordofan, the regime was obliged to engineer the electoral defeat of Abdel Aziz, who would clearly have won in a fair election. Khartoum’s candidate in the election was Ahmed Haroun, a man who participated enthusiastically in the Darfur genocide and has been indicted by the International Criminal Court for massive crimes against humanity.
Throughout the minutes, one inevitably senses a deep frustration on the part of the regime in its inability to defeat the forces of Abdel Aziz militarily, an inability that results in a peculiar demonization. It should not be surprising that if the regime should re-initiate hostilities, Nuba civilians will be the primary targets, as they have been during the past seven years—living under Khartoum’s humanitarian blockade and a relentless and indiscriminate campaign of aerial assault, currently suspended but certain to resume if war breaks out again.
[Note, November 29, 2019: Sudanese lawyer Abdelrahman Al Gasim, who received the 2018 ABA International Human Rights Award, has in a communication to me described the English translation of the Arabic original of the minutes as “excellent” and in way that gave no hint of doubt about the authenticity of the minutes. Indeed, he also indicated that Darfuri groups in the diaspora are convinced of the authenticity of the minutes on the basis of their knowledge of how various offices in the Khartoum regime have been infiltrated by opposition personnel.
Undoubtedly there will be some—especially in Khartoum, the AU, and among the SPLA/M-N who are part of the “Blue Nile faction”—who will question the authenticity of the minutes. But since the minutes correspond so closely to what is known of the attitudes and behavior of the NCP regime, the burden of proving the minutes are somehow fake is on those who claim as much. I would say on a personal note that my two extremely knowledgeable and trustworthy sources for these leaked minutes would never knowingly pass to me fake documents, knowing that this would have a severely negative effect on my credibility as an analyst and commentator.]
[Note, December 3, 2018: I have continued to seek confirmation of the authenticity of the leaked minutes. While no evidence can be dispositive one way or another on the question of authenticity, regional intelligence officials and others have provided what I consider substantial, if necessarily confidential, confirmation of the authenticity of the minutes. (See also Open Democracy UK’s characterization of the minutes | https://www.opendemocracy.net/rebecca-tinsley/from-saudi-to-cameroon-do-uk-business-links-really-open-channels-to-raise-human-righ).
I have to date received no credible evidence that the minutes are not authentic.]
From the minutes of the November 18, 2018 meeting of senior officials of the National Congress Party (my own interpolated comments are all in bold blue italics followed by my initials, ER):
Attendants:
• Field Marshal Omer Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir –The President of the Republic and Chairman of National Congress
• Dr. Faisal Hassan Ibrahim – Deputy Chairman of the National Congress, Assistant to the President of the Republic and the Chief Negotiator
• Lt-Gen. Kamal Abdalmaruf Almahi – Chief of General Staff
• Dr. Abdalrahman Ahmed al-Khidir – Chairman of the Political Sector
• Lt-Gen. (PSC) Salah Abdalla – Director General of the National Intelligence Security and Service
• Prof. Ibrahim Ahmed Omer – Speaker of the National Assembly
• Engineer Tarig Hamza Zeinalaabdiin – Director of Popular Security, Executive Director of Sudatel Companies Group
• Omar Al-Bashir (Field Marshal, President of the Republic, and Chairman of National Congress):
“For Alhilu’s Nuba followers we have only guns, bullets and the air they breathe.”
[This statement is clear in implication, although the phrase “the air they breathe,” is not immediately intelligible. We should remember the title of Amnesty International’s documentation of Khartoum’s use of chemical weapons in the 2016 Jebel Marra offensive:
“Scorched Earth, Poisoned Air: Sudanese Government Forces Ravage Jebel Marra, Darfur,” 29 September 2016, Index number: AFR 54/4877/2016
“The hills where they [the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement-North, SPLA/M-N) stay will become tighter than the eye of a needle.”
[The implied use of military force is clear—ER]
“We negotiated with the SPLA in the Two Areas so that they surrender their weapons and we reclaim our land and stop foreign missionaries.”
[Without security guarantees and guarantors—of the sort that were contained in neither of the Darfur “peace agreements”—the SPLA/M-N will not surrender their weapons.
The phrase “foreign missionaries is consistent with various paranoid pronouncements in the minutes about how the SPLA/M-N has survived militarily during seven years of fighting—ER]
“The remaining period is very short and we are determined to attain peace by the end of this year…”
[This is an ominously short time-frame for a non-military resolution of outstanding issues in South Kordofan—ER]
… and it is imperative that we put an end to Alhilu’s and Ammar Amoun’s games in the name of the Nuba people. We will not allow Alhilu and Ammar Amoun to achieve any political victory and they are rejected even by the Nuba.”
[This runs directly counter to my own experience in the Nuba Mountains and the views of all Nuba in the diaspora that I know—ER]
“Our first priority is to disband the SPLA in South Kordofan and this requires political and diplomatic measures with the countries and organisations that support them. We will tempt and deceive them with false peace.”
[It is difficult not to see that negotiations are in Khartoum’s eyes simply a deceitful way of defeating the SPLA/M-N in ways that have been unattainable by fighting—ER]
“The meeting with Alhilu gave us true indication about the threats against the strategic interests of Sudan government currently and in the future and this will help us to build our plans and strategies. It has to be clear that we are determined to achieve peace in the two areas [South Kordofan and Blue Nile] and Darfur once and for all, before the end of this year no matter what.”
[The timeline of year’s end is again made explicit, with the clear implication that if Khartoum has not achieved what it wants, it will resume war in South Kordofan in an attempt to defeat Abdel Aziz’s forces—ER]
• Dr. Faisal Hassan Ibrahim (Deputy Chairman of the National Congress, Assistant to the President of the Republic and the Chief Negotiator):
“The next round of negotiation will be the last for all armed movements and if it fails we will explore other options to deter the rebels.”
[The minutes as a whole make clear that the “other options” are military in nature—ER]
• Dr. Abdurahman Ahmed al-Khidir (Chairman of the Political Sector):
“We should concentrate on the Nuba Mountains: if the SPLM-N in the Nuba Mountains is dispersed, then Blue Nile will automatically disperse. To this end, we charged Brig-Gen Mohamed Yunis Babikir and Brig-Gen Steven Misa to buy leaders within the negotiation team.”
[As a military assessment, the claim that if the Nuba Mountains are militarily controlled then Blue Nile will be as well is almost certainly true.
The conviction that any and all opponent can be “bought” is the focus of my first analysis of these minutes | http://sudanreeves.org/2018/11/29/8917/ —ER]
• Lt-Gen. Salah Abdalla (Director General of the National Intelligence Security and Service:
“Intelligence, the collection of information and the war against the SPLA-N are going on as planned.”
[There is some ambiguity in the phrasing here, but what is clear is that military intelligence and preparations for resumed war in South Kordofan are proceeding “as planned”—ER]
“The question whether Alhilu will go to war and escape peace remains to be seen in the near future, despite the information we have obtained. Our attempts in western jabels (mountains) will defeat all Alhilu and Ammar’s dreams if we succeed.”
[The “question” as Khartoum frames it is whether Abdel Aziz will capitulate in negotiations, or create the pretext for resumed military hostilities by the regime—and in the near future—ER]
“No self-determination, transitional period, or referendum [will be offered in negotiations]; and any peace agreement must be considered final if it ends the existence of SPLA-N army in the Two Areas.”
[Coming from the unspeakably brutal Salah Gosh, this suggests that resumed conflict will be a war of annihilation—ER]
• Lt-Gen. Kamal Abdalmarouf (Chief of General Staff):
“The SAF will support the SPLA persons of western jabels (mountains) with armament, ammunition and information in any military operation they intend to carry against Alhilu and his supporters.”
[This statement is confusing but may be suggesting that SPLA defectors will be assisted by Khartoum in the western jebels (mountains) of South Kordofan—ER]
from the “Recommendations and resolutions”:
“The presence of SPLA-N in the Two Areas constitutes a threat to the national security and the SAF is mandated according to the constitution to take the necessary measures in order to remove this threat.”
[This is the justification that will be offered if hostilities do indeed resume—ER]
“No extension of cease-fire at the end of the year, unless a permanent cease-fire and security arrangements are signed.”
[Yet again, the ominous suggestion that violence may resume in South Kordofan within the month—ER]
“The end of this year is the last chance for settlement through negotiation.”
[Khartoum’s alternative to “negotiation,” repeatedly defined by deceit and bribery, is war—ER]
“Show the interest of the Government of Sudan to negotiate with Alhilu’s group to give them false feeling of importance in order to entice them.”
[The language of deceit is unrelenting—ER]
REGIME ATTITUDES TOWARDS ABDEL AZIZ AL-HILU AS LEADER OF THE SOUTH KORDOFAN SPLA/M-N
• Al-Bashir:
“I saw Alhilu during swearing-in ceremony as deputy governor for south Kordofan and I did not like him. I wish we had captured him with Bolad. We also tried to capture him in Eastern Sudan and eventually he fled Kadugli but sooner or later, we will get him.”
• Dr. Faisal Hassan Ibrahim:
“It is the psychological factor that controls Alhilu, Ammar Amoun, Kuku Jagdul and Abdalla Ibrahim Abass—obscure and insignificant individuals with no political or educational accomplishments.”
“Alhilu and Ammar Amoun deliberately avoided talking to us and it looks like they are suffering from psychological complexes and deep hatred towards the NCP.”
[It is bizarre to see the claim that hatred of the NIF/NCP regime means an individual is suffering from “psychological complexes”!—ER]
“You may have read Alhilu’s paper that discussed issues like the constitution, identity and slavery, even Mbeki got very angry and gave them a lesson on references of the negotiation.”
[Although there is a terrible history of enslavement in South Kordofan and elsewhere in Sudan, especially what is now South Sudan, Khartoum thinks this is irrelevant to present political views—and if the regime is to be believed, so does the corrupt head of the AUHIP, Thabo Mbeki—ER]
“Alhilu’s delegation is filled with racism and hatred for the leaders of NCP and the Islamic Movement.”
“Alhilu is known for his hostility to the Islamists due to his communist background. He caused war in Darfur with Bolad…
[History as only this regime knows how to fabricate it—ER]
…and ignited the second war [in the Nuba Mountains];
[Khartoum initiated the second conflict in the Nuba Mountains in June 2011; the first conflict, particularly the genocidal phase that began in the early 1990s, was based in part on a regime-designed “fatwa”—ER]
and he was the one who obliged Malik and pressurised him to go to war.”
[Former Blue Nile Governor Malik Agar has a very different posture toward the regime, and this has created a deep split within the SPLA/M-N—ER]
• Engineer Tarig Hamza:
“Alhilu and his group cannot be trusted and they rebelled against peace when they were defeated in the election. There are hidden agenda of the churches, Jews and rogue organisations in the SPLM-controlled areas.”
[This paranoid view of the role of other countries and religions in Sudan is longstanding—ER]
“Alhilu and his group cannot be trusted and they rebelled against peace when they were defeated in the election. There are hidden agenda of the churches, Jews and rogue organisations in the SPLM-controlled areas.”
“They opened hospitals and university colleges in violation of our sovereignty. Basically they are outlaws; therefore, the priority is to liberate the land. Military victory is possible if Salva Kiir ends his support and closes the border.”
[The claim that South Sudan has substantially supported the SPLA/M-N is also longstanding, but for which there is exceedingly little evidence—ER]
• Prof. Ibrahim Ahmed Omer (Speaker of the National Assembly):
“Alhilu still hopes and expects the international community to resort back to the rhetoric of deteriorated situation in South Kordofan and, therefore, he lives on illusions and does not accept the prevailing realities.”
[The refusal to accept the intelligence, integrity, and commitment of Abdel Aziz ultimately works against Khartoum’s ambitions, whether in negotiations or battle—ER]
“Alhilu and Ammar live in illusion, idle and are implementing the instructions of Baroness Cox, Zionist-American lobby inside Sudan. Alhilu and Ammar have become enemies to the Islamic World as a whole and it is halal (decreed or permitted by God) to deceive them.”
[Bizarre but revealing; the notion that “it is halal (decreed or permitted by God) to deceive them” is also extraordinarily revealing—ER]
• Lt-Gen Salah Abdalla (Director General of the National Intelligence Security and Service):
“The truth is that Ammar Amoun, Ahmed Abdarahman, Izzat Kuku, Ibrahim Almulfa and Karlo Tirille are in agreement with Alhilu to create a state to rule, topple the Islamist Movement and takeover power or join South Sudan; all these are the implementation of Israel agenda in Sudan.”
[Such views of Israel and “Zionism” have long been a staple within regime propaganda—ER]
“[Abdel Aziz] pretended to appear in the negotiation hall as serious military commander leading a strong military force that can defeat the SAF and the PDF forces.”
[In fact, forces of the SPLA/M-N under Abdel Aziz have, over seven years, repeatedly defeated SAF and militia forces; going forward, however, with the war in Darfur essentially over, it is not clear how the SAF, supplemented by the redeployed Rapid Support Forces, can continue to resisted—ER]
Resolution:
“Label Alhilu’s group as tribalist, racist organisation that has nothing to do with other issues concerning Sudan.”
[This indeed has been the effort of the regime—ER]