Leaked Minutes of November 18, 2018 Meeting of Senior National Congress Party Officials in Khartoum (speaking to negotiations with Abdel Aziz al-Hilu and issues involving the “Two Areas”)

Eric Reeves | November 26, 2018 | https://wp.me/p45rOG-2jN

Below appear the leaked minutes of a meeting of senior officials of the National Congress Party regime, which took place in Khartoum on November 18, 2018. They have come to me from two extremely reliable sources, including the source who provided the leaked minutes of August 31, 2014 meeting of NCP military and security officials (minutes extensively vetted and analyzed with an overwhelming consensus that they are indeed authentic). These new minutes have been published on-line by Africans Press, a news organization with I am unfamiliar and with which I have had no contact.

The text in completely unedited form (with original typographic errors, words run together, spelling errors and obvious omission) appears on my website at | http://sudanreeves.org/2018/11/28/completely-unedited-english-and-original-arabic-texts-minutes-of-deliberations-of-the-meeting-between-the-chairman-of-the-national-congress-the-chief-negotiator-for-the-two-areas-and-the/ . The text here has been normalized and corrected, but not changed substantively except in the bold emphases I have supplied. I will be analyzing the implications of the text and pursuing further its authenticity. I would particularly note for the present the extraordinary prominence of the word “money,” which seems the all-purpose solution to any diplomatic difficulty. The various promises of “money,” a word that appears more than two dozen times at key junctures, is conspicuous. I would also note the bizarre presumption with which the frequently invoked “National Dialogue” is referred to, as if it represents some sort of Sudanese political consensus, when of course this NCP-manufactured “dialogue” is simply a regime propaganda tool.

Finally, there are repeated points that suggest military action against the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement-North under Abdel Aziz al-Hilu in the Nuba Mountains will begin before the end of the year.

Believing fully in its authenticity, I have edited the English translation from the original Arabic as it has come to me—for clarity, typographic integrity, and for grammatical/idiomatic issues. Of the Arabic original, I can say nothing at present, but am actively pursuing the question of authenticity.

[Note, November 29, 2019: Sudanese lawyer Abdelrahman Al Gasim, who received the 2018 ABA International Human Rights Award, has described the translation as “excellent.”]

Again all emphases in bold in the text are mine. The original Arabic text follows the translation.

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In the name of Allah the Merciful the Beneficent

بة لمداولات إجتماع رئيس الم

Top secret

The National Congress | The National Congress Chairman Office

Minutes of Deliberations of the Meeting between the Chairman of the National Congress, The Chief Negotiator for the Two Areas and the Military and Security Committee for Negotiation support and alternative substitutes held in the National Congress Chairman’s Office on 18/11/2018.

Attendants:

• Field Marshal Omer Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir –The President of the Republic and Chairman of National Congress

• Dr Faisal Hassan Ibrahim – Deputy Chairman of the National Congress, Assistant to the President of the Republic and the Chief Negotiator.

• Lt-Gen Kamal Abdalmaruf Almahi – Chief of General Staff.

• Dr. Abdalrahman Ahmed al-Khidir – Chairman of the Political Sector

• Lt-Gen (PSC) Salah Abdalla – Director General of the National Intelligence Security and Service.

• Prof Ibrahim Ahmed Omer – Speaker of the National Assembly

• Engineer Tarig Hamza Zeinalaabdiin – Director of Popular Security, Executive Director of Sudatel Companies Group

Agenda:

[a] Analysing the reasons for the failure of the unannounced negotiation with Alhilu faction in South Africa

[b] The negotiation position for the up-coming round and expected scenarios.

Deliberations

I. Field Marshal Omer al-Bashir:

My question is what makes Alhilu [Abdel Aziz al-Hilu] raise the ceiling of demands for the Nuba people while the Sudan government and its allies in the South has settled the issue of liberating the two areas and Darfur from the armed movements?

I saw Alhilu during swearing-in ceremony as deputy governor for south Kordofan and I did not like him. I wish we had captured him with Bolad. We also tried to capture him in Eastern Sudan and eventually he fled Kadugli but sooner or later, we will get him. For Alhilu’s Nuba followers we have only guns, bullets and the air they breathe. The hills where they stay will become tighter than the eye of a needle.

We negotiated with the SPLA in the Two Areas so that they surrender their weapons and we reclaim our land and stop foreign missionaries. The remaining period is very short and we are determined to attain peace by the end of this year, and it is imperative that we put an end to Alhilu’s and Ammar Amoun’s games in the name of the Nuba people. We will not allow Alhilu and Ammar Amoun to achieve any political victory and they are rejected even by the Nuba.

The Nuba people are divided—some are loyal to Sudan and we recognise their rights, but those who are affiliated to the SPLA, their rights are in South Sudan and they are our enemies. We are capable of handling the followers of Alhilu from Burun and Uduk people in the Blue Nile. Our first priority is to disband the SPLA in South Kordofan and this requires political and diplomatic measures with the countries and organisations that support them. We will tempt and deceive them with false peace.

We maintain the following constants:

The National Dialogue has been concluded and we have a document that encompasses all the National political issues and those who are willing to join the dialogue have to sign the outcome. There is no room for re-opening the dialogue and the negotiation with the rebels, Sudan Call; the National Consensus should focus on the elections and the permanent constitution. The meetings we held in South Africa with Alhilu’s group showed us the threat posed by Alhilu, Ammar Amoun and their followers on the unity of Sudan and the rule of the Islamists.

Alhilu presented out-dated, impossible demands as if he has been promised support. We have to know whether it is Israel, America, Salva Kiir or Egypt. Self-determination and the presence of two armies and transitional period are unacceptable. The meeting with Alhilu gave us true indication about the threats against the strategic interests of Sudan government currently and in the future and this will help us to build our plans and strategies. It has to be clear that we are determined to achieve peace in the two areas and Darfur once and for all, before the end of this year no matter what.

The initiative of the president of South Sudan, Salva Kiir—to mediate between the two factions of SPLA-N (Alhilu/Agar), Darfur movements and the government of Sudan—is welcome because he has leverage over SPLA-N and is able to unite the leadership and return Agar and Arman to their positions and form a new delegation with a new negotiation positions to implement the previous agreements. Salva Kiir has continued to provide logistical support for SPLA so can reunite the two factions.

We are looking forward to achieving peace on our terms and based on our interests, and we are still waiting for Salva Kiir to inform us about his efforts to unite SPLA and negotiation with the government with security arrangements as priority.

Alhilu and Ammar Amoun have no right to talk about the issues that were already discussed in the National Dialogue and the majority of the Sudanese political parties think that the dialogue should not be re-opened. We negotiate with Alhilu’s group not because we like them, but because we want to dismantle the SPLA peacefully and make political gains by achieving peace. The presence of SPLA in the Two Areas represent a direct threat to the national security and hampers investment projects in South Kordofan. The international border with South Sudan should be under the control of Sudan armed forces to safe-guard our interests in South Sudan. Alhilu’s faction did not participate in the National Dialogue, but they can study the recommendations and the resolutions.

Mbeki told us that initially Alhilu’s delegation accepted the outcome of the dialogue, but later recanted and this proves that Alhilu’s delegation lack the vision for negotiation to accomplish peace and this is an indication of animosity towards the Islamists. Why do we hold on to Salva Kiir’s Mediation? Because we have a mutual agreement, peace in South Sudan in return for peace in Sudan. If the SPLA remains divided and Alhilu’s group insists on negotiating unilaterally in the Two Areas, we will negotiate with them to know their intentions—the group of Agar is more flexible.

In the contacts between the German government and Darfur movements, [the movements] were told that was the last round to be mediated by the German government to reach a final peace, and we are waiting for the outcome of the up-coming round. Negotiation with Darfur movements is based on Doha Agreement and their visit to Addis Ababa is to sign cessation of hostilities.

America’s position is not encouraging in spite of our role in South Sudan. If they (the Americans) are serious, they have to exert pressure on Alhilu to accept the American initiative to provide assistance to the Two Areas. We accepted the American initiative and contributed to the peace process in the South, an achievement that was praised by the regional and international community, including America.

We will not accept a transitional period or [allow] the SPLA one day of self-determination or autonomy; we will support the initiative of Nuba people abroad, to solve the problem in the Nuba Mountains and put pressure on the faction of Alhilu and Ammar Amoun. We should facilitate for them to meet AUHIP and President Thabo Mbeki, representatives of TROIKA and the international community to express their views on how to find a solution to the problem of South Kordofan.

We expect Salva Kiir to play a positive role in bringing peace in the Two Areas, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. We have a lot of pending issues: shared borders, demilitarised safe zones, crossing points and the implementation of joint cooperation agreements signed in 2012.

The priority is to unite the SPLA and not to allow Alhilu and Ammar to achieve political victory. We have to make them look weak and defeated like students in a discussion forum in front of NCP teachers. The Nuba in the SPLM/A do not have political rights or identity issues to negotiate about—all these issues are included in the document of National Dialogue. The system of governance in Sudan is Islamic and we will not give up Shari ‘law and the identity of Sudan is Islamic, Arabic and African and we are committed to the charter of the League of Arab States. Any draft of framework agreement or negotiation agenda should not tamper with national constants [or] the [alignment]of the Islamic movement and the NCP.

[We are p]utting into consideration the regional and international developments and Southern opposition leadership who are opposed to the continuation of war in the Two Areas.

II. Dr Faisal Hassan Ibrahim:

In the NCP, we have a principled position regarding the negotiation based on direct constants with Alhilu’s delegation to get to know them, build social relations and get together as brothers, but Alhilu tried to isolate them. We will try once more to work jointly to help each other. I emphasize what the president said, we always held talks about the two areas with the SPLA for seven years and eighteen rounds and the first time Alhilu participated, the talks collapsed because of lack of understanding that the negotiation derives its legitimacy from [UNSC] Resolution 2046 and the roadmap which is already outdated?

It was clear that the SPLA negotiation team always comes to the talks without clear vision and deliberately spoils the negotiation. For two and a half years we maintained a ceasefire which was renewed by President Omer al-Bashir more than once to provide an opportunity for the leadership of SPLM/A reconsider their positions towards peace and stop the war in the Two Areas that affect all the Sudanese.

Peace in the two areas is necessary for political, economical and security stability and issues like the constitution and identity have been settled in the National Dialogue and cannot be re-negotiated outside this forum. Based on our observation, the SPLA, Alhilu’s faction, lacks political will and this was clear from our meetings in South Africa. It is the psychological factor that controls Alhilu, Ammar Amoun, Kuku Jagdul and Abdalla Ibrahim Abass—obscure and insignificant individuals with no political or educational accomplishments.

Alhilu and Ammar Amoun deliberately avoided talking to us and it looks like they are suffering from psychological complexes and deep hatred towards the NCP. We did not agree and we know the reasons for the failure of previous negotiations with Arman and Agar was Alhilu in collaboration with Ammar Amoun and Ahmed Abdul Rahman. Alhilu and Ammar Amoun’s coup against the legitimate leadership, Malik Agar, Yasir Arman and Ismail Jallab brought about individuals who lack experience. The movement is now divided and we tried to encourage Abdel-Aziz Alhilu to negotiate just for the fact that the majority of SPLA is under his command. If we manage to dismantle the SPLA, Alhilu and Amar will have no political future in Sudan.

Alhilu’s group rejected all the negotiation references that were adopted during eighteen rounds of talk, including those associated to African [Union] Peace and Security Council and the unrewarding peace in the Two Areas.

We suggested to start with the humanitarian approach, security arrangements, then the political settlement. That is because the humanitarian approach in any negotiation between two warring parties comes before the political agenda and we were motivated by the suffering of the people in the areas under the SPLA.

The next step would have been the security arrangements to determine the identity of combatants and their number in order to reintegrate them in Sudan Armed Forces or the society, and then we upgrade the ceasefire into security arrangements. We reaffirmed to Alhilu that we would not accept the two armies based on the constitution. You may have read Alhilu’s paper that discussed issues like the constitution, identity and slavery, even Mbeki got very angry and gave them a lesson on references of the negotiation.

We accepted Salva Kiir’s mediation because we failed to convince Alhilu to disband the SPLA and withdraw from Sudanese territories. Alhilu and Ammar Amoun will face dire consequences if they try to implement intelligence agenda of certain countries to divide Sudan. Salva Kiir’s mediation is not a replacement to AUHIP’s role and if he fails, the NCP is capable of defending its interests. In reference to the assessment of meetings in South Africa with Alhilu’s delegation we observed the following:

Alhilu and Ammar Amoun are not interested in peace and they are willing to go back to war to cover up their failure in forcing the government to give in to their demands.

Their negotiation skills are weak and we can blackmail them using other Nuba factions. To mislead Alhilu and his group, we told them we can negotiate on the political approach if they sign on the security arrangements before finishing the political discussions. In fact, we can agree with Mbeki to pass this trick. Alhilu’s delegation is filled with racism and hatred for the leaders of NCP and the Islamic Movement, and negotiation will not succeed unless Salva Kiir forces Alhilu to make concessions, we negotiate directly with the field commanders or a rapid military operation to force them to accept NCP’s conditions.

The next round of negotiation will be the last for all armed movements and if it fails we will explore other options to deter the rebels. Salva Kiir included Darfur movements in his mediation, but we will not accept any peace agreements that are not based on Doha Agreement as a reference. Alhilu led the negotiation team for the first time after he ousted Malik Agar and Yasir Arman, and the liberation council in the Nuba Mountains repeated the same mistake of Garang when he appointed Alhilu claiming that it was Yousif Kuwa’s recommendations.

When Alhilu became Chairman of the SPLA in the Two Areas, we knew that he will be worst and more extreme in the negotiations, and peace will not be achieved in the Two Areas under his leadership. Alhilu views the Government of Sudan as Arabo-Islamic entity and he wants to establish a state in the Nuba Mountains and that is why he wants to keep the SPLA.

Is Salva Kiir, President of South Sudan, the supreme commander of SPLA in the Two Areas inside the Republic of Sudan? And what is the strategy of the security and intelligence agency, popular security, the Armed Forces, the NCP and the Islamic Movement to counter the rigid position of Alhilu and Ammar Amoun?

III. Dr Abdurahman Ahmed al-Khidir:

Using money might bring a good result, and after all, political conflict is about interest. With money we were able to finance South Sudan Peace when the IGAD failed to secure twenty million US dollars for a negotiation process, and why can’t we secure similar amount of money to achieve peace in the Two Areas and use the money according to negotiation trends. The amount should be paid from Islamic Movement money abroad.

Money plays a role in determining results very quickly, and everybody will be satisfied. You can buy every politician, but the approach needs studying, planning and knowledge of the tendencies of the leader, their hobbies, personal characteristics and all the family and organisational problems surrounding them as well as internal conflicts.

The NCP succeeded practically through South Sudan Government to sell itself as pro-peace. We banked successfully on the fight against terrorism, illegal migration, and human trafficking. We advertised that our continued presence in Africa and the Horn of Africa is the best option for the United States and Europe. We make some concessions that do not affect our control over power.

South Sudan Peace is a chance to dismantle the SPLA-N in the Two Areas, and if we were to miss this chance, regional and international circumstances might change. Alhilu is known for his hostility to the Islamists due to his communist background. He caused war in Darfur with Bolad and ignited the second war and he was the one who obliged Malik and pressurised him to go to war.

He incited Nuba people for self-determination and that the SPLA-N would guarantee their rights. The Nuba people want unity. Up to now we have not reached the stage of negotiation with Alhilu and the effort is to make a frame for negotiations.

Firstly, to ensure Alhilu’s commitment to the previous agreements with Arman and all references for negotiations according to the UNSC Resolution 2046, cessation of hostilities, humanitarian, security and political arrangements. These are issues that were agreed upon in draft the framework agreement with Yasir Arman and how come Alhilu wants to start from zero. We shall use tricks and deception to make them agree on negotiation agenda and then outsmart them through facilitating the participation of Nuba in Diaspora.

We should concentrate on the Nuba Mountains: if the SPLM-N in the Nuba Mountains is dispersed, then Blue Nile will automatically disperse. To this end, we charged Brig-Gen Mohamed Yunis Babikir and Brig-Gen Steven Misa to buy leaders within the negotiation team. Mohamed Yunis has contacts with field commanders and we need him to contribute to the dismantling of SPLA-N and he knows the psychology of Blue Nile people and can buy any leader for any price according to their position. The importance of the leader will increase when his tribe’s members are many in the SPLA.

Alhilu will try to escape and buy time, because the American Administration made new conditions on lifting Sudan from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism. We participated in South Sudan Peace and despite that they came with new lies, improvement of conditions for peace; what does that mean? It means support to the rebels in order not to make agreement with the government. We should not rely on foreign role, but to bring peace from within. By our own efforts and capabilities, we shall defeat any hostility or intelligent agenda as the agenda of Salva Kiir was shuttered before.

American Conditions:

• Promotion of cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

• Improvement on human rights records, including religious and freedom of the press.

• Creation of conducive environment for peace in Sudan.

• Freedom of access to humanitarian assistance and stop all acts of internal hostilities.

• Taking measures to resolve some high profile acts of terror.

• Compliance with the UNSC resolution on North Korea.

What concerns us in these conditions are peace processes, religious freedoms and the passage of humanitarian assistance. We hope Americans will impose access based on their initiative. The so-called religious freedoms are mere bidding and nothing else, and the percentage of Christians in Sudan has decreased significantly after the secession of South Sudan and they represent less than one percent of the population. We fear the rebels might interpret these conditions wrongly, as Sudan will never mortgage its future to America and we will impose peace by force no matter what. The SPLM/A-N and the Darfurian movements having been subjected to difficult conditions due to international and regional pressure; Alhilu and his group will finally be forced to accept political settlement without achieving even minimum of their aspirations. This is due to the European and American pressure and the international concern to end conflicts in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan.

These pressures have made the Darfurian movements, the SPLM-N in the Two Areas, both factions to change their positions. What concerns us is how can Ammar Amoun and his delegation be convinced with the importance of setting agenda for negotiation. Tell them that no objection on negotiation through political agenda, but we need only negotiation on ceasefire and assist the civilians with humanitarian aid simultaneously with security arrangements.

Their presentation of interim period, self-determination, and the identity issues—all these were resolved in the National Dialogue. Give them the recommendations of the dialogue. They must be tricked to accept open negotiation; this is important and if they accept open negotiation, their dispersion is easy. For negotiation period is enough for social relations among the delegation to take place and money will play a great role in the fate of negotiations.

The Nuba are the most liable people to be bought. What is important for them is that you secure their future financially and we are ready to pay millions [of dollars] to buy allegiances of Alhilu’s cadres. Try them except Alhilu. Even Ammar Amoun check him: why he is angry, he might be bought. It’s a market, we buy and they are basically bought to many countries and eventually can be bought to us. The dollar will play its role, for the conflicts of SPLM-N are over money. We saw and tested leaders of the movement in South Sudan and found how money had dismantled the movement and sustained the war.

IV. Engineer Tarig Hamza:

Of course, money will settle the case in our favour, create social relations with Alhilu’s delegation and advance social relations over political differences. Through our monitoring of Alhilu’s negotiation team, they are weak in negotiation and we need them to accept open negotiation by any means. Give them a glimpse of hope in order to deceive them. We can achieve some gains, but concentration on money is important and we will find who can be lured by money. Our money is ready for buying. Try to exchange greetings to break the psychological barrier; nobody can refuse money.

We must penetrate them and the best way for penetration is during negotiations. It is tested with the Darfurian movements, and most splits happened in negotiation hotels, and it is not necessary for those whom we have bought to come to Khartoum; they can go anywhere and enjoy their money. The case of the Two Areas is more important than the case of Darfur, because of the presence of SPLA. It is easy to penetrate negotiation delegations because rebel movements chose their delegation members on tribal bases, not on qualifications, which means [that] if you buy one person it means you have bought many others. Change the way of dealing with them to the better. Why are they angry? If it is money, we will share it with them and you can exchange gifts with the delegation, take photos and sit down with them at lobbies of the hotels and try to share with them food and drinks whenever you get a chance. Provide them with a sense of security, we can reach our goal easily, it’s not difficult and money is at hand.

Let Mbeki help you in penetration by shortening the distances and sittings with some of them without mediator and befriend the heads of the delegations according to the indicators of personal security assessment: the way it has been happening with Arman’s delegation. People used to meet and relations were built which led to the recruitment of a big group from Arman delegation. They are influential leaders; they were active elements of the delegation. If it has not been Alhilu’s coup, we would have finished the myth of SPLA once and for all.

Butheina Ibrahim Dinar said she should be reinstated in the National Intelligence and Security Service and should be given her rank; and Mubarak Ardol did his best in exposing Alhilu and Bakri Abdalbasit Madani who is one of Islamic youth from Blue Nile is present within the ranks of the enemy and he did a lot and was the representative of SPLM-N in Addis Ababa. Walid Hamid accepted to deal with us after his wife Regina who was a member of the negotiation team of South Sudan convinced him. Regina is a leader within Dr Riek Machar’s movement. There were leaders of Sudan Call who were angry with the NCP and cursing, but when we filled their pockets with money they became the most loyal to the NCP.

Money played a big role to make the Darfurian leaders to accept to go to Doha and then to Addis Ababa. We are ready to pay for the unification of SPLM-N and dismantle it. We met with Tut Galuak, Security Advisor for President Salva Kiir who briefed us on Salva Kiir’s efforts and said: “Alhilu, Amar and Ahmed Saeed are refusing the unification of SPLM-N and do not like peace, but Salva Kiir will talk to him and will extend invitation to the Darfurian movements.”

We agreed with Tut to buy support of leaders who can influence Salva Kiir to take a decisive stance towards the unification of SPLM-N. Tut Galuak served the NCP a great deal in war and in peace and has a great tribal influence among Paulino Matip’s group and we bought him a multi-story building, we furnished it and covered all wedding costs of his new marriage. He became a wealthy man and we will secure more money for him to unite the SPLM-N and serve any other request.

We should abide by Salva Kiir’s initiative, for Alhilu is trying to buy time. The unification of the movement will contribute to the settlement of the problem in the two areas. Piecemeal solution does not work and will create more problems. Alhilu and his group cannot be trusted and they rebelled against peace when they were defeated in the election. There are hidden agenda of the churches, Jews and rogue organisations in the SPLM-controlled areas. They opened hospitals and university colleges in violation of our sovereignty. Basically they are outlaws; therefore, the priority is to liberate the land. Military victory is possible if Salva Kiir ends his support and closes the border.

We should not give Alhilu any space for political gains at the expense of the Islamic Movement. The negotiation sshould focus on previous agreements and any framework agreement or negotiation schedule must be based on National principles. We must prepare for war if negotiations fail.

V. Prof Ibrahim Ahmed Omer:

We should adopt the strategy of political money and money for endearment, because most of Nuba commanders do not have future or houses either inside Sudan or abroad. We need to instill in the Nuba people love for money and acquisition of wealth as we did with the Southerners. The negotiation team must make good relations with the people of the Two Areas in Alhilu’s team as this will be the approach to establish contacts and we have to convince them for open negotiations, and the increased contacts abroad is enough to remove the bitterness and money will be there. Money can play a role to overcome the differences. Money is capable of solving problems. Whenever the delegation members are widened and cadres became more in number, recruitment becomes easier and penetration starts during negotiation.

Tut Galuak, advisor of Salva Kiir for Security Affairs struggled for the unity of Sudan and fought against the SPLM and was the best cadre of Paulino Matip. Avail to him all the money necessary and tell him that the budget is open for him and the Islamic Movement’s money is under his disposal and we are ready to open foreign accounts for him in any country in the world and let him buy any number of leaders to fight against the SPLM.

The SPLA-N presence in the Two Areas still poses unusual threat to National Security and foreign policy of the Government of Sudan.

The situation has changed in South Sudan and the negotiation team must cope with these realities and move to build up pressure on Alhilu’s delegation and force them to accept settlement with less conditions and demands. The situation is in our favour and this is the only chance to crush the aspirations of Alhilu and Ammar Amoun. Alhilu still hopes and expects the international community to resort back to the rhetoric of deteriorated situation in South Kordofan and, therefore, he lives on illusions and does not accept the prevailing realities. Sudan actually has surpassed the crisis of the Two Areas and that Darfur has become peaceful and by the end of this year, the Two Areas will be SPLA-free.

The Darfurian people are closer to agreement, and despite the war, the Darfurian leaders did not demand self-determination or transitional government except Abdel Wahid and we know he is supported by Israel and he, therefore, has a debt to pay. The position of these Darfurian leaders is noble; they did not sell their country and did not change their attitudes.

Our brother, Alhilu and Ammar live in illusion, idle and are implementing the instructions of Baroness Cox, Zionist-American lobby inside Sudan. Alhilu and Ammar have become enemies to the Islamic World as a whole and it is halal (decreed or permitted by God) to deceive them. War is deception and mockery; and conspiracy against them is a must. Letting Alhilu to jump over these realities, and start from zero and present self-determination is an enmity and ill will. Are there lands registered under the name of SPLM-N? Even Alhilu—does he have land in South Kordofan? Even the Nuba, their space is minimal. Arab and non-Arab tribes are many.

These are realities you should focus on in negotiation. The NCP negotiators must teach Alhilu a lesson in dodging and mockery so that he can regret at the end. Alhilu’s treatment of the NCP delegation with contempt and lack of respect was unacceptable; even regional and international community came to the conclusion that the secession of South Sudan was a failure by all standards. The Nuba people soon will discover that they have died in vain and they were victims of New Sudan delusion.

Are there any lands allocated to the Nuba? So Alhilu wants to distribute? South Kordofan lands belong to many tribes which are the majority, and how can a minority decide on behalf of the majority?

Negotiations agenda are based on previous references with Arman, with some lenience to lure Alhilu’s team to accept open negotiation. It is better for the NCP that Alhilu’s negotiation team to have many leaders from the Nuba people.

VI. Lt-Gen Salah Abdalla:

Despite confidentiality, South Africa negotiations between brother Faisal, Alhilu, Ammar and Kuku Jagdul did not achieve any result, yet it disclosed the positions that could be developed in to political agenda for the coming unofficial round of talks. High ambitions of Alhilu and Ammar led to the failure of the talks.

The truth is that Ammar Amoun, Ahmed Abdarahman, Izzat Kuku, Ibrahim Almulfa and Karlo Tirille are in agreement with Alhilu to create a state to rule, topple the Islamist Movement and takeover power or join South Sudan; all these are the implementation of Israel agenda in Sudan. Alhilu is notorious for sabotaging Sudan. In order to put this plan in action, Alhilu used Agar to dismiss Jallab then, they dismissed Agar and Arman. Alhilu assigned Ahmed Abdarahman to prevent Arman from signing any peace agreement with the NCP. Alhilu’s resignation was designed to stop the signing of peace agreement.

Malik’s opinion that the NCP will not accept self-determination or the demand for two armies was correct. Alhilu, Ammar and Jagdul are psychopaths who demand the impossible (self-determination, two armies and transitional period). After Alhilu’s loss of the election, the declaration of war, the use of Darfurian movements within the SRF, the killing and liquidation of PDF and Native Administration leaders who belonged to the NCP and the Islamic Movement in Abu Karshola by Kuku Idris are the results. Ammar and Alhilu’s position is intended to buy time, waiting for possible regional and international changes to take place and help in tilting the balance of forces in the SPLA-N favour. He pretended to appear in the negotiation hall as serious military commander leading a strong military force that can defeat the SAF and the PDF forces.

From [his attitude?] you can sense the uncertainty of Alhilu about the future and feeling that his negotiation position is weak. He lacks the experts who can read the minds of NCP leaders and their dangerous intelligence and security agents, who were recognised by all the African countries and even America. Alhilu is abandoned by Salva Kiir, but still showing indifference and pretending that he can do without the support of Salva Kiir, and that they can achieve what they failed to get in the seven years of war.

Alhilu wishes endless extension of ceasefire to enable him to maintain his forces and avoid military defeat. The Nuba people and Uduk are dreaming of secession in order to join the South. On the other hand, Alhilu is dreaming of achieving Garang’s legacy, through self-determination for the Two Areas, and maintain the SPLA-N army during the interim period.

President al-Bashir is the only president in Africa who has succeeded to bring peace to South Sudan; Salva Kiir is expected to follow suit and end the conflicts in Darfur and the Two Areas. In case he fails, we have enough experience to end it on our own terms. After we learned about the fears of Alhilu and Ammar, brother Faisal and his delegation should socialise with Ammar’s delegation; involve them in full open negotiations where big number of negotiators participate. Big delegations are easy to infiltrate and divide. That way we can end the conflict in the shortest possible time as we did in Abuja and caused problems and differences among the Sudan Liberation Movement, and everybody began interested in themselves. Try that modality again and we shall win. Alhilu will not know what has gone in his movement.

Arrange to convince them to discuss the cease-fire and security arrangements first, because the political issue is there in the National Dialogue Forum. You can agree with them on any issue except those related to national constants in order to drag them to accept negotiations; let us meet to lay down a strategy in both cases. Intelligence, the collection of information and the war against the SPLA-N are going on as planned.

The question whether Alhilu will go to war and escape peace remains to be seen in the near future, despite the information we have obtained. Our attempts in western jabels (mountains) will defeat all Alhilu and Ammar’s dreams if we succeed.

VII. Lt-Gen Kamal Abdalmarouf:

We, thanks to God, managed to discover the instincts of the Nuba persons who are with Alhilu, and Alhilu cannot move without the support of SPLA but, unwittingly, they revealed what is psychologically latent in themselves, their ambitions and the impossible aspirations [ ] in a country ruled by the NCP. This was reached in a measure-discovering session, for our goals were to find out the mental secrets of the enemy, the course of their thinking and the extent [of] their hopes and [where their] vision lay. This is exactly what has happened, and from watching the video of our intelligence spying camera that covered all the negotiations sessions in South Africa. This is due to the high capabilities of our security and intelligence services. Unknowingly, Alhilu, Ammar and Jagdul gave away important indications of the nature of their psychological secrets and what they hoped for and desire, though they utterly know that they are impossible to achieve in reality.

Had they had a little shrewdness and civility, they would have avoided the call for self-determination, because such ideas cannot repeat themselves in history. It is impossible to allow self-determination for the Two Areas; even Naivasha gave them Popular Consultation only. Alhilu is meddling with the resources of the people of Sudan. There is no land that belongs to the Nuba people in South Kordofan. These are Sudanese lands inhabited by all tribes of Sudan.

Land issues in the case of South Kordofan differ from land issues in the case of South Sudan, which was demarcated since the time of the British rule. We will not allow the presence of any armed forces parallel to the SAF. In the meeting of SAF with the president, we decided who will rule the Sudan and how. No self-determination, no transitional government and no other armed forces beside the SAF. That, who is interested in political work should lay down the gun and sign the National Dialogue Charter, and [they] who want to rule Sudan can contest the elections. We have strong armed forces that are ready to defend the land, and they succeeded in destroying the Darfur armed movements who targeted the Arab tribes, Islam and the Muslims in an attempt to convert Darfur into Christianity and Judaism serving the Israeli interests in Darfur.

The SAF and the RSF destroyed fifteen strong Darfurian armed movements, also the SAF managed to repulse more than six hundred attacks launched by the armed movements and won all these battles. Also, they succeeded to abort hundreds of conspiracies by those movements which targeted the infrastructure of the Sudanese state in a politically calculated process to dismantle and divide it. It is an Israeli strategy confirmed to us by senior movement’s leaders who signed peace agreements, the prisoners of war (POWs) and the equipment captured in battles. Thus the SAF laid down (Risk Anticipation Strategy) which enabled us to deal with the rebels in Darfur—we shall apply the same strategy in South Kordofan. The SAF will support the SPLA persons of western jabels (mountains) with armament, ammunition and information in any military operation they intend to carry against Alhilu and his supporters.

Recommendations and Resolutions:

• We stick to Salva Kiir’s initiative to unite the SPLA-N two wings, mediate between them—and [for] the NCP to address the root causes of the problem in the Two Areas based on the AUHIP references.

• Salva Kiir’s initiative is not a substitute to the AU negotiation references; it complements them.

• Any Dialogue regarding Darfur case, the Doha Agreement remains the reference.

• National Dialogue Committee had resolved all the National issues related to the future of Sudan; its national charter and recommendations constitute references formation-building and national consensus. Any approach to Sudan holistic issues should be done in accordance to 7+7 mechanism references.

• Establishment of joint forces with South Sudan to control the border and bring stability and free movements of civilians.

• Benefit from the crucial role of the security and intelligence Committee for East and Central Africa (CESA) in exchanging ideas and visions in favour of the security of South Sudan and the effect of the mercenary movements (the SPLA and the Darfurian movements) on the Peace Agreement in the South.

• Use Sudan’s experience in South Sudan conflict resolution to establish strategic Regional security strategy with Egypt, Ethiopia, Chad and Central African Republic.

•Discussion of transitional government is out of question. Participation in the political process through elections only.

• In Sudan there is one National army and it will not be accepted for the SPLA-N to maintain a parallel army.

• The presence of SPLA-N in the Two Areas constitutes a threat to the National security and the SAF is mandated according to the constitution to take the necessary measures in order to remove this threat.

• No extension of cease-fire at the end of the year, unless a permanent cease-fire and security arrangements are signed.

• Insist that all corridors for humanitarian assistance and relief comes from Sudan to enable the NISS supervise all the humanitarian operations.

• Sudan Foreign Minister should depict Sudan as peace-loving while Alhilu’s group are war-mongers and Sudan Government has the right to defend its land.

• Disassociation between the comprehensive solution and the Two Areas problem and drag Alhilu’s group to partial settlement.

• Label Alhilu’s group as tribalist, racist organisation that has nothing to do with other issues concerning Sudan.

• Unification of the SPLA-N is strategic to the settlement of the conflict in the Two Areas.

• No self-determination, transitional period or referendum; and any peace agreement must be considered final if it ends the existence of SPLA-N army in the Two Areas.

• Inform the Nuer, Shuluk and Equatorians in a clandestine manner that the presences of SPLA-N who are supporting Salva Kiir in the Two Areas constitute a threat to their political future in South Sudan.

• Support the splinter groups under Brig-Gen Ismail Ahmed Abdalla to organise opposition entities against Alhilu and Ammar.

• Sudan Foreign Minister to travel to Europe to explain Sudan vision on peace and that the humanitarian assistance to the rebel-controlled areas should be cross-lines.

•National Security Intelligence Agencies should follow and report on weapons entering the SPLA-N-controlled areas.

• Negotiation of political issues take place according to former agreements with Yasir Arman associated with the National Dialogue outcome.

• Insist and stick to the framework agreement and cessation of hostilities papers agreed to and signed by Yasir Arman.

• Security arrangements for the SPLA should be given priority in agreements.

• The end of this year is the last chance for settlement through negotiation.

• Salva Kiir should reinstate Malik Agar as Chairman of the SPLM-N, Abdul-Aziz Deputy Chairman and Yasir Arman Secretary-General in order to attain peace and should clarify his opinion on the peace process in Sudan before time runs out.

• Support the Nuba people to submit memos to the embassies of the UNSC permanent members and EU stating that Alhilu does not represent them.

• Agree with Mbeki to look for a deceptive plan for Ammar and his group to accept open negotiations with the Government of Sudan to be used as evidence against Alhilu who refused to negotiate for the achievement of peaceful settlement of conflict, that will enable us to market the idea of imposing sanctions against the SPLA through our agents in the UN and the AU.

• Show the interest of the Government of Sudan to negotiate with Alhilu’s group to give them false feeling of importance in order to entice them.

• Establish relations with Alhilu’s delegation, exchange telephone numbers with them gradually, and meet them individually during the breaks in hotel cafeteria.

• Tell them that the political differences do not hamper social relations between the Sudanese in order to win them through NCP’s various ways and means.

• No cross-border humanitarian assistance to be allowed.

• Allocation of fund from the Islamic Movement accounts abroad to be used to bribe and win members from Alhilu’s group.

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ؤتمر الوطني مع رئيس وفد المفاوضات واللجنة الأمنية والعسكرية لإسناد

التفاوض المُسرَّبة بتاريخ : 18 نوفمبر 2018

مقدمة :

طالعنا الوثيقة المُسرَّبة لمحضر مداولات إجتماع رئيس المؤتمر الوطني مع رئيس وفد المفاوضات بتاريخ 18/11/2018 الذي حضره حسب المحضر كل من :

1/ المُشير/ عمر حسن أحمد البشير – رئيس الجمهورية ورئيس المؤتمر الوطني

2/ دكتور / فيصل حسن إبراهيم – نائب رئيس المؤتمر الوطنيورئيس وفد التفاوض

3/ فريق أول ركن / كمال عبد المعروف الماحي – رئيس هيئة الأركان المشتركة

4/ دكتور / عبد الرحمن أحمد الخضر – رئيس القطاع السياسي بالمؤتمر الوطني

5/ فريق أول ركن / صلاح عبد الله قوش – مدير عام جهاز الأمن والمخابرات

6/ بروفيسور / إبراهيم أحمد عمر – رئيس المجلس الوطني

7/ مهندس / طارق حمزة زين العابدين – مدير الأمن الشعبي –المدير التنفيذي لمجموعة شركات سوداتل.

ناقش الإجتماع مواضيع مختلفة أهمها كيفية التعامل مع الحركة الشعبية والجيش الشعبي لتحرير السودان – شمال. وبغض النظر عن مصدر الوثيقة وصحتها أم لا، فإن ما ورد في الوثيقة يتفِّق تماماً مع طريقة المؤتمر الوطني في التفكير والمُمارسة بالإضافة إلى وجود وقائع على الأرض تؤكد ما جاء في الوثيقة مثل التحرُّكات العسكرية في العديد من المحاور، وحركة سلاح الجو، وغيرها من الأحداث. وقد كشفت الوثيقة بعض النقاط ، وأثارت ملاحظات مهمة :

طبيعة وصفات الحضور والمشاركين في الإجتماع تعكس العقلية والإستراتيجية الأمنية للمؤتمر الوطني في تعامله مع ملف التفاوض الذي يُمثِّل المحور الرئيسي للإجتماع حسب الأجندة.

كشفت الوثيقة الإرتباط العضوي بين الحركة الإسلامية والنظام الحاكم

كشفت الوثيقة أيضاً المبادىء والإستراتيجيات – الأهداف،بالإضافة إلى وسائل تحقيق هذه الأهداف.

المبادىء والإستراتيجيات :

1/ أكَّد الإجتماع وشدَّد على (الثوابت الوطنية) والدولة الدينية مع رفض الإصلاح الديمقراطي ومبدأ المُساواة بين الناس ورفضهم لحقوق المُهمَّشين وإنكار وجودهم، والدليل على ذلك ما قاله البشيرحسب التسريب :

(حكم السودان إسلامي ولا تنازل عن الشريعة الإسلامية وهوية السودان إسلامية عربية – والإلتزام بميثاق جامعة الدول العربية –أي مسودة إتفاق إطاري أو أجندة المفاوضات يجب أن لا تمس الثوابت الوطنية وتوجهات الحركة الإسلامية والمؤتمر الوطني).

2/ موقف المؤتمر الوطني بشأن الأرض في مناطق الهامش : كشفت التسريبات موقف المؤتمر الوطني الحقيقي والمُستبطَن بخصوص أراضي السكان الأصليين في مناطق الهامش، وقد عبَّر رئيس هيئة الأركان المشتركة فريق أول ركن / كمال عبد المعروف عن ذلك بقوله : (لا توجد أراضي للنوبة بجنوب كردفان وإنما هى أراضي سودانية تسكن فيها كل القبائل السودانية، وتختلف وضعية جنوب كردفان عن جنوب السودان وكانت أراضي مُحدَّدة منذ الإنجليز).

– وأضاف إبراهيم أحمد عمر بقوله : (هل توجد أراضي مُخصَّصة للنوبة مع الحلو حتى يطالب بتقسيمها، وأراضي جنوب كردفان هي ملك لقبائل كتيرة وهم غالبية أكتر من النوبة وكيف تُقرِّر الأقلِّية في شأن الأغلبية) .. !

– وقد عبَّر البشير أيضاً عن قلقه بتواجد الجيش الشعبي قائلاً : (إن وجود الجيش الشعبي بالمنطقتين ما زال يُمثِّل تهديد مباشر للأمن القومي ويُعطِّل مشاريع الإستثمار بجنوب كردفان .. تفاوضنا لجمع السلاح وإستلام أراضينا) .

3/ التسريبات أكَّدت إن المؤتمر الوطني يتَّخذ الحرب كإستراتيجية للبقاء في السُلطة لأطول فترة مُمكنة وإنهم غير حريصين على السلام، وقد أكَّد ذلك عمر البشير بقوله : (ما الذي يدفع الحلو إلى رفع سقف مطالب أبناء النوبة رغم إن قرار حكومة السودان وحلفائنا بالجنوب محسوم بتحرير المنطقتين ودارفور من الحركات المُتمرِّدة)وحديث رئيس وفد التفاوض فيصل حسن إبراهيم : (إرغام الحلو لتقديم تنازلات، .. أو قام سلفاكير بتوحيد الحركة الشعبية، .. أو من خلال حرب خاطفة ترغمهم على الإذعان لشروط المؤتمر الوطني).

4/ محاولة المؤتمر الوطني الإلتفاف على القضايا الجوهرية وتجنُّب الخوض في جذور المشكلة ومناقشتها، وسعيه للتوصُّل إلى سلام شكلي لإقناع المجتمع الإقليمي والدولي بجديتهم في تحقيق السلام دون أن يكون هناك حل حقيقي يُعالج مشاكل المُضطهدين في السودان وهذا ما أكَّده عمر البشير : (التفاوض مع حركات دارفور وفق إتفاق الدوحة ولن نسمح بفتح الإتفاقية مُجدداً للتفاوض، وزيارتهم لأديس أبابا للتوقيع على وقف العدائيات) .. (ليست لأبناء النوبة بالحركة الشعبية والجيش الشعبي حقوق سياسية أو هوية يتم التفاوض حولها ..) .. (يجب أن لا تمس أي مسودة إتفاق إطاري أو أجندة المفاوضات الثوابت الوطنية وتوجُّهات الحركة الإسلامية والمؤتمر الوطني).

5/ الإعتماد على الوساطة الأفريقية غير المُحايدة في تمرير أجندتهم وتحقيق مكاسب سياسية خلال التفاوض كما جاء على لسان عمر البشير : (عندنا ثوابت لا يمكن تجاوزها وهي الحوار الوطني وصل إلى نهاياته، ولدينا وثيقة قومية تحكم الساحة السياسية وهذا ما إتفقنا عليه مع الرئيس ثامبو أمبيكي).

6/ إعتماد الأموال كآلية لشراء الذمم وإحداث إنشاقاقات وسط أعضاء الحركة الشعبية وإضعافها حسب ما جاء على لسان عبد الرحمن الخضر : (إستخدام الأموال ربما أتى بنتيجة أفضل .. والقرش يلعب دور في حسم النتائج بسرعة فائقة وكل الناس بتكون رضيانة، كل سياسي ممكن تشتريه لكن طريقة الدخول فيه تحتاج دراسة وتخطيط ومعرفة ميول القيادي وهوايته وصفاته الشخصية وكل ما يحيط به من مشاكل أسرية وتنظيمية والصراعات الداخلية).

وحسب التسريب أضاف طارق حمزة بقوله : (طبعاً المال سوف يحسم القضية لصالحنا .. التركيز على الأموال مهم وسوف نجد من يغريه المال، ونحن أموالنا جاهزة للشراء، ومافي زول بيابَى القروش والدولار وهذه مُجرَّبة .. وأغلب الإنشقاقات تمت في فنادق التفاوض).

وبناءً على مبادئهم هذه كشفوا عن أهدافهم الحقيقية فيما يخص مستقبل الدولة السودانية عموماً ومستقبل الحل السلمي بشكل خاص وتتلخَّص أهدافهم هذه في

1/ محاولة عزل موقف الحركة الشعبية التفاوضي عن القضايا القومية والتمسُّك بمخرجات الحوار الوطني التي تٌمثِّل وجهة نظر ورؤية المؤتمر الوطني.

2/ الحفاظ على بقاء النظام في السلطة والحفاظ على سيطرة الحركة الإسلامية على النظام

3/ التخلُّص من خصومهم بكافة الوسائل المشروعة وغير المشروعة، وأهم خصومهم الحركة الشعبية والجيش الشعبي لتحرير السودان – شمال

ولتحقيق هذه الأهداف وحسب ما جاء في المداولات فقد تم تحديد الوسائل التي يريدون بها تحقيق هذه الأهداف وتتلخَّص في :

1/ الخداع : كما جاء في موجهات عمر البشير : (همنا الأول نُفكك الجيش الشعبي بجنوب كردفان وهذا يحتاج لخطوات سياسية ودبلوماسية مع الدول والمنظمات الداعمة لهم نوقف الإمداد ونغريهم بالسلام الزائف) وما جاء أيضاً في التوصية رقم 29 : (التأكيد على إن الحكومة تريد مفاوضة مجموعة الحلو لإعطائهم أهمية زائفة ويتم إستدراجهم إلى عمق التفاوض).

2/ شراء الذمم وفي هذا يعتمد المؤتمر الوطني على أموال الحركة الإسلامية بالخارج (المال السياسي)

3/ الترهيب والتلويح بالإغتيالات

4/ زرع الفتنة بين الحركة الشعبية لتحرير السودان – شمال وبعض قبائل جنوب السودان كما جاء في التوصية رقم 18 : (قيادة عمل سري مع قبائل النوير والشلك والإستوائيين بإن تواجد أبناء النوبة المؤيدين لسلفاكير بالجيش الشعبي بالمنطقتين خطر على مستقبلهم السياسي في جنوب السودان).

5/ الإعداد للحرب والإبادة وهذا ما يؤكده البشير : (أبناء النوبة ما عندنا ليهم غير البندقية والرصاص والهواء الماشي، والجبال القاعدين فيها بتبقى ليهم أضيَّق من خُرم الإبرة .. تفاوضنا لجمع السلاح وإستلام أراضينا وإيقاف المؤسسات التبشيرية الأجنبية .. ).

6/ إعتماد المؤتمر الوطني على ما يُسمَّى بـ(مُبادرة أبناء النوبة في الخارج) لإضعاف الموقف التفاوضي للحركة الشعبية ومحاولتهم تسويق المُبادرة للوساطة الأفريقية وممثلي دول الترويكا والمجتمع الدولي.

7/ تصفية الجيش الشعبي لتحرير السودان- شمال من خلال التفاوض، وبالتالي فإن تركيزهم في المفاوضات ينحصر في ملف الترتيبات الأمنية دون المساس بالقضايا السياسية.

الخلاصة :

1/ المؤتمر الوطني هو المسؤول عن إطالة أمد الحرب بعدم جديتهم للوصول إلى سلام شامل وعادل

2/ إرتباط النظام بأجندة خارجية غير وطنية (الحركة الإسلامية العالمية).

3/ (توحيد الحركة الشعبية – شمال) يقف من خلفه المؤتمر الوطني بإعتبار إن وجود الرئيس والأمين العام السابقين سيُسرِّع العملية التفاوضية بسبب التنازلات التي قاموا بتقديمها في الجولات السابقة.

قراءة حول الوثيقة المُسرَّبة لمداولات إجتماع رئيس المؤتمر الوطني مع رئيس وفد المفاوضات واللجنة الأمنية والعسكرية لإسناد التفاوض المُسرَّبة بتاريخ : 18 نوفمبر 2018