The National Islamic Front/National Congress Party and International Terrorism: A long, grim history:
Compendium of Reports, Analyses 1992 – 2017
To: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
From: Ted Dagne, Specialist in African Affairs, 7-7646 | Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Subject: Sudan and Terrorism
October 15, 2009
[The following section was prepared by John Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and National Security (email@example.com, 7-5529). U.S Department of State, “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” at [ http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm ], visited February 10, 2009]
Sudan and the World Trade Center Bombing in 1993
According to the 1996 Patterns of Global Terrorism report, “in April 1996 the Department of State expelled a Sudanese diplomat at the Sudanese UN Mission who had ties to the conspirators planning to bomb the UN building and other targets in New York in 1993. A Sudanese national, who pleaded guilty in February 1995 to various charges of complicity in the New York City bomb plots foiled by the FBI, indicated two members of the Sudanese UN Mission had offered to facilitate access to the UN building in support of the bombing plot.”
Sheikh Abdel Rahman, the Egyptian-born leader of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, received his visa in Khartoum and reportedly was a guest of a senior Sudanese Government official for several weeks. Moreover, of the 15 men indicted for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, five were Sudanese nationals who had strong ties with Sudanese diplomats stationed in New York at the Sudanese embassy.
[The following section was prepared by John Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and National Security (firstname.lastname@example.org, 7-5529). U.S Department of State, “State Sponsors of Terrorism,” at [ http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm ], visited February 10, 2009]
The Government of Sudan played a critical role in the assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, June 25, 1995). This terrorist act should serve to remind us why the United States must be exceedingly skeptical in assessing the terrorist “intelligence” now expediently coming from a fearful Khartoum. U.N. records, transcripts, and resolutions make clear—as do US intelligence sources—that responsibility for this terrorist act belongs to the National Islamic Front regime. This regime is the present Government of Sudan; and it is composed of the same cast of vicious characters implicated in this highly significant terrorist event. Obviously whatever they are offering in the way of “intelligence” will have been fully purged and sanitized—perhaps voluminous, but surely expedient.
On June 25, 1995, a very well-planned and ambitiously organized assassination attempt was made against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during a visit to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for a summit of the Organization of African Unity. (Ethiopia shares a very significant border with Sudan.) Evidence of the Government of Sudan’s complicity was clear and overwhelming from the beginning. This evidence would lead to a unanimous UN Security Council Resolution (No. 1044, adopted in January 1996) imposing diplomatic sanctions on Sudan for its failure to cooperate in the investigation of the assassination attempt.
The reason the Government of Sudan–the National Islamic Front regime—did not cooperate in the investigation is clear: it was responsible for supporting the assassination and for providing a means of escape to the assassination operatives who survived and managed to flee back to Sudan.
How great was their responsibility? At the time, U.S. representative to the UN Edward W. Gnehm declared: “[in passing Resolution 1044] the [UN Security] Council recognized Sudan’s complicity in supporting and sheltering those who plotted the attempted assassination of the Egyptian President and the Sudanese Government’s sponsorship of terrorism as part of its foreign policy” [text from UN Press Release, April 26, 1996].
The key language here is the Government of Sudan’s “supporting and sheltering” the terrorists who attempted to assassinate Mubarak. Also of note is the language: “the Sudanese Government’s sponsorship of terrorism as part of its foreign policy.”
Gnehm went on to say: “The claims of the Government of the Sudan that it had tried to locate the three wanted suspects had no credibility. Sudanese authorities had been aware of the location of the three before, during and after the assassination attempt, and after the extradition request from Ethiopia was received. Such actions were only part of a broader pattern of Sudanese support for terrorism, which equally demanded action by the international community” [text from UN Press Release, April 26, 1996].
What are the implications of a United States representative to the UN declaring that the Government of Sudan, the National Islamic Front regime, knew the location of the assassination operatives “before, during, and after the assassination attempt”?
They are obvious: the United States knew at the time, as it did when it recently abstained in a UN resolution lifting sanctions against Sudan, that the Government of Sudan was deeply complicit in the Mubarak assassination attempt. It knew and knows, in other words, that some of the members of the National Islamic Front, which continues to constitute the Government of Sudan, are the same men responsible for the assassination attempt against Mubarak. How likely is it, then, that we can expect from Khartoum any truly useful “intelligence” on the Mubarak assassination attempt—or on any other terrorist act in which Khartoum itself has been complicit?
In fact, there is very particular intelligence about just who in the National Islamic Front regime was responsible for the terrorist attempt against Mubarak. According to an informed and exceedingly well-placed source in Washington, Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, now first Vice President of the Government of Sudan and the real power in the regime, was one of those behind the assassination. Even more damning, Ghazi Salahdin—now senior advisor to President Omar Bashir—was not only behind the assassination attempt, but is authoritatively reported to have provided transport and passports to the assassination operatives who escaped from Ethiopia, enabling them to move on to Afghanistan. Others figures complicit in the assassination attempt include Nafi Ali Nafi, then Chief of External Intelligence (now another senior advisor to General Beahir), and Qutbi al-Mahdi, perhaps the most virulently anti-American member of the National Islamic Front.
The evidence, both from the UN and from intelligence and regional sources, makes clear that the Government of Sudan—the National Islamic Front—was deeply complicit in the assassination attempt.
The Government of Ethiopia, on whose territory the attempt took place, also made clear that it knew the Government of Sudan—the National Islamic Front—was responsible for the assassination attempt.
The Ethiopian representative to the UN Security Council declared: “Evidence unearthed by his Government implicated the Government of the Sudan in the assassination attempt against President Mubarak of Egypt, clearly illustrating a threat to the peace and security of the region” [text from UN Press Release, January 31, 1996].
According to UN transcripts, Ethiopia went even further, with much greater particularity, in revealing its findings about the role of the National Islamic Front in the assassination attempt: “According to Ethiopia’s investigation, those involved in the assassination attempt were members of a terrorist organization called Al-Gama’a-Islamia. The two main leaders were based in Khartoum. The terrorists in custody admit that: their leaders live in Khartoum; the plot was hatched in Khartoum; their mission to assassinate President Mubarak was given to them in Khartoum; and the weapons intended to be used in their mission were flown into Addis Ababa by Sudan Airways from Khartoum. Moreover, the passports they possess, in virtually all cases, were prepared for them in Khartoum” [text from UN Press Release, January 31, 1996].
All this is common knowledge among U.S. government officials who are now dealing with a Sudan repeatedly described as “cooperative.” Such characterizations clearly imply a willingness to bury the inconvenient facts of recent history, including the Mubarak assassination attempt—along with many other terrorist activities in which Sudan is, and continues to be, complicit.
Given this willful obscuring of Sudan’s past, it is worth quoting another comment from the UN transcript, revealing what U.S. government views were at the time of this extraordinarily significant assassination attempt. (If Mubarak had indeed been assassinated, the consequences for the region would have been immensely consequential, and potentially deeply destabilizing; an Islamist “uprising” was to have been triggered in Egypt by the assassination):
[U.S. representative to the UN Edward W. Gnehm ]: “Sudan’s efforts to export terrorism [have] even reached the United Nations. Two employees of the Sudanese Mission had been active accomplices in the plot to assassinate President Mubarak during a visit to New York, and to blow up the United Nations. [Representative Gnehm] provided details of the plots and said his statements were not just allegations, but were part of the public records of the courts in New York. He elaborated on other support by the Sudan for terrorists, including the use of its airline and financial resources” [UN Press Release, April 26, 1996].
That was then; this is now, in the horrific wake of the events of September 11th. So, how expedient a deal is the U.S. willing to cut with Sudan for “intelligence” so expediently offered? How willing is it to overlook Sudan’s terrorist past? its terrorist present?
And most consequentially, how willing is the US to cut a deal with a regime that continues a massive campaign of terror against its own people—the people of southern Sudan and other marginalized areas? Are we willing to abandon these peoples to ongoing genocidal destruction in our pursuit of all possible “intelligence” from Khartoum? Are we willing to become as expedient as our adversaries in this fearsome new “war on terrorism”? Some terribly disturbing answers are emerging.
To: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
From: Ted Dagne, Specialist in African Affairs, 7-7646 | Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Subject: Sudan and Terrorism
October 15, 2009
Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
On August 7, 1998, mid-morning explosions killed 213 people, 12 of whom were U.S. citizens, at the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and eleven people (none American) at the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. As many as 5,000 people were injured in Nairobi, and 86 in Dar es Salaam. In retaliation, on August 20, 1998, President Clinton directed U.S. military forces to attack a terrorist training complex in Afghanistan and pharmaceutical factory in Sudan believed to be manufacturing precursors for chemical weapons. U.S. Navy surface ships and submarines, operating in the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, fired 75 or more Tomahawk cruise missiles at the two targets. The government of Sudan condemned the attack, accusing the Clinton Administration of aggression.
November 2, 2001: An article in today’s Wall Street Journal lays out in impressive detail the connections not only between the Khartoum regime, bin Laden, and his al-Qaeda network, but also the deep intertwining of Saudi financial institutions. As many have observed, Saudi Arabia has been remarkably unforthcoming about its financial connections to bin Laden and al-Qaeda. The growing body of evidence suggests they are right to be fearful of the implications of their seamy past.
A financial war on terrorism is clearly inevitable: unless terrorists can be deprived of financial and other resources, they will continue to mount large-scale and increasingly destructive attacks on all who oppose their maniacal vision. As an earlier series of analyses from this source has sought to demonstrate, the National Islamic Front regime in Khartoum continues to support bin Laden and al-Qaeda, as well as other terrorists, in a variety of ways. It has seemed appropriate to reiterate the fact that the State Department’s most recent report on world terrorism (April 2001) declares: “[In 2000] Sudan continued to be used as a safe haven by members of various groups, including associates of Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qaida organization.”
Moreover, Khartoum has used its diplomatic presence abroad to raise funds for bin Laden and al-Qaeda, to facilitate the movement of al-Qaeda operatives, and to recruit for al-Qaeda. And bin Laden’s huge financial and commercial resources in Sudan (banking, construction, agriculture) certainly did not evaporate when he left in 1996, but have remained accessible for his massive support of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The Washington Post (October 11, 2001) reported that that “Tens of millions of the $100 million provided by bin Laden to the Taliban since he arrived in Afghanistan from Sudan in 1996 has been directly traced to bin Laden entities through banking and other transfers.” This means Khartoum.
But though various features of this story have been reported in a number of newspaper investigations and governmental reports, the full picture has not yet been brought into focus. This is largely because of the sheer complexity of the mosaic of financial institutions involved. Reuters reported (Oct 10, 2001) on a report released by a French member of Parliament that noted, “Osama bin Laden could have links, direct or indirect, with more than 500 banks, businesses and charities across the globe.”
Reuters also reported that “beyond the [bin Laden] family empire, [the French parliamentary report] detailed a network of financial institutions which it said the Islamic militant set up throughout the 1990s, mainly in places like Sudan, but with links or bases in Europe, many of them in Britain.”
Most strikingly, the French report (titled “Economic Environment of Osama bin Laden”) noted that besides direct funding from Islamic revolutionary groups based in Kandahar, Afghanistan, bin Laden also relies on a holding company based in Khartoum:
According to the several cross-matched sources, this [Khartoum-based] holding company groups seven Sudanese firms and an indeterminate number of others in Yemen, in the import-export sector, publishing and ceramics, as well as electrics in Kenya” (Reuters, October 10, 2001).
It is in this context that we should see the significance of today’s well-researched Wall Street Journal reporting:
U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism officials say they have information linking the [Saudi Arabian] Dallah al Baraka Group to transactions by al Qaeda and other extremist groups. One U.S. official said al Qaeda is suspected of using the banking services of one of the group’s biggest subsidiaries, the Jidda-based al Baraka Bank, which has offices across the Middle East and Asia.
Officials wouldn’t give specific information about what transactions caught their interest. But Dallah’s chairman, Saleh Abdullah Kamel, is a longtime investor in a Sudanese bank used during the 1990s by al Qaeda.” (Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2001)
The Sudanese bank in question is the now notorious al Shamal Islamic Bank, whose accounts have been frozen in France and whose activities have been highlighted in a Senate report by Senator Carl Levin. Indeed, al Shamal Islamic Bank’s links to bin Laden have been repeatedly reported on, including the fact that the bank was supplied with $50 million in start-up capital by bin Laden. The Wall Street Journal goes on to note that:
Mr. Kamel has extensive business ties in Sudan, which was used as a base by Mr. bin Laden in the 1990s before he moved to Afghanistan. Mr. Kamel is listed as an original investor and top shareholder in the al Shamal Islamic Bank of Khartoum, Sudan, which U.S. prosecutors say was used to funnel large amounts of money to al Qaeda operatives.
And why wouldn’t al Shamal Islamic Bank “funnel large amounts of money to al Qaeda operatives”? Again, it was capitalized by bin Laden himself. Al Shamal Islamic Bank figures in other ways, as the Journal also reports:
In 1996, the State Department alleged that Mr. bin Laden and several wealthy sympathizers of Sudan’s National Islamic Front founded the al Shamal Bank. During recent trials in New York of al Qaeda members involved in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa, witnesses testified that al Shamal was used to move at least $350,000 for al Qaeda, including a $250,000 wire transfer to the U.S. in 1993 for purchase of an airplane.
An unflinching look at the realities of Khartoum’s ongoing support for international terrorism, and bin Laden and al-Qaeda in particular, should do a good deal to chasten the language now emanating from Washington about the regime’s “cooperation” in the war on terrorism. The [November 2, 2001]article, along with a raft of previous reports, is only the prelude to several major investigative reports that will soon be appearing.
More on Khartoum and Osama bin Laden/al-Qaeda
In the days following September 11, 2001, a number of revealing reports quickly emerged, demonstrating that bin Laden’s departure for Afghanistan did not end his relationship with the Khartoum regime. For example, the Boston Globe, CNN, and Reuters all reported on the continuing role of al-Shamal Bank in financing Osama bin Laden’s campaign of terror against the United States. Unsurprisingly, al-Shamal Bank is in Khartoum. Moreover, the National Islamic Front (as it was known during bin Laden’s sojourn) also gave bin Laden many lucrative opportunities not only in banking, but in agriculture and construction. And as the al-Shamal Bank example suggested, bin Laden continued to derive extensive support from Khartoum well after his departure for Afghanistan. The Boston Globe offered a particularly telling example:
“Bin Laden could be using the [al-]Shamal bank to gain access to US banks,” [Senator Carl] Levin said, calling for new laws that would prevent such access. Levin cited an instance in which $250,000 was wired from [al-]Shamal Bank to a bin Laden associate in Texas, who used the money to buy a plane for bin Laden. (September 27, 2001)
According to CNN (September 26, 2001), bin Laden had provided $50 million in start-up capital for the al-Shamal Bank. It’s simply not credible that the Khartoum regime wasn’t fully aware of such a large financial presence in its banking system. And as the Boston Globe also notes in reporting on the years in which bin Laden was actually in Sudan: “U.S. officials said bin Laden controlled some of the largest commercial enterprises in Sudan, generating both profits and a cover for terrorist activities.” In yet another revealing moment in the Boston Globe report, we learn that:
[Bin Laden’s] businesses were not just focused on the bottom line, U.S. prosecutors [in the Tanzania and Kenya embassies bombing trial] say. In one transaction, a bin Laden company sent sugar from Sudan to Afghanistan. But on its return flight, the rented Sudan Airways cargo plane was loaded with Milan rockets and Stinger missiles.
Moreover, al-Qaeda never fully left Khartoum and Sudan, even after bin Laden’s departure. The April 2001 State Department report on state sponsors of terrorism declared emphatically: “[In 2000] Sudan continued to be used as a safe haven by members of various groups, including associates of Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qaida organization.”
The broadest and most authoritative picture was provided by Africa Confidential, and much of what was said over a decade ago remains true today:
The N[ational I[slamic] F[ront] political and security apparatus is intact, as are the NIF’s and the international Islamists’ control of the economy. Many of those running terrorist training are still in security and ministerial jobs. So, well informed Sudanese doubt that the NIF will hand much of value to U.S. investigators. The NIF is as Islamist as its friends Usama and the Taliban. This regime believes in what it does. Any concession is intended only to protect the greater cause. Secondly, any major betrayal would be suicidal, just as dangerous as holding free elections. (Africa Confidential, Volume 42, No. 19, September 28, 2001)
British Prime Minister at the time, Tony Blair, disclosed in the wake of 9/11 that:
… “these bin Laden companies were key assets in the al-Qaeda terrorist campaign. Since 1989, Osama bin Laden has established a series of (Sudanese) businesses to provide income for al-Qaeda, and to provide cover for the procurement of explosives, weapons and chemicals, and for the travel of al-Qaeda operatives,” said a report tabled in the British parliament. (The Citizen [Ottawa], October 12, 2001)
In the same account The Citizen reported (along with many others):
The FBI has confirmed that Mohamed Atta, who piloted one of the commercial jetliners into the World Trade Center, wired money to Mr. bin Laden’s former paymaster in Sudan, Shaykh Sai’id el Masry, also known as Mustafa Muhammad Ahmad, on the eve of the terrorist attacks…. Shaykh Sai’id [Mustafa Muhammad Ahmad] controlled the bin Laden financial network in Sudan through a company called Taba Investments, and used profits from related Sudanese banks and businesses to finance and cloak terrorist training.
The Associated Press reported that Ali Mohamed, who pled guilty to conspiracy in the 1998 east African embassy bombings, said
…he [Mohamed] arranged security for a meeting in the Sudan between Hezbollah’s chief and bin Laden. Hezbollah provided explosives training for al-Qaida and Islamic Jihad, Mohamed said, while Iran supplied Egyptian Jihad with weapons and used Hezbollah to supply explosives that were disguised to look like rocks.” (Associated Press, October 12, 2001)
The Washington Post, on October 11, 2001 reported that “Tens of millions of the $100 million provided by bin Laden to the Taliban since he arrived in Afghanistan from Sudan in 1996 has been directly traced to bin Laden entities through banking and other transfers.” These transfers would certainly have involved the Taba Investments Company and al-Shamal Bank in Khartoum, which received $50 million in start-up capital from bin Laden when he was in Sudan.
The Post had earlier reported: “Aldy el-Attar, a 53-year-old surgeon who had a practice in the city of Neu-Ulm in the state of Bavaria, met separately both with alleged hijacker Mohamed Atta and Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, an alleged financier for Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda network, the sources said. El-Attar traveled frequently in Europe and between Germany and Sudan” (October 9, 2001).
The Los Angeles Times reported on October 7, 2001 that a unit of Islamic moujahedeen in Bosnia had been financed by bin Laden “by means of small convoys of recruits from the Arab world through his businesses in Sudan, according to Mideast sources.”
And The Guardian of October 1, 2001 reported in detail on the financial background of bin Laden and al-Qaeda:
United States investigators believe they have found the “smoking gun” linking Osama bin Laden to the September 11 terrorist attacks, with the discovery of financial evidence showing money transfers between the hijackers and a bin Laden aide in the United Arab Emirates. The man at the centre of the financial web is believed to be Sheikh Saeed, also known as Mustafa Mohamed Ahmad, who worked as a financial manager for bin Laden when the Saudi exile was based in Sudan, and is still a trusted paymaster in bin Laden’s al-Qaida organisation.
Perhaps the most chilling and explicit report was that of September 28, 2001, from the National Post (Canada). Citing documents from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the National Post reported on two disturbing developments:
 Sudanese leaders [of the National Islamic Front regime] agreed in 1998 to use their embassy staff in New York, London and Rome to raise funds for Osama bin Laden, according to documents from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.
 The documents, filed in Federal Court, also claim the Sudanese agreed to arrange for diplomatic credentials for bin Laden followers, allowing them unfettered travel around the world. The alleged agreement was struck between bin Laden’s top aide, Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahri, and “Sudanese Islamic leaders,” the CSIS brief said.
This report found its counterpart in the Hindustan Times (New Delhi) of September 20, 2001:
According to a senior police official, fresh evidence gathered by them has revealed that Ismail, the first secretary in the Sudanese embassy, was not only operating as a conduit of Osama bin Laden in the Capital [New Delhi] but was also trying to recruit more operatives for subversive activities.
[See also my overview account of the banking, investment, and commercial intertwining of the Khartoum regime and bin Laden and al-Qaeda at: “Osama bin Laden’s Ongoing Commercial and Financial Connections to Khartoum, September 19, 2001 and “Khartoum and a ‘financial war on terrorism’: connecting the dots,” November 2, 2001, http://sudanreeves.org/2004/12/22/khartoum-and-a-financial-war-on-terrorism-connecting-the-dots-november-2-2001]
[See also transcripts of the 1998 embassy bombings trial, which had recently concluded. The trial for these acts of terrorism clearly indicated the responsibility of bin Laden and his terrorist network al-Qaeda. Companies such as Talisman Energy and the Government of Canada must certainly have had considerable knowledge of bin Laden’s, and thus Sudan’s, role in the embassy bombings when Talisman officially entered Sudan in October 1998. For transcripts of the trial, revealing much about bin Laden’s financial and commercial connections to Sudan, see the analysis of those transcripts by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/binladen.htm ]
Has Khartoum really changed?
And just who is the man and the organization that Khartoum chose to have as such a close ally and business partner? Bin Laden makes little distinction between American civilians and soldiers. “You say I am fighting against the American civilians,” he told one interviewer. “My enemy is every American man who is fighting against me, even by paying taxes” (Los Angeles Times, September 15, 2001).
The same attitude prevails in many powerful quarters in Khartoum, as suggested by the willingness to assist in the transfer of powerful rockets to Gaza, where their only targets can be Israeli civilians, taxpaying and otherwise. General Gration’s false claim that only domestic “politics” keeps Sudan on the State Department list of state sponsors of international terrorism reflects either disabling ignorance or cynical mendacity; in his case it’s a tough call to make. But the U.S. intelligence community knows full well all that I report here—and still chooses to attempt to define U.S. Sudan policy through the lens of counter-terrorism “cooperation” with Khartoum.
Despite President Bush’s 2005 reiteration of the genocide finding against Khartoum for its actions in Darfur, first announced in September 2004 by former Secretary of State Colin Powell, the CIA flew to Washington, DC—on executive jet—Major-General Saleh ‘Gosh,’ head of the regime’s National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS). This occurred even as Gosh was known to be a prime architect of genocide in Darfur. In an extraordinary depiction of the controversy over this visit, even within the Bush administration, the Los Angeles Times reported on June 17, 2005:
The CIA and Mukhabarat [Khartoum’s intelligence and security services] officials have met regularly over the last few years, but Gosh had been seeking an invitation to Washington in recognition of his government’s efforts, sources told The Times. The CIA, hoping to seal the partnership, extended the invitation. “The agency’s view was that the Sudanese are helping us on terrorism and it was proud to bring him over,” said a government source with knowledge of Gosh’s visit. “They didn’t care about the political implications.”
These “political implications,” of course, included Khartoum’s understanding of the significance of Washington’s willingness to invite not simply a known génocidaire, but a man directly responsible for many tens of thousands of “disappearances,” extrajudicial executions, instances of brutal torture, political arrests, and other violations of human rights. These have been regularly chronicled for many years by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the African Center for Justice and Peace Studies (UK), among others.
As the Los Angeles Times dispatch continued:
An internal debate erupted after word of the invitation [to Gosh] spread to other government agencies. Their concern stemmed in part from a 2004 letter that 11 members of Congress sent to Bush, which accused Gosh of being a chief architect of the violence in Darfur. The letter said Sudan had engaged in a ‘scorched-earth policy against innocent civilians in Darfur.’ It identified 21 Sudanese government, military and militia leaders as responsible and called on the administration to freeze their assets and ban them from coming to the U.S. Gosh was No. 2 on the list.
Several sources, including a State Department official, said the question of the propriety of the visit provoked sharp divisions at that agency. Similar opposition emerged at the Justice Department, where officials discussed arresting Gosh, according to two sources.” The CIA was “proud” of inviting Saleh Gosh; the Justice Department considered arresting him.
The State Department view was also rendered insightfully:
“Ted Dagne, a Sudan specialist with the Congressional Research service, said State Department officials believed Gosh’s trip would ‘send a political signal to the [Sudanese] government that Darfur would not prevent Sudan from winning support in Washington.’”
The signal was received clearly in Khartoum….
In fact, the visit by Gosh only highlighted a key feature of the relationship with Khartoum that has been cultivated by both the Bush and Obama administrations. In August 2010 the Washington Post reported at length on the extensive cooperation between the CIA and Khartoum’s brutally repressive NISS:
“[T]he CIA is continuing to train and equip Sudan’s intelligence service in the name of fighting terrorism. The irony is not lost on critics of the arrangement. ‘The U.S. government is training the Sudanese intelligence services and conducting bilateral operations with them—all in the name of the long war,’ said a former intelligence officer who served in Sudan. “We also refer to the Sudanese as a state sponsor of terror, have called their activities in Darfur genocide, and supported the issuance of arrest warrants for the Sudanese president for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined by the International Criminal Court.”
“Certainly,” the former intelligence officer added, “the CIA is providing training to the National Intelligence and Security Service,’ known as the NISS. ‘I suspect it was begun … in the very early days after September 11.’ Others say it began in the 1990s.”
The Post article continues:
“There has also been transfers of equipment” to the NISS, [the official] said, “computers, etcetera.” Another knowledgeable former U.S. intelligence official said the CIA-NISS partnership began even earlier, in the Clinton administration, and called it “incredibly valuable.” “We have a had a long term relationship with the Sudanese, even when they closed the embassy for a short period in the late 90s,” the official said on condition of anonymity because the topic is so sensitive.
These “computers, etcetera” were undoubtedly used by the NISS to keep track of dissidents, to monitor private conversations (especially with international interlocutors), and to forestall any nascent political opposition. Whatever surveillance capacity was included in the transferred U.S. equipment would have certainly been put immediately to domestic use. Those who have been tortured, arrested without trial, or executed extra-judicially may well have U.S. intelligence equipment to thank.
The means by which this arrangement are justified by intelligence officials are so absurd as to seem the stuff of satire:
Some U.S. officials with intimate knowledge of the CIA’s program contend that the spy agency’s relationship with the NISS actually fosters human rights. “The intelligence channel has been one tool our government has used to try to influence the Sudanese in terms of human rights and the rule of law,” said one such official. “That was a deliberate policy decision, made with inter-agency support …. ”
The notion that human rights are “fostered” by a bilateral arrangement in which the U.S. provides equipment and training to one of the most repressive regimes in the world is utterly preposterous. The credulous notion that this equipment will not be readily diverted to support domestic political tyranny reveals a radical ignorance of the character of the Khartoum regime. There is not a shred of evidence to support these ludicrous claims, and there are reams of human rights reports that make clear Khartoum has only grown more repressive during the years in question.
Just as fantastically, the Post reports:
“If the Sudanese go outside the box,’ [one official with intimate knowledge of the CIA’s program] maintained, ‘we can pull the plug.”
“Go outside the box”? Just how does the CIA understand “the box” in Sudan? Is eight years of genocidal destruction in Darfur “within the box”? Is the constant and deliberate aerial bombardment of civilian and humanitarian targets “within the box”? Are the military seizure of Abyei and the continuing indiscriminate military assaults in South Kordofan and Blue Nile “within the box”? Is ethnically-targeted slaughter “within the box”? Is the denial of humanitarian access to many, many hundreds of thousands of Sudanese civilians “within the box”?
|Reference id||aka Wikileaks id #91177|
|Subject||Iran And Syria Nonproliferation Act — Notification Of Sanctions Against Three Sudanese Entities (c)|
|Origin||Secretary of State (United States)|
|Cable time||Thu, 28 Dec 2006 22:23 UTC|
|History||· Time unknown: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks|
O P 282223Z DEC 06 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
Hide header S E C R E T STATE 203861 E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2031 TAGS: PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], MTCRE [Missile Technology Control Regime], PREL [External Political Relations], MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications], ETTC [Trade and Technology Controls], SU [Sudan]
SUBJECT: IRAN AND SYRIA NONPROLIFERATION ACT — NOTIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THREE SUDANESE ENTITIES (C) Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(D), and (H). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Khartoum please see paragraph 5. ¶2. (S)
Background: The Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act (ISNA) requires periodic reports to Congress identifying foreign entities with respect to whom there is credible information indicating that they have transferred to or acquired from Iran or Syria items on multilateral lists (Australia Group (AG), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)) or other items with the potential to make a material contribution to missile, WMD, or certain other weapons programs. The USG has determined that Al Zarga Optical and Electronics Company, Giad Industrial Complex, and Yarmouk Industrial Complex have engaged in activities, as noted above, that warrant the imposition of measures pursuant to Section 3 of the ISNA. ¶3. (S)
Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of the ISNA, the following penalties are imposed on these entities, (or individuals), their subunits, subsidiaries, and successors.
: a. No department or agency of the United States Government may procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement of any goods, technology, or services from them; b. No department or agency of the United States Government may provide any assistance to them…
and they shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance program of the United States Government; c. No USG sales to them of any item on the United States Munitions List are permitted, and all sales to them of any defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act are terminated; and d. No new individual licenses shall be granted for the transfer to them of items, the export of which is controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979 or the Export Administration Regulations, and existing such licenses are suspended. These measures, which will take effect shortly, will remain in place for two years. We want to provide advance notice to the Sudanese Government of this decision, note that this determination will be published soon in the Federal Register, and make clear that the penalties are only on the entities or individuals. End Background. ¶4. (S) Purpose/Objective: To inform the host government of the sanctions determination prior to its publication in the Federal Register. ¶5. (S)
Action request: Post is requested to provide the following suggested talking points to appropriate Sudanese government officials and report response. Post should stress that the measures taken are related to our Iran and Syria policies, not the ongoing dialogue on Darfur. Talking points also may be provided as a non-paper. ¶6. (S//REL SUDAN) Suggested Talking Points: — The United States has determined that there is credible information indicating that Al Zarga Optical and Electronics Company, Giad Industrial Complex, and Yarmouk Industrial Complex transferred to or acquired from Iran since January 1, 1999, or transferred to or acquired from Syria since January 1, 2005, items on a multilateral control list, or other items that have the potential to contribute materially to WMD, missile, or certain other weapons programs in Iran or Syria. — Based on these transfers, we have imposed certain measures against these entities as provided in the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act (ISNA). — We are not in a position at this time to describe the activities which led to this determination, but be assured that these actions are not related to our ongoing dialogue on Darfur. — Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of the ISNA, the following measures are imposed on these entities, (or individuals), and their successors, subunits, and subsidiaries: a. No department or agency of the United States Government may procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement of any goods, technology, or services from them; b. No department or agency of the United States Government may provide any assistance to them, and they shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance program of the United States Government; c. No USG sales to them of any item on the United States Munitions List are permitted, and all sales to them of any defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act are terminated: and d. No new individual licenses shall be granted for the transfer to them of items, the export of which is controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979 or the Export Administration Regulations, and existing such licenses are suspended. —
These measures will take effect shortly and will remain in place for two years. — This determination will be published soon in the Federal Register. ¶7. (U) Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR and AF/SPG. A response is requested as soon as possible. Department point of contact is Ralph Palmiero, ISN/MTR, 202-647-3737(email@example.com). RICE NNNN End Cable Text
Obama, in accepting Lyman’s assessment, has given unmistakable evidence of prioritizing counter-terrorism “cooperation” with the present regime over concern about ongoing atrocity crimes committed by that same regime on an ongoing basis (many highly informed observers who are not part of the Obama administration have grave reservations about the quality what this “cooperation” yields). This, in turn, directly contradicts an Obama campaign statement on this very issue; for in April 2008 candidate Obama expressed “deep concern” that the Bush administration was making an unseemly deal with the Khartoum regime as a means to bolster the fledgling but already failing UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID):
“This reckless and cynical initiative [by President George W. Bush] would reward a regime in Khartoum that has a record of failing to live up to its commitments. First, no country should be removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism for any reason other than the existence of verifiable proof that the government in question does not support terrorist organizations.” (http://www.barackobama.com/2008/04/18/statement_of_senator_barack_ob_10.php;
NB: this link to candidate Obama’s statement has gone “dead,” and merely leads to the present Obama administration self-promotion site)
During Senate testimony of July 2009, Gration declared:
“There’s no evidence in our intelligence community that supports [Sudan] being on the state sponsors of terrorism. It’s a political decision,” Gration said. (National Public Radio) (http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=111422940)
It is conceivable, but unlikely, that Gration did not know of the reports on Khartoum’s involvement in supporting terrorism that had been revealed in a series of “wiki-leaked” documents earlier that year, as well as the State Department assessments from preceding years. In the latter document, to which Gration certainly had access by the time of his testimony, we find that:
…al-Qa’ida-inspired terrorist elements as well as elements of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and HAMAS, remained in Sudan in 2009 (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/index.htm).
Moreover, U.S. intelligence knew that in March 2009 Sudan had played a role in supplying Iranian arms for Hamas in Gaza. The Guardian (UK) reported in late 2010 on “wiki-leaked” State Department cables from both January and March 2009, well before Gration’s testimony:
State department cables released by WikiLeaks show that Sudan was warned by the U.S. in January 2009 not to allow the delivery of unspecified Iranian arms that were expected to be passed to Hamas in the Gaza Strip around the time of Israel’s Cast Lead offensive, in which 1,400 Palestinians were killed. (December 6, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/06/wikileaks-sudan-iranian-arms-gaza/)
US diplomats were instructed to express “exceptional concern” to Khartoum officials, but those warnings evidently went unheeded. The Guardian goes on to report:
In March 2009, Jordan and Egypt were informed by the U.S. of new Iranian plans to ship a cargo of “lethal military equipment” to Syria with onward transfer to Sudan and then to Hamas.
The cables don’t specify what the disposition of this “lethal military equipment” was. But Hamas is considered a terrorist organization by Canada, the European Union, Japan—and the U.S., a fact confirmed in the most recent State Department report on “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” Again, Khartoum’s role in the supply operation to Hamas in March 2009 is explicitly identified by U.S. intelligence.
But the second event of the past week, viewed historically, is just as disturbing as the attack on Dr. Catena, even when the issue is terrorism itself—against which the past two U.S. administration’s have declared themselves to be at war. For in the most recent report from the U.S. State Department (April 30, 2014, representing findings for 2013) Sudan is one of only four countries designated as a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” (the others are Syria, Iran, and—dubiously—Cuba). The report, with its expedient praise of the regime, seems designed to encourage Khartoum to get out of the terrorism business entirely, but such was not the case in 2013. The report notes:
• Elements of al-Qa’ida-inspired terrorist groups remained in Sudan. The Government of Sudan has taken steps to limit the activities of these elements, and has worked to disrupt foreign fighters’ use of Sudan as a logistics base and transit point for terrorists going to Mali, Syria, and Afghanistan.
• However, groups continued to operate in Sudan in 2013 and there continued to be reports of Sudanese nationals participating in terrorist organizations. For example, regional media outlets alleged one Sudanese national was part of an al-Shabaab terrorist cell that attacked the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in September. There was also evidence that Sudanese violent extremists participated in terrorist activities in Somalia and Mali.
• In 2013, Sudan continued to allow members of Hamas to travel, fundraise, and live in Sudan.
• The UN and NGOs reported in 2013 that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is likely operating in the disputed Kafia Kingi area, claimed by Sudan and South Sudan, in close proximity to Sudanese Armed Forces. At year’s end, the United States continued to engage the Government of Sudan, the AU, and the UN to evaluate these reports. (the full State Department Sudan report appears as Appendix B)
The report begins by noting that Sudan has been on the State Department list since 1993, when Osama bin Laden found safe haven in Sudan and was in fact eagerly embraced by what was then known only as the National Islamic Front. Bin Laden was in Sudan from 1992 – 1996, the years during which al-Qaeda came to fruition; and there are a great many reports confirming Khartoum’s continued support for bin Laden even after he and al-Qaeda had moved on to Afghanistan.
But the history of the “State Sponsor of Terrorism” designation reveals a peculiarly torturous relationship between Khartoum and Washington, one that has reached new lows in expediency during the Obama administration. This has led most conspicuously to the “de-coupling” of Darfur from the whole issue of Khartoum’s sponsorship of terrorism, as explained by a “senior Obama administration official” (the official is not named in the State Department transcript of a November 9, 2010 background briefing):
“… the U.S. [is] prepared to accelerate the removal of Sudan from the state sponsor of terrorism list if the Government of Sudan did two things. One is to fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and two, to live up to all of the legal conditions required under law for Sudan to be taken off the state sponsors list. By doing this, we would also be de-coupling the state sponsor of terrorism from Darfur and from the Darfur issue.” (emphasis added)
Sudan policy was guided first and foremost by the concerns of the intelligence community, including the CIA. Men such as John Brennan (current head of the CIA, but formerly the Agency deputy responsible for counter-terrorism) and Denis McDonough (former Deputy National Security Advisor who wielded immense foreign policy influence with Obama and is now White House Chief of Staff) were making the key decisions, not Hillary Clinton. That the decision to extend counter-terrorism cooperation with Khartoum meant ignoring U.S. law was evidently yet another price willing to be paid:
A senior U.S. official told The Washington Times on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the matter. “We have told the Sudanese that what we intend to do is to waive the application of the [Congressionally mandated] Darfur Peace and Accountability Act] in this regard should they fulfill all requirements of the [Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005],” he added. (Washington Times, February 11, 2011; http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/8/sudans-terror-list-removal-untied-from-darfur)
In fact, the Obama administration continued the botched implementation of the CPA that had begun when the Bush administration—having achieved a major diplomatic victory in Africa—walked away from the difficult challenges of implementing the CPA. One reason we are now witnessing the spectacle of ethnic slaughter and the prospect of massive famine in South Sudan is that those who secured the peace—particularly the U.S. and the UK—did not do enough to anticipate the obstacles to implementation, or the obduracy of Khartoum, or the desperate need for governance reform in the South, where the Government of South Sudan was in many ways little more than an extension of the guerrilla movement of the SPLA/SPLM. This need for reform, both within the SPLM and in the governance structure of the country as a whole, was the precipitating cause for the complex, and still not fully explained events of December 15, 2013, when fighting broke out in Juba and quickly turned into ethnically-targeted violence.
The disastrous last-minute diplomatic press around Abyei, almost six years after the signing of the CPA, is a measure of how much the U.S. had let implementation issues slide. For in addition to Abyei, the CPA-stipulated border delineation and demarcation of Sudan and South Sudan had not occurred; there was no agreement on oil transit fees or revenue sharing between Khartoum and Juba, even as independence was slated for July 9, 2011; several of the five main contested areas are potential flash-points for renewed North/South conflict, including Kafia Kingi (clearly part of the South if we are guided by the maps defining the region as of January 1, 1956). This is the area where there is very strong evidence that Khartoum is again supporting the maniacally brutal Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony:
The UN and NGOs reported in 2013 that the Lord’s Resistance Army is likely operating in the disputed Kafia Kingi area, claimed by Sudan and South Sudan, in close proximity to Sudanese Armed Forces. (U.S. State Department, State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview, April 30, 2014)
Certainly there is no disputing that Khartoum used the LRA as a proxy force during the long civil war, against both South Sudan and Uganda, trying in the latter case to prevent Uganda from assisting the SPLA. Renewed support for the LRA, which looks increasingly likely, is an inexpensive extension of the regime’s brutal counter-insurgency strategy.
Small Arms Survey | May 2014
AFP May 12: Iran plays major role in Sudan arms sector, study finds In March, Israel intercepted a ship it said was headed to Gaza via Sudan with M-302 missiles and other Iranian weapons
BY AFP May 12, 2014, KHARTOUM, Sudan —
Evidence suggests Iran has played a key role in supporting wartorn Sudan’s weapons production, while Tehran has also been Khartoum’s secondbiggest supplier of arms, a study said on Monday. Some of those imported arms, along with others from China, have reached rebel groups in Sudan as well as South Sudan, said the Small Arms Survey report based on more than two years of investigation. It said that there is “emerging evidence that Iran has played a significant role in supporting Sudan’s weapons manufacturing sector.” China has also reportedly provided training and technical support for Sudanese weapons production, the report said. It cited data showing that most of Sudan’s imported small arms, light weapons, ammunition, rocket and grenade launchers have come from China in recent years. But the report also elaborates on the extent of Sudan’s military links with Iran, which have repeatedly been the subject of regional concern and speculation. “Military ties between Iran and Sudan have grown strong over the years,” said the Small Arms Survey, a Swiss-based independent research group. In March, Israel intercepted in the Red Sea a ship, the Klos-C, which it said carried M-302 missiles and other weapons shipped from Iran. They were to have been offloaded at Port Sudan and then taken overland to Palestinian militants in Gaza.
Small Arms Survey:
from: WEAPONS TRACING IN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN Conflict between state and non-state forces continues in Sudan and South Sudan, despite multiple peace agreements. In late 2013, a number of anti-government militias were engaged in vigorous insurgencies in South Sudan; meanwhile, separate branches of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM–N) were fighting rebellions on two fronts in the Sudanese states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and the Darfur conflict continued. To shed light on the types, origin, and supply patterns of arms and ammunition to non-state armed groups, the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan launched the Arms and Ammunition Tracing Desk in 2011.
The project has built on and adapted techniques pioneered by UN embargo panel investigations, applying a multi-step process of weapons identification, mapping, and verification. While Sudan and South Sudan are home to an abundance of legacy weapons from the civil war era, many of which originated in former Eastern Bloc countries, this chapter focuses on more recently produced weapons, including arms and ammunition manufactured in China and Iran, as well as Sudanese-produced weapons and ammunition. The vast majority of the weapons documented with rebel groups originated in Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) stockpiles. Field inspections in Sudan and South Sudan have noted a large variety of Chinese equipment, including assault rifles, generalpurpose and heavy machine guns, RPG-7-pattern rocket launchers, automatic grenade launchers, antitank missiles, various types of rockets, and small-calibre ammunition. Armed opposition groups in Darfur and South Kordofan, as well as rebel and tribal militias in South Sudan—as well as the SAF—all had varieties of Chinese weapons in their possession.
According to data reported to the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade), China was the largest supplier state, accounting for 58 per cent of reported transfers to Sudan of small arms and light weapons, their ammunition, and ‘conventional weapons’. Military ties between Iran and Sudan have also grown strong over the years. According to UN Comtrade, Iran was the source of 13 per cent of Khartoum’s self-reported arms imports in 2001–12. These have included RPG-7-pattern launchers, No. 4 anti-personnel landmines, mortar rounds and tubes, as well as 7.62 × 39 mm and 12.7 × 108 mm ammunition. Many types were observed in the hands of South Sudanese rebel forces, the SPLM–N in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, as well as with SAF. SPLA–N fighters watch over ammunition and weapons captured from the Sudan Armed Forces, near Gos village in the Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan, Sudan, May 2012. © Goran Tomasevic/ReutersCHAPTER 7 SUMMARY HIGHLIGHTS
Sudan has become a significant producer of arms and ammunition in Africa, and the Survey has observed domestically produced Sudanese arms and ammunition in significant quantities with Sudanese forces, among armed groups in Darfur and South Kordofan, with South Sudanese insurgents, and in several other conflict zones outside of Sudan and South Sudan. While the government-owned Military Industry Corporation (MIC) claims to manufacture a wide range of small arms and ammunition, as well as armoured vehicles and main battle tanks, the Survey has documented a narrower range, including machine guns, mortars, various rockets, and small arms ammunition. The Survey’s Arms and Ammunition Tracing Desk project has revealed that non-state armed groups in Sudan and South Sudan rarely obtain their weapons directly from foreign states; instead, they tend to receive materiel from local sources. Some of the arming has been deliberate, as in the case of Khartoum’s arming of Southern rebel commanders—who have, in turn, passed on weapons to tribal militias. Non-state armed groups also acquire weapons from state forces through battlefield capture. Some groups are more successful at this than others. With decreasing support from external actors, a coalition of rebels in Sudan—the Sudan Revolutionary Front—has maintained a sizeable arsenal through its military victories against SAF. In South Kordofan, the SPLM–N captured hundreds of thousands of rounds of small- to medium-calibre ammunition as well as more than a dozen vehicles and tanks from SAF in 2012.
While the SPLM–N in Blue Nile has been somewhat less successful at capturing military equipment than their South Kordofan counterparts, they too have seized significant quantities of SAF weapons during battle. In most instances, these weapons not only correlate with the materiel that the SPLM–N captured in South Kordofan, but also match the equipment captured from SAF in Darfur and that found in the hands of Southern militias in South Sudan. Sudanese government stockpiles have proved to be the main source of military hardware for insurgent groups. In general, then, Sudanese government stockpiles have proved to be the main source of military hardware for insurgent groups. But Southern insurgent groups have also captured arms and ammunition from the SPLA. In 2012–13, David Yau Yau’s militia secured large numbers of weapons and their associated ammunition as a result of its battlefield successes against the SPLA in Jonglei.
These weapons included heavy machine guns, mortars, and several vehicles. Investigators are increasingly documenting newer-model weapons with removed serial numbers and markings. Much has been learned in Sudan and South Sudan, but much remains unknown. The particulars of the supply chain—the specific actors involved, their motivations, and potential rewards—require further study. Tracing in Sudan and South Sudan also faces new challenges. Perhaps the most difficult is the increase in newer-model weapons documented with removed serial numbers and markings. Such removal may be a response to investigations into the custody chain of newly arrived weapons. While this practice makes tracing much more difficult—although not impossible—it is also a clear indicator of illicit supply.
Sudanese planes carrying arms land in Libya: report
June 6, 2014 (KHARTOUM) – Libyan forces loyal to a renegade former general accused the Sudanese government of sending weapons via planes to Islamist militias. Colonel Mohamed al-Hejazi, spokesperson of Khalifa Heftar forces, told Cairo-based al-Youm al-Sabe’ newspaper that the latest shipment arrived on Friday morning at Meetiga military base airport. The military spokesperson asserted that Sudan sent planes carrying arms to these extremist groups at different times in the past without the knowledge of the Libyan government. He said these weapons have already been received by a militia loyal to Abdul Hakim Belhaj adding that Qatar funds these deliveries.
This week, the newspaper quoted unnamed sources as saying that Belhaj himself travelled to Sudan for meetings with officials in Khartoum there to coordinate logistics for Qatari aid.
Heftar’s rise came after he claimed that his forces represent the legitimate Libyan army and has managed to win the support of military units inside Benghazi for his offensive against the jihadists which he labeled as Operation Karama (dignity). The Libyan government however accused him of trying to stage a coup but Heftar says that these militias have wreaked havoc in the North African nation.
Libya has been plagued by political infighting, with government and parliament unable to control militias that have continued to defy state authority since ousting Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.
Jerusalem Post, “Report: Alleged Israeli strike on Sudanese weapons arsenal” | 07/21/2014 11:53
Arsenal reportedly held long range missiles for Hamas; Sudanese officials deny Israeli strike weeks after Sudan’s president met with Mashaal in Qatar. An Israel Air Force jet
An Israel Air Force jet Photo: REUTERS Sources in Khartoum claimed on Monday that Israeli forces struck a weapons arsenal which held long range missiles for Hamas.
The Arabic-language UK-based newspaper Al-Arab reported that the government in Sudan is not confirming the incident in order to cover up relations with the terrorist organization in Gaza. Such ties could entangle the country’s president Omar al-Bashir with an accusation of supporting terrorism from the US and Western nations.
The attack came only hours after Israel accused the Sudanese government of storing long range missiles for Hamas.
Eyewitnesses claimed to have seen a “huge explosion” and billows of smoke before ambulances and firefighters arrived at the scene. Six people were allegedly wounded in the attack.
Sudanese security forces stated that the huge explosion in a weapons arsenal was the result of a fire that broke out and took place on Friday morning in the al-Jili neighborhood of the capital.
The Sudanese Army Spokesman Khaled Sa’ad denied all connections in the incident to an attack by foreign forces.
Two weeks before the alleged Israeli strike, Sudan’s President al-Bashir was seen meeting with Hamas chief Khaled Mashaal in Qatar.
SATURDAY 21 FEBRUARY 2015
US, Israel driving support for terror organisations: Bashir | February 20, 2015 (ADDIS ABABA) – Sudanese president Omar Hassen al Bashir has accused US and Israeli intelligence agencies of funding terror organisations ISIS and Nigeria’s boko haram.
In an interview with Euro News on Friday Bashir condemned the terror entities as “brutal”, saying they have no link to Islam and accusing the CIA and Mosad of being the driving force behind the organisations.
“Because aside from the US and Israel no other entity has anything to gain from funding such groups,” he said. He said the US policy in the Arab world and the support it provides to Israel were among the main factors driving many young Muslims to join the ranks of terrorist organisations.
Bashir called on the international community to end its violent response to terror organisations, warning it could lead to further extremism.
“Taking at look at the policy of the US and its boundless support to Israel, as well as the Israeli policy against Palestine; these are the main reasons young Muslims are joining these organizations,” he said.
According to Bashir, Israeli aggression against holy sites such as al-aqusa mosque, the expulsion of Palestinians from their homes and ongoing hostilities in Gaza are only serving to fan resentment and anger young Muslims.
“We are against the Israeli policy in the region,” he said. “We fully support the Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation,” he added.
When asked about his involvement in alleged war crimes and genocide in Darfur, the Sudanese president dismissed the allegations as part of “anti-Sudan campaigns”.
“We are paying for [the] attitude toward US policy in the Arab region,” he told the European broadcaster, citing Sudan’s position against the war in Iraq and Iraqi occupation in Kuwait.
“I personally travelled to Iraqi and told Sadam Hussein that this was wrong and must be corrected,” Bashir said, arguing that Sudan’s position has created hostilities with world powers such as the US.
Bashir also denied accusations of ethnic cleansing in Darfur, describing the claims as “a mere allegation” and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a “political court”. He alleged that some of the witnesses in the case had since returned to Sudan and expressed regret over the evidence they provided, admitting that they had been coached.
The Sudanese president is the only sitting head of state facing a trial in the ICC.
Bashir also dismissed any concerns of an uprising in Sudan similar to that which occurred during the Arab spring. He said while there had been some attempts in the past 25 years, support for the government remained strong. He said Sudanese opposition groups have no capacity to mobilise the whole population as had been attempted in the past.
Relevant excerpts from August 31, 2014 meeting of the Khartoum regime’s most senior military and security officials (National Defense College, Khartoum):
English translation of 31 August 2014 high-level security, military meeting, posted 29 September 2014
In the name of God most gracious and most merciful
Restricted and Confidential
Republic of Sudan
National Intelligence & Security Service
Central Security Corporation
[ Concerning the authenticity of these leaked minutes, see | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1w5 ]
• Lt. Gen. Abdal-Gadir Mohammed Zeen – National Service Coordinator:
The balance in our relationship with Iran on one side and the Gulf States on the other side is important, but my question is: Will Saudi Arabia change its position after it has classified the Muslim Brothers as terrorists? On the other hand, our relationship with Iran is linked to our relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood International Organization. Accordingly, we must consult with Iran and the rest of our Islamist group, before taking any step in this regard, specially that the relationship with the SA Kingdom is not guaranteed, despite their knowledge that we are in a position to threaten their rule.
I agree to dividing and dispersing these armed movements and the continuation of the military operations against them.
The Egyptians have no choice but to establish special relations with us, given the victory of the Islamists in the battle for Tripoli despite Egyptian support to Gen. Haftar and the air strikes which failed to achieve their goals. These are useful cards in hand and we should use them properly.
We must preserve the internal opposition and deter any one who even thinks of causing instability. This year we have trained strategic battalions in the different states to protect the elections and assist the police in suppressing any such activities that may be carried out by the rebellion or the supporters of the New Sudan Project Yasir has contacts with Youth and Women groups urging them to organize and participate in the demonstrations in order to sabotage the coming elections.
- General Abdalla al-Jaili, PDF General Coordinator:
We have been targeted for the last twenty-five years because of our relationship with Iran. Both revolutions are committed to Islam. There is no country, other than Iran, who has the courage to say no to the whole West. Iran is an essential partner to the National Salvation Revolution. It was Iran who provided us with free and unlimited support, whereas Saudi Arabia was supporting Garang and the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). We shall be testing the credibility of these Gulf States, despite my belief that they are pro-America.
There is a recent awakening among the Darfur movements in agreement with us. They have accepted people into the security system and have become a real addition to the efforts against the rebellion. There is a desire in the two areas to join the PDF, and this year is our best year. We trained and graduated 80 batches in all the states (different ages), and three Brigades are ready for combat in order to protect the elections. The rebellion must be firmly confronted, and we will open fire on any demonstrations or uprising. The security of the country is a red line and those who are interested in the New Sudan Project should go to the South.
- General Al-Rashiid Faqiri, Director of National Security:
All the embassies and chanceries in Khartoum are infiltrated and our elements report to us who goes in or out. In order to foil the New Sudan Project, we are watching closely all political party activities. When we discover that a politician is going abroad to meet the rebels we usually stop him from travelling.
- General Siddiq Amer, Director General of Intelligence and Security:
I agree to all what has been said. My comment concerns our relationship with Saudi Arabia and Emirates on one side and Iran on the other side. We are capable of misleading the Gulf States by taking open, declared steps and procedures towards improving diplomatic relations with them. They are backed by the Americans and Israel and have concerns regarding our relationship with Iran which is beneficial to us, because Iran is our biggest ally in the region, in terms of the cooperation in the areas of intelligence and military industrial production. We have relations with all the Islamic Movements World Wide and we represent a door for Iran to all these Islamic groups.
Currently, the Arab World got divided into two axis or alliances, the Resistance axis and the Moderate axis. We must have a foot hold in both camps. This situation became apparent when we nominated General Mahjoub Sharafi as ambassador to Cairo so he could supervise the activities of the Islamic Movements in the Arab countries in North Africa and monitor the Sudanese Opposition activities in Egypt. The Egyptians rejected him and we understood the message. Again the Egyptians want us to take the side of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. Before that, the Egyptians held the funds intended for our embassy, at Cairo Airport. We told them that, we are not in a position to transfer the money through a bank. One of them said: “But Saudi Arabia can solve this problem of money transfer”. This is the second message.
In my opinion we should not leave Saudi Arabia and the Emirates to receive Sadiq al-Mahdi and allow the SRF activities. We should confront them and present to them the evidence: audio tapes, names of intelligence officers and contact persons proving that they, Saudi Arabia and Emirates, are the ones who financed Sept. 2014 uprising and demonstrations in Khartoum to bring our government down. They are always attempting to recruit Islamic leaders and it happened that, they contacted two of our officers – Brigadier Generals – and met with them here in Khartoum. Before that meeting, Mohammed Atta and I, met with the two officers and encouraged them to meet the Saudis to find out what they want. We provided them with complete security guarantees against questioning by any one.
After five meetings with the Saudis the two officers reported to us that hose meeting with them wanted Islamist officers who are pro-Saudi Arabia to carry out a coup. The President, the Chief of Staff, Minister of Defense, Security Chiefs and Public Security were all informed of this taking place. Then we all agreed not to take any action that may disturb the relation with the Saudi Kingdom since we are in control of the situation. At the end the two Brigadiers told them that, carrying out a coup is difficult, because all the current army officers and the Islamic Movement Members are elements of the Public Security Agency. We managed through the two officers to follow the threats coming from the side of Saudi Arabia to our regime.
I, think we should improve the relation with the Saudis and benefit from them, but it must be clear that, they are not trustworthy. At the same time we maintain our strategic relationship with Iran.
Let us continue to dismantle the armed movements. The mechanisms to do that are already in place and working. This year the Sudan People’s Army (SPLA) managed to cultivate large areas in South Kordofan State. We must not allow them to harvest these crops. Good harvest means supplies for the war effort. We must starve them, so that, commanders and civilians desert them and then we can recruit the deserters to use them in the war to defeat the rebels.
We are the only country in the world that will not be affected by the conflicts taking place between Sunni Islamic groups and the Shiia. We have succeeded in maintaining good relations with all Islamic groups, through the cover of social organizations, and not through the state institutions. The secret of the strength of the National Salvation Revolution (NCP) Government lies in the smooth management of the alliance with Shiia of Iran on one side and the alliance with the Sunni Islamic groups on the other side. Any negligence or failure to maintain this fragile relation between the Sunni and Shiia, will be disastrous.
The South is still supporting the rebels with the aim to overthrow our government and change all of Sudan. In order to counter that danger, we are employing a plan to infiltrate and empty the refugee camps, recruit field commanders and train the locals in the affected areas to fight and defeat the rebellion.
The Saudi Military attaché paid me a visit, and told me that his government is ready for military cooperation with us, and they are ready to supply whatever logistics needed by SAF. The aim is to promote that relation, into full cooperation between the two governments. He said we are the closest people to you. I told him that, you are cooperating with America to the maximum in the region without consideration of the rights of others. Also the Emirates military attaché visits us regularly and we listen to him.
My opinion is that, the Shiia religious activities may cause conflict, particularly in the presence of the Salafi Sunni Movements, Muslim Brothers, Sunna Suporters (Ansar al Sunna), Sharia Supporters (Ansar Sharia), People of the Holy Book, Hijra and Tableegh (messengers) group, Tahrir Party Group, Caliphate State and the Daawa Supporters. We don’t want confrontations to happen which may cause us to lose both (Shiia and Sunnis). We must explain to the Iran M.I. the threats we face, they will understand, and we will benefit. At the same time we tell the Saudis that we are taking your side.
We have intensified the work to train and graduate Libyan M.I. cadres. Currently, they are doing an advanced course on Internet operation, deciphering of codes, interception of telephones and wireless radios. Their leadership requested us to train and establish for them a strong M.I. system.
- General Yehya Mohammed Kheir, Minister of State for Defense:
The major strength in the alliance between the rebels and Sadiq al-Mahdi is the SPLM. They benefit the most from the alliance politically, diplomatically and media wise due to the presence of three of its most important political and military leaders. The SPLM is trying to repeat the same scenario done by Garang in the Asmara conference for substantive issues. We should be aware of the SPLM tactics. In the past, if Garang lost a battle in the field, he attacked another area and made a political move. They are losing in the field, but trying to raise the morale of their forces by signing the Paris Declaration and postponing their internal problems.
We must defeat the movement and push it out of the two areas. We shall not recognize any Paris Declaration, because it is a hostile agreement and reflects a conspiracy designed by the enemies of Sudan. The negotiations will be confined to the two areas only (South Kordofan and Blue Nile). The Darfur movements have lost their power. Yet, if they want negotiations let them go to Doha.
This year will mark the end of the rebellion, because we shall send a huge force to attack from all directions. We shall take them by surprise, by sending forces from Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Darfur in an offensive by both land and air, carried out by people from the movement in this area who have joined the security forces. We shall turn them into a political opposition that is easy to dismantle.
Our relationship with Iran is strategic. We will inform them of our intention to close down their cultural centers for security reasons; because there is a threat to these centers from some Sunni radical groups who may target them and cause conflict. But again we must take a similar step towards the Wahabi group, to avoid any misinterpretation by the Iranians of these measures as targeting only the Shiite group. In which case, the Sudanese Shiia will be pushed to go underground and operate secretly, and this can pose a greater threat. Any limited and temporary step we take, to serve and secure our interests with the Saudis and Gulf States is welcome. But we should not rush into anything, because they have made an attempt to change our government, when they supported Sept. 2013 demonstrations. It was an offending action by Saudis that we cannot forget. They were afraid, thinking that we will react by supporting some radical groups in their country, since we have not pointed our finger to anybody.
During the Air-force exhibition in Dubai, I, met some Saudi Arabia and Emirates officers who talked a lot about the Sept. 2013 uprising in an attempt to find out the impact of those demonstrations on us, pretending to be sympathetic, but their real intention was to discover whether we are aware about their involvement in those events.
General Siddiq Amer, Director General of Intelligence and Security:
- The Gulf States have only very weak information about the terrorist groups that are based in Libya, Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, North Africa Arab Countries and Afghanistan, because there is a lot of tension in their relations with these radical groups. They want us to cooperate with them in the war against terrorism, because the radical groups constitute a direct threat to them. Their relation with ISIS, Nusra Front, Muslim Brothers and Palestine Islamic Movement is even weaker. We will not sacrifice our relations with the Islamists and Iran for a relationship with the Saudis and the Gulf States. What is possible is a relationship that serves our mutual economic interests in terms of investment and employment.
The Egyptians are to improve their relationship with us. They have all the information regarding our opposition in Egypt, their activities, meetings and relationships with the embassies in Egypt. We, in turn, shall prevent the Muslim Brothers and the radical groups in Libya from attacking Egyptian installations. This position must be applied to the Saudi Kingdom, the Emirates and even America. We offer our cooperation with them in the war against terrorism in exchange for their ceasing their support of the armed movements in the international forums. Our intelligence and security files can play a role in the improvement of our economy and diplomatic relations. They can also be used to abort the conspiracies of the rebellion against us. The victory of our people in Libya is an indication that we will also achieve victory over the New Sudan Project.
- General Imad al-Din Adawy, Chief of Joint Operations:
I consent to all what was said by the Commanders, and I see that it should be turned immediately into resolutions for implementation.
This agreement also caused the annoyance of the Egyptians who considered it a military pact signed against their interests in the waters of the Blue Nile. That prompted them to concede with us and they decided to prevent Ali Mahmud Hasaneen (Sudanese Opposition Leader) from holding his party’s convention in Cairo as a sign of good will. On top of that, they rushed to open the Occhett Crossing at the border near Halfa and they extended an invitation to the President to visit Egypt. This means lifting the ban on the Muslim Brothers. We must take advantage of this change in the position of the Egyptian government and ask them to control and limit Sadiq al-Mahdi and other opposition leaders’ activities in Cairo. We also expect President Sisi to help improve our relation with the Gulf States in exchange for securing his country against the Muslim Brothers, conducting a peace pact between the Muslim Brothers and the regime and finding a way to cease confrontations, at least for the time being.
Our joint forces with Tchad are in their best state. The Libyan border is totally secured, specially after the victory of our allies (Libya Dawn Forces) in Tripoli. We managed to deliver to them the weapons and military equipment donated by Qatar and Turkey and we formed a joint operations room with them under one of the colonels in order to coordinate and administer the military operations. Turkey and Qatar provided us with information in favor of the revolutionaries on top of the information collected by our own agents so they can control the whole country.
The greatest threat to us is from South Sudan. They are refusing to agree on drawing the Zero Line. We suggested the formation of joint forces along the border line, but they refused that too. They are still supporting the two divisions of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile. Accordingly, we must provide Reik’s forces with great support in order to wage the war against Juba and clean the whole of Greater Upper Nile area.
During their visit to Khartoum, Reik and Taaban reported to us everything about the logistical support from Juba to the rebels, the route of supply and who transports it to them. They also gave us information about the meetings held between Juba and the rebels in regards to the disengagement, the support Salva Kiir gives to the two divisions and his intentions towards us in Khartoum; also the presence of the Americans and the Israelis in Juba and the support they provide, in addition to Musevini’s support of the SRF, and Kampala hosting the majority of the rebel leaders, also the arrangement made between Juba and Kampala to transport rebel leaders to Uganda after the signing of the joint cooperation agreement between them. Now we have the necessary information which will enable us to take the right decision against the South and Uganda, and to deal with the movements that are collaborating with them.
My personal opinion is that any negotiations with the rebels are a waste of time. They will not get what they want. Also, we don’t accept them to return back and stay among us after the assistance they rendered to the enemy to separate the South. Above that, they are still planning to divide and separate the rest of the country. They will continue their business of separation throughout. It is better that we defeat them with military action and those who remain, we must bring them back under Daniel Codi, Siraj and Al-Sese who are all inside movements. We should attack them before the harvest and bombard their food stores and isolate them completely.
- Major General Hashim Osman Al-Hussein, Director General of Police:
Facing reality is important. Even the Addis meeting went in the same direction of defaming the Islamic Movement and was an attempt to impose conditions they couldn’t achieve through fighting and are trying to get them through taking advantage of Sadiq al-Mahdi.
Sadik has failed to unite his own party, how could he unite movements of conflicting interests and agendas? Some people in the movements will not come for the dialogue at all. Jibril, due to the killing of his brother, Yasir Arman has nothing in common with us, Al- Hilu has problems with the Nuba, Malik Aqar killed thirty POWs from Gisan because they belong to the NCP and did not vote for him in the elections, one of those victims was Mayor of Gisan. They detained Malik for 21 days and buried the victims in a mass grave. Minni Minawi killed many people from the Berti tribe and Abdal-Wahid has no group.
Let us go ahead and prepare a force to protect the elections. Secondly, if the negotiations are necessary let them take place after the elections. Also, the internal national dialogue can continue after we hold the elections. We will continue recruiting and splitting the field commanders, and winning them to our side since we have all the information about the rebels. We have to sign more agreements and never meet with the rebels as one group. Anybody who wants to join us must surrender his gun. There must be strict control over the freedom of the press and the political statements from the party leaders. National security should remain a red line. Any political or press statement should not violate the laws, so that we don’t become like South Sudan, or the Central African Republic which is the desire of the rebels. In the statement with Sadiq they mentioned having a relationship with South Sudan in the present and into the future – notice their treason – What business do we have with the South? Let them solve their own problems and again, the problem of South Sudan is not one that can be solved.
Let us enforce the criminalization of anybody who supports the rebellion or criticizes the national armed forces. Currently we put in place a plan to deploy 2,000 men from the Central Reserve Force in Darfur and the areas we liberated in South Kordofan in order to bring life back to normal in those areas and assist the Nuba people who wanted to bring their relatives from the rebel areas. There is a security problem in Abiyei due to weakness on the side of Al-Kher Al-Fahiim. He must be replaced by a person with military background from the Misiriya tribe. We need somebody who can infiltrate them and use them against each other.
- Major General Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint General Staff:
We have a problem with Saudi Arabia because they found out about the weapons we sent by way of the Red Sea.to Abd al-Malik Al-Huthi’s Shiia group in Yemen.
We have instructed all the division Commanders in the various states to monitor the National Dialogue sessions in their respective states and follow the activities in order to use the resolutions for the unification of the people’s understanding of the national role of the armed forces and the fact that all the Sudanese people must join the SAF for it is not restricted to one party or group.
SAF is against any dialogue that is supervised by foreigners. Any parties calling for the dialogue to be supervised by foreign agencies merely target the security and stability of the country and desire to dismantle the SAF so that Sudan will fall under the mercy of the armed militias.
The Islamist officers refuse any form of dialogue interfering with the SAF. We support separate forums for negotiation with the rebels, each in his place, no unification of forums or negotiation with them as a group. People talk about the political crisis, where is that crisis? All those rebels were part of the government once. They rebelled and killed many people from SAF. And today they say SAF is not a national force, or SAF is using foreign militias and thus escalated their campaign against SAF to hinder their progress towards the bases of the rebels to clean them up. Now the SAF is in its best shape supported by the local RSF in the areas controlled by the rebels. We are ready to launch military operations. The war is still going on and there is a response from the people of Nuba, Blue Nile and Darfur in all the Sudan states to join the RSF after they realized the big increase in the salaries of all the armed forces. A soldier’s salary is 2 million, a lieutenant / first lieutenant: 4 million, a captain 6 million, a colonel and above more than 10. The RSF’s salaries are higher and they receive 3 million as incentives for operations …This increase and great financial capability should be utilized to fight the rebels.
As soon as this increase in salaries was implemented, the Darfur movements brought to us more than 2000 trainees. Dadjo brought 1350 soldiers and officers whom we deployed to camps to change their military beliefs. We said that any officer or soldier who comes to us from the rebels in the two areas through the committees will be granted same rank and salary and will fight with us.
The elections are a constitutional issue and should not be tied to the national dialogue.
There is no connection between the strategic relation with Iran and the spread of the Shiia belief. Still we need to consult with them before we take any step to close the cultural centers. This issue has been discussed with the Republican Guards Commander in Iran. They know that all the Sudanese are Sunni and the Shiia belief is prohibited. We rule the people by power, not all the people support us and it is possible that some radicals can create problems like what happened in Western Sudan, when they killed a Shite’ over religious differences. So let us separate between the two issues… the strategic relation and the Shiia Cultural Centers.
We have a problem with Saudi Arabia because they found out about the weapons we sent by way of the Red Sea.to Abd al-Malik Al-Huthi’s Shiia group in Yemen.
We must create a balance of forces in South Sudan. Reik, Taaban and Dhieu Mathok came and requested support in the areas of M.I. and training specially in operating tanks and artillery. They also requested armament. They want to be given advanced weapons. Our reply was that we have no objection, provided that we agree on a common objective. For sure we will benefit from their discourse. Taaban apologized for the support he rendered to Darfurian movements and the role he played in Higlig battle. He explained that the Dinka used them in that battle to spoil their relation with the North. But they lately discovered their mistake. Now they are fighting to achieve a federal system or autonomy for each region. I think any autonomy for the Greater Upper Nile is good for us in terms of border security, oil resources and trade. Now people are studying how to have well-trained and equipped forces with advanced MI and logistic support.
In any case, our relation with Iran is a red line for without the support of Iran, the National Salvation Revolution would have been defeated.
We assigned Bdr. Gen. Al-Fadil Bashir Mohammed to organize JEM forces because this is a great force. We will not exchange POWs with the rebels. Those are people who are criminalized according to the law. They rebelled against the State – and not in another country. The war against the rebels ends when they return to negotiations, dismantle all militias and surrender all Sudanese land. We have the right to hire anybody interested in fighting for money. The rebels should be the last people to talk about foreigners – Who is supporting them and where are they staying? Aren’t they living in foreign countries? We can bring all the Islamic movements to fight them, We only have to say that these rebels are agents of America. We can create conflict for them with the Islamic radicals, just so they realize their true size, but that is a card we have not used until now. Today our forces are controlling all the operation fields and we have taken the initiative. I second the proposal to change Al-Kher Al-Fahiim of Abiyei Committee. We must impose the rule of Law and the authority of the state, in the areas of tribal conflict.
- Major General Mohammed Atta, Director General of N.I.S.S.:
There are certain entities demanding that we publish a report on the events of Sept. 2013 or else bring Sudan back to Chapter 4. Other intelligence people are pushing to know whether we think that the September 2013 events were a conspiracy planned and financed by Egypt, Saudi and Emirates intelligence to create the Arab Spring in Sudan in order to change the regime and that we suppressed the demonstrations using brutal force to ensure this is not repeated.
We intercepted all the telephone calls coming from Saudi, Emirates and Egyptian intelligence. Some people from the political parties of the Sudan say they orchestrated the demonstrations, yet they brought experts to administer the demonstrations. We were monitoring the telephones and other communications and we managed to arrest the real players. They confessed and disclosed all the details about the conspiracy and the names of officers assigned to supervise the demonstrations and the leadership in each country who were receiving daily reports. That is why Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Emirates are concerned/afraid after all their agents have been exposed and arrested by our security forces. On our side we did not disclose anything up until now, we want to use this file to blackmail them instead. They have taken many measures fearing that we may use or release terrorist groups to revenge from them. No need to fear or hurry, we shall use this file to the maximum. We will not disclose it. They talked to Ali Karti asking him to stop collaboration with Iran, and promising to support us. Ali told me, but Ali didn’t know anything. So they are now sending mediators to help improve the relations.
They are asking us not to supply the Huthi of Yemen with any weapons. Also they asked us to remove our Air Defense and they will replace it for us no matter the cost.
In regards to the Shiia activities, the Religious Intelligence branch is keeping a file with all the names of those converted to the Shiia’ belief. It has not reached the level of a threat yet. Whenever a problem arises, I always call the Consul or contact the Iranian national security director and inform him about the risks connected with open proselytization. We have radical groups and fundamentalists who can react and cause troubles. The Sudanese are Sunni and reject the Shiia belief. But not all the Sudanese are followers of the Islamic movement. Anyhow, there are regular meetings between us to overcome any misunderstanding. The most difficult problem was the incident of killing a Shiite in Western Sudan because he declared his new belief and engaged in a debate with a Sunni in the state of Western Darfur. As soon as the incident happened, I received a call from the Iranian Security Advisor and the Chief of Republican Guards. We agreed to separate between the two issues: The strategic military and security relationship on one side, and the cultural relationship on the other. After that they reported the agreement to their leadership.
We accommodate all the civilians who desert the rebel areas, and they go through orientation by the Nubians who are loyal to the government. They explain the risks of rebellion and the fact that they can protect themselves by encouraging their children to join the RSF. We want to prove that the defeat of the rebellion in Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile was achieved by the local people in the area. We must not allow the delivery of humanitarian relief before we reach a comprehensive ceasefire and a full security agreement. We will not allow them to unite the opposition, and anybody who meets the rebels will be arrested, charged and taken to court. If Sadiq al-Mahdi had not apologized he would have been in prison up to now. This also applies to Ibrahim al-Sheikh: if he doesn’t submit a written apology to the RSF or accept to collaborate with us he will not be released from prison.
The Paris Declaration and all the other rebel meetings are merely a conspiracy funded by organizations and governments who are against us, but their pressures don’t worry us in the least. They went to Europe not knowing that, the EU is supporting the dialogue initiative. We are not in a hurry. It is the rebels who fear that other events may overshadow their case, and they will be forgotten by the World indeed.
With the appearance of ISIS, Europe and America must cooperate with us for combating terrorism. This is where we can bargain the SRF case. They tried to use the Christians’ case but they failed. We are Islamists and we can’t abandon our conviction because of five individuals. We are following all their movements and we don’t respond to pressures. The whole world boycotted us, including the Arab Countries at the beginning of the National Salvation Revolution’s rule, but they failed to remove us from power. We took their words seriously and implemented high security precautions. We monitor the rebels including all means of communication they use. We have people who will meet them in Addis Ababa and photograph all their meetings. This will enable our body language experts to analyze their characters during and after the meetings, in order to find out their impressions. They are not aware of this happening. We said any relief assistance must be under our supervision and only after we reach a comprehensive political agreement. They are targeting the security forces, but they don’t know how these forces work. Even those who came during the days of Naivasha, went without knowing how we think or work.
The rebels, who are talking about a comprehensive approach, want us to negotiate with them as an armed movement. They want to have political partnership with us, and their forces to become joint forces with SAF. They also want us to grant the two areas and Darfur autonomy. After that, the rest of the parties get only the remaining crumbs. These rebels are a creation of the Internet. There are some in Darfur and few others in the two areas. They think we are weak. The communists give them wrong information about us. One time they tell them that the regime is collapsing and another time that the NCP accepted dialogue because they are suffering from internal differences. They don’t know that even if the NCP disappeared, we still have the regular armed forces that are able to fill up the vacuum.
I have attended the President’s meeting with the whole leadership of the NISS on Monday Aug. 14th 2014. We briefed him on how the NISS works, and explained to him our vision. We said the national dialogue must be held inside the country, elections must take place on schedule, the decisive summer campaign must continue. We should step-up the recruitment to increase the RSF. We must send a force from the RSF to guard the gold mining activities, and prevent selling the gold to anybody apart from the Central Bank of Sudan, and they have to control the borders from Abu-Hamad to the Red Sea state and up to Wadi-Halfa. We should establish four military training centers far away from the cities and under the supervision of Security Bdr. Gen. Abd al-Sid Omer. Any journalist or politician who criticizes the RSF must be arrested and charged with spying.
The President praised Bakhit Debajo’s movement and instructed that his men must be trained. He also thanked the leaders of the Nuba Mountains for their nationalism, loyalty and their sincere desire in fighting the rebellion, plus their effort to encourage the youth to join the RSF in order to participate in ridding the mountains of the SRF. We also submitted to him a proposal to divide the South Kordufan state into two states on condition that it is completely liberated and with the participation of the locals of east Kordofan in the liberation effort.
We recruit all the able bodied youth to join the RSF, especially now that the salaries have increased. In fact when we discussed this idea with leaders from East Kordofan, they welcomed it. Thus we will be able to crush the strife with this action even though the rebels are planning to internationalize the issues of the area. We are busy monitoring the movements of the rebel leaders, we know where they go and we have vast groups who meet with them. Some are hiding in those countries under the cover of business. Others got political asylum and are recognized by the governments of those countries. The infiltration of militias is always easy.
I say that our relationship with Iran is strategic and should be above all other interests. Anyone who wants to sabotage it doesn’t understand the art of keeping balances and lacks the necessary information.
All the plans for dividing the SRF and the SPLM are in place to dispose of the New Sudan Project. We agreed with Taaban to establish an efficient Intelligence and Security system to cover all their offices and the requirements of the field. This system will work under our supervision and we shall analyze and process the information for them. The running cost of their offices is my personal responsibility beside the N.I.S.S. We pledged to provide them with full protection and security, since we were instructed by the President since Dr. Reik’s visit to Khartoum.
- General Abd al-Rahim Mohammed Husein, Minister of Defense:
I shall start with our relationship with Iran and say it is a strategic and everlasting relationship. We cannot compromise or lose it. All the advancement in our military industry is from Iran. They opened the doors of their stores of weapons for us, at a time the Arabs stood against us. The Iranian support came when we were fighting a rebellion that spread in all directions including the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The Iranians provided us with experts and they trained our M.I. and security cadres. They also trained us in weapons production and transferred to us modern technology in the military production industry. There is one full battalion of the Republican Guards still with us here and other experts who are constructing interception and spying bases in order to protect us, plus an advanced AirDefense system. They built for us Kenana and Jebel Awliya Air Force bases. One month ago they transported to us BM missile launchers and their rockets using civil aviation planes. We stored them in Kenana and sold part of them to Qatar to support Libya fighters after they were subjected to attacks by the Egyptian and Emirates air forces. That helped them to achieve victory. I say the military relationship should be separated from the religious one.
The problem of the two areas is connected to the implementation of the Joint Cooperation Agreement with Juba to define the Zero Line and the observation mechanism. In addition to opening the “buffer zone” and the border trade crossing points. If the South accepted, the rebels will succumb and will agree to negotiate the issues of the two areas only. I agreed with Mbeki that he will go to the South to meet Salva Kiir in order to set a date for the meeting of the political and security committee under the AUHIP. We also consulted each other on the necessity of bringing all the Darfurian movements to the dialogue on the basis of the vision of the government and the dialogue is to be inside Sudan.
I told him that we trust Mohamed Bin Shammas who will bring all the Darfur movements to Addis Ababa. The purpose of the Addis meeting with them is only consultation and not negotiation. In case any of them is interested in negotiation let him go to Doha. He is going to bring all of them together and seek their opinion on the proposal, if they reject the dialogue then the position of Sudan will be safe, and we will be able to defend it in front of the international community. In that case Sudan will be seen by the international community to have done its best. Mbeki will participate in the internal dialogue as an observer. Also I, met Ali al-Zaatari (UN), Salah Halima (AL), and Hailey Menkerios and all of them support us. We have achieved a lot.
When I met Mohammed Bin Shammas, he said the UN is going to investigate into the reports of the UNAMID Mission and advised me to correct things on the ground to conform to their reports about our performance. He told me that Darfur has no case or problem, the remaining movements should join Doha agreement, and if they want to join the internal national initiative it is up to them and let them come. We leave the invitation to the dialogue to be the responsibility of the AU. I’m a witness Sudan did its best, it is the movements that insist to continue the war and there is nothing that can bring together Darfur and the two areas. These are two different problems. Each case has a forum.
We must continue the military operations. We shall continue bombarding the rebel concentration areas by air force. Next summer we need every fighter from any country who can fight under our command in addition to the locals in the war affected areas to act as guides to the rebel defenses. The SRF statement on Aug. 20, 2014 and the Paris Declaration expose their intentions and objectives that they repeated since 1989, there is nothing new in them and they fail to achieve them. If it were not for Naivasha all the rebellion would have been finished. Those interested in dialogue should surrender their guns, but these ones have big hopes and they are attempting to dismantle SAF and the Security Agency who are blocking them from achieving the goals of the traitors and their masters. All the statements they released after those meetings are unrealistic. The organizations supporting them continue to repeat the same; this helps us understand what they think.
We did a great job with the Ethiopians in terms of securing the borders. The Egyptians conceded a lot. They prevented the opposition from conducting any activities in Cairo, but this is not enough. They must deport all the movements and close their offices. Up to now we have not treated them equally. But I, spoke to their Minister of Defense and they know what we can do in collaboration with Qatar and Libya, because the Islamists movements took the initiative in Libya.
The people of South Sudan must accept to meet us and tell us their opinion on the drawing of the zero line and the buffer zone. If they refused we can deal with them in a manner that suits the threat they pose to us. I met Reik, Dhieu and Taaban and they are regretting the decision to separate the South. We decided to return his house to him. He requested our assistance for he has shortage in the M.I. personnel, operations command and tank technicians. We must use the many cards we have against the South in order to teach them a lesson they will never forget.
SAF and the Security are ready from now to protect the elections, and our instructions are that any demonstrations, crowds or sabotage must be met with fire, because sabotaging the elections and targeting state institutions was mentioned in their statements calling for the removal of the regime through armed struggle or demonstrations. All these means are crimes and can be considered as rebellion against the state, or an attempt to disturb law and order and cause chaos. We still remember the Sept. 2013 experience, after we opened fire they stopped issuing any statements and ceased all action. Any discussion of the on- going or up-coming military operations is considered a crime and should be dealt with in a firm manner immediately.
The dialogue must lead us to the elections and not the discussion of the military and security laws…It is worth mentioning here that, the youth started to register, in order to join SAF and the RSF after the increase of the salaries in a manner that was unprecedented and unexpected. A soldier’s salary is 2 million, a 2nd Lt. Officer’s salary is 4 million aside from other allowances and services. The salary of a Lt. Colonel is greater than the salary of a minister in the government.
Our instructions are that all the civilians who escape from the operation areas should receive good treatment and their children are to be encouraged to join the RSF.
The economic situation is being addressed and will improve due to the fact that our country has all the requirements for industrialization, agriculture, basic infrastructure for the oil industry, and there is no hungry person. This is temporary; these days will pass. The military industries will cover all our needs in the armed forces.
You must know that we have around forty (40) companies abroad that constitute the investments for security purposes in addition to the Islamic Movement companies, and Public Security companies whose total capital is greater than two billion. They are still run by civilians, because we thought about that since the first days of the revolution. We anticipated that we are going to be targeted, and we must use cover. If we succeeded to maintain the security sector which is a priority, then it will protect our institutions and our mission will not be affected by the economic situation.
• General Abd al-Rahim Mohammed Husein, Minister of Defense:
America is facing the crisis of the ISIS and the other Jihadist movements that are newly formed and can move freely outside the traditional surveillance networks. Currently, there are twenty thousand (20,000) Jihadists and fifteen (15) newly formed Jihadist Movements who are scattered all over, from Morocco to Egypt, Sinai, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, all the Gulf States, a wide presence in Africa and Europe and nobody owns a data-base on that as the one we have. We release only limited information to the Americans according to request, and the price is the armed movements file. The coming days carry a lot of surprises.
- Professor Ibrahim Ghandur , Deputy Chairman of the NCP:
I agree to all what has been said so far.
The relationship with Iran is one of the best relationships in the history of the Sudan. Accordingly, the management of this relationship requires wisdom and knowledge of all its details. The assistance we received from Iran is immeasurable. The commonalities between us are many. People should not limit their concern to the aspect of converting to Shiism only. There are many infiltrators who are working to see us lose our relationship with Iran. We must note that Iran is a friend to all the Islamic movements worldwide. We need to conduct internal consultations first and then we put our Iranian partners in the picture about all the details.
The economic crisis is temporary. It will improve, since programs were put in place to solve the problems. It will be over soon by increasing the agricultural and animal production. At the same time we must discover what the Arabs and the Egyptians need, taking into consideration their hatred towards the rule of the Muslim Brothers and their intentions towards us. We need at this juncture to end the war. Once the war is over we use the money spent there to support the economy. So, ending the civil war in Darfur states and Kordofan will have positive impact on the economy, specially their livestock.
- Major General Bakri Hasan Salih, First Vice President:
All the political forces in the country and the regional and international communities are following with great interest the steps taken by President Bashir to change his former policies. This is probably followed by other changes in the working system in the government. This may appear to be a technical issue, but it is also considered part of the concept of change taking place in Sudan.
President Bashir has given instructions for comprehensive change in the structure of the party and the state allowing more power in defining the country’s strategy so it embraces a wider range of internal, regional and international issues.
The greatest security and social threat comes from South Sudan, for two reasons: First, the foreign existence which represents a direct threat for us (Uganda, America, France and Israel), and the Armed Movements; and secondly, the refugees and those displaced due to war, diseases, and social crimes, (The Sudanese refugees in the camps of the two areas, children missing education, spread of diseases and converting to Christianity).
We are not interested in any relationship with South Sudan or the neighboring countries, but reality requires us to adapt with the new circumstances. Dr. Reik paid me a visit on Aug. 11th 2014. He could not believe what happened in the South. He said the Dinka exterminated his tribe. He requested assistance in all respects. We also have our own agenda. The president accepted to host a liaison office. Salva Kiir is hosting the Torabora and the two divisions.
The negotiations, the National Dialogue, the Paris Declaration and all their statements are needed to take us to the elections. Those who are interested to join the National Salvation Revolution and co-exist with us are welcome. But we are not ready to respond or work under pressure. Nobody is paying us anything and we are not indebted to anybody. America deceived us in regards to the separation of the South. They did not lift our name from the list of the States sponsoring terrorism or relieve our debts. So the Envoy should not come.
Regarding Sadiq Al-Mahdy, his children are with us here. The longer he stays abroad the more it will become boring for him. So, let him finish his visits. What next?
Mbeki met with me and the President and we agreed with him to bring together all the movements for dialogue and also Bin Shammas is convincing his people. My reading and their statements show that they will not come. We want peace from within. We count on Idriis Dibbi, Qatar, and Wadaa committee to help us achieve this peace from within.
You must work hard to see Siddiiq Ismail back to the file of the movements in the Umma party. But it will require a lot of effort. We should not neglect the file of South Sudan and the cooperation agreement. Let the joint committee be activated. Let us work to support the people of South Kordofan where the northern sector has become devoted to political confirmation and a warehouse for the armed movements.
Our strategic relationships are unchangeable. Whoever wants to assist us is welcome to do that without imposing any conditions. When I was in Saudi Arabia Abd al-Hafiz Ibrahim came to meet me and told me that the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the kingdom told him that they wanted to support Sudan, but the problem is the relationship with Iran. I realized that he is infiltrated. I told Mohammed Atta to put him under surveillance. Now, we do not communicate with him. Leave him until we pass the elections. After that many people must be changed. It is important to collect information and monitor the people who want to change the regime. How can we trust them?
Regarding the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, scatter them and do not let them stay together in one place. Put them in different places in Khartoum, but again away from the vital establishments.
Place them under close surveillance, because are infiltrated by many governments. Mohammed Atta you have complete data about them that we collected during my tenure in the management of the N.I.S.S. Still there are good ones among them. The most important thing is that you have to keep an eye on them in order to provide them with protection in the first place, then to know the details of each and every one of them. Give them programmed SIM Cards with the interception device in order to know more about them. They are guests and Turkey is financing them
- Foreign policy management departments should work under the supervision of the military and security agencies responsible for national security affairs to adapt to the new internal and external changes, and the American Policy’s concepts in dealing with these changes. Recognizing the internal and external challenges and understanding the relationship between them and monitoring their issuing results internally spontaneously or under local circumstances.
- We consider the New Sudan Project as a top internal and regional challenge that seeks to expand the foreign intervention and division of Sudan. All the political, security, military, and diplomatic agencies should change the approach in dealing with it.
- Recognize Dr. Reik’s Liaison office and all agencies are required to provide protection and security for them.
- Maintain and protect the relationship with Iran. Managing this relationship through the military and security agencies.
- Immediate work to divide the movements according to a well-studied plan.
- Rejection of the Paris Declaration, criminalizing its implementation and holding accountable its signatories.
- The joint political and security committee with South Sudan should hold its meetings before the beginning of the decisive summer campaign.
- Support the mechanism intended to disperse or empty the IDP camps.
- Create differences and security strike in the IDP camps.
- Presentation of a convincing legal defense to the coming Human Rights conference in Geneva.
- Consider the New Sudan Project as a threat to the unity and stability of Sudan.
- Exercise pressures and present motivators to Sadiq al-Mahdi’s children to press him to return to Sudan.
- Increase the numbers of all the regular forces and encourage the youth to join the RSF.
- Treatment of Police Central Reserve Force participating in the military operations equally with SAF and the RSF.