Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy

by Eric Reeves

On the Invisibility of Darfur: Causes and consequences over the past five years (Part Two) | October 2016 | Annex A (2013)

| Misc. Documents, Letters | Author: | 7042 words

On the Invisibility of Darfur: Causes and consequences over the past five years (Part Two) | October 2016 | Annex A (2013)

http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Xt

Excerpts from representative analyses and descriptions:

•  Darfur Destroyed: A week in the life of a dying land

Eric Reeves  |  27 November 2013  |  http://wp.me/p45rOG-19J

The scale of human destruction and suffering in Darfur is scarcely imaginable, and would not be imaginable at all if we were to depend on the reporting of the UN (either humanitarian agencies or the UN/African Union “hybrid” Mission in Darfur, UNAMID).  The grim task of reporting on Darfur’s realities has fallen almost entirely to Radio Dabanga, which next month marks its fifth anniversary of this reporting.  It has become an indispensible journalistic resource, all that prevents the first genocide of the 21st century from becoming entirely invisible.

Indeed, it is through the eyes of Radio Dabanga and a few critical reports (from the Small Arms Survey and one or two other organizations) that we have seen the changes on the ground, as the extreme violence of village and population destruction that continued through 2007, and even beyond, has given way to an enormously cruel and destructive “genocide by attrition.”  For we cannot forget that it is the Khartoum regime that has permitted, largely deliberately, the prevailing chaotic violence that targets largely those of non-Arab or African ethnicity.

To be sure, inter-Arab tribal fighting has become an enormous source of destruction and insecurity, in part because Khartoum has clearly taken sides in many instances.  In other cases, the absence of the easy spoils that characterized early years of the genocide has produced its own perverse tribal frictions and tensions, as competition over arable and pasturable land appropriated early on continues today.

But the bombing of civilians in Jebel Marra targets almost exclusively the African tribal groups of the region; the Zaghawa of eastern Darfur were mercilessly targeted by Khartoum’s military and militia forces after Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) leader Minni Minawi—a Zaghawa—abandoned the regime in late 2010 (see authoritative Small Arms Survey report of July 2012).  And above all, the populations in the camps for displaced persons are Darfur Destroyed: A week in the life of a dying land, 27 November 2013—overwhelmingly of non-Arab ethnicity—and they face the most brutal of assaults and rapidly deteriorating humanitarian

•  “They Bombed Everything that Moved: Aerial Military attacks on Civilians and Humanitarians in Sudan, 1999 – 2011” (updated September 2013)  |  http://wp.me/p45rOG-17L

This week I published the fifth update to my original May 6, 2011 report and data spreadsheet (www.SudanBombing.org) chronicling military attacks on civilians and humanitarians in Sudan.  Collectively, the reports and data attempt to render as completely as possible all confirmed aerial attacks on civilians and humanitarians working in what is now Sudan and South Sudan.  To date the figure is more than 2,000, although this figure almost certainly represents but a small fraction of the total number of attacks that have occurred over two decades.  The attacks recorded here are all the responsibility of the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime in Khartoum, which this year marked its 24th year in power following the June 30, 1989 military coup.

The current update focuses on Darfur, with a subsequent update to focus on South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and the North/South border areas.  The data spreadsheet of June 2012 will be updated on completion of this second narrative update.

The current update comprises eight sections:

                        Preface and Notes

[1]  Aerial attacks in Darfur continue undiminishe

[2]  Consequences to date and the course of future human destruction

[3]  Continuing violent hostility toward international humanitarians

[4]  Aircraft and munitions in use in Darfur and greater Sudan

[5]  The near-term future for Darfur and greater Sudan: The Abyei Crisis

[6]  Context for reports of aerial attacks from Radio Dabanga and others

[7] COMPENDIUM: Bombing reports, accounts, dispatches

[8]  Sources and bibliographies for bombing reports

By far the longest is section VII, which comprises a very large number of bombing attacks reported by Darfuri eyewitnesses.  The vast majority come from Radio Dabanga; the absence of any meaningful reporting by the UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is all too conspicuous, as the mission slide closer to complete failure.  There are some international wire reports, but without the accounts from Radio Dabanga, the world would know virtually nothing about the catastrophic violence and insecurity that prevails throughout Darfur.

The grim truth, however, is that even knowing what is occurring in Darfur, the international community is obsessed with geostrategic interests in the Middle East, preeminently Syria.  The painfully invidious comparison implicit in Secretary of State John Kerry’s claim about the unique horror of chemical weapons is all the more painful because it is politically expedient (see my discussion of this issue at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-reeves/on-invoking-the-deaths-of_b_3968044.html).

The original update, data spreadsheet, and September 2013 update may all be found at: www.SudanBombing.org.

•  “Human Mortality in Darfur: What is Unspoken, and What This Silence Means,”Sudan Tribune

Eric Reeves, 8 September 2013  |   http://wp.me/p45rOG-16T

For more than five years the UN has offered no new figures on mortality in Darfur, no estimate of the number of lives lost to violence and its consequences in the decade-long conflict.  The last figure officially promulgated was 300,000, a crude calculation by then head of UN humanitarian operations John Holmes (April 2008), based on no new data or revised methodology: it was simply an extrapolation from the previous UN figure of 200,000, which had been established with some rigor by the UN’s World Health Organization (WHO) in 2004 and 2005.

But as a senior UN official explained to me at the time of the WHO study, there would be no further mortality studies in Darfur: Khartoum had threatened those collecting data and had made clear its intense hostility to any further analysis of the number of dead.  This in part explains why Holmes was driven to the crude extrapolation he offered in 2008.

Data continued to accumulate, however, although even this had ceased by July 2010 with the publication of a report from “Darfurian Voices” (“Darfurian Voices: Documenting Darfurian Refugees’ Views on Issues of Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation” (July 2010).  On the basis of this survey and all previous data, as well as an important but deeply flawed account from researchers at the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) (January 2010), I published in August 2010 a lengthy analysis that concluded approximately 500,000 people had died from all war-related causes in Darfur and eastern Chad from February 2003 through July 2010 (see (http://www.sudanreeves.org/?p=2269). There have been no subsequent data of significance, or critiques of my methodology, that I am aware of.

But it is now September 2013—more than three years later—and still we have no revision of the UN estimate for the number of people who have died as a result of the Darfur conflict. Holmes’ casual estimate continues to be the one cited most often by news organizations. Moreover, we have no data bearing on Global Acute Malnutrition for Darfur as a whole or other global indicators of morbidity.  But we know people have continued to die—and in large numbers, if not at the rate of the earlier years of the genocide.  How can total mortality remain an unaddressed issue?  The answer remains Khartoum’s intimidation of the UN and thereby the international nongovernmental (humanitarian) organizations (INGOs) in Darfur, which dare not get ahead of the UN in releasing data and reports on mortality and morbidity.

This is shocking UN capitulation to a regime that has always insisted that “10,000” people in total have died in the Darfur conflict.  This capitulation has always been implicitly justified in the name of continued access, but the continuous expulsion, harassment, and obstruction of INGOs makes clear that Khartoum will not hesitate to remove even the most essential humanitarian resources if its demands are not met.  The recent experience of the UN’s own High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is all too revealing:

The Sudan government has expelled 20 members of staff of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “compromising the ability of the refugee agency to effectively undertake its work in Darfur.” Agency spokesperson Melissa Fleming confirmed at a UN briefing in Geneva on Tuesday that “of the 37 UNHCR international staff based in Darfur, only 17 currently have valid permits to continue their work.”

Fleming confirmed:

“Permits in the other 20 cases have not been renewed, despite extended follow-up by UNHCR with the relevant government authorities, forcing us to scale down our operations. “This has particularly affected our work in North Darfur. None of our international staff based in El Fasher have been granted permits to return, with the last remaining staff having been asked to leave at short notice in early July. The result is that for over a month, UNHCR has been unable to effectively undertake protection and assistance activities for displaced persons in North Darfur,” Fleming said. (Radio Dabanga, Darfur relief operations hampered as 20 UNHCR staff expelled [Geneva/El Fasher], August 6, 2013) (all emphases in all quotes have been added)

•  “Events in Darfur Rapidly Spiraling Out of Control as Security Continues to Collapse,”Sudan Tribune

Eric Reeves  |  August 29, 2013  |  http://wp.me/p45rOG-15L

As the world reacts with horror to chemical weapons attacks on civilians in Syria, and watches with grim anticipation as an American military response takes shape, there appears to be little “band-width” for other international news.  It is all easy too overlook the much more widespread suffering and civilian destruction in Darfur, an ongoing catastrophe that is accelerating in such a way that humanitarian organizations may soon be compelled to withdraw, leaving an immense vacuum in the provision of food, primary medical care, and clean water.

The UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) appears to be in a state of collapse, unable to protect itself or to serve any deterrent or civilian protection purposes.  Several events in particular this past week give a sense of how weak this beleaguered force has become and the consequences of allowing Khartoum to create in Darfur an intolerable climate of insecurity. Their implications are analyzed briefly below.

It seems important as well, however, to understand just how misleading the implicit comparisons are between civilian victims of chemical weapons in Syria and the civilian victims of utterly indiscriminate aerial bombardment by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) of the Khartoum regime—not only in Darfur but in Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan as well.  In the case of Syria, the strenuous language deployed is a pretext for military action in a region of very considerable geostrategic significance.  As a consequence, there has been much talk of how the Assad regime’s chemical attacks on the outskirts of Damascus are a “moral obscenity,” that they are somehow uniquely “gruesome,” that such actions are the ne plus ultra of military barbarism.

But such descriptions as used by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry are finally expedient; for presumably Kerry knows full well the consequences of aerial attacks on civilians in Darfur and greater Sudan as a whole.  There have been more than 2,000 such confirmed aerial attacks on civilians and humanitarians over the past fifteen years, and this is likely only a small fraction of the actual number of bombings.  Many tens of thousands have been killed in these attacks—directly or indirectly—dwarfing the number of casualties from chemical weapons attacks in Syria and even in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s infamous al-Anfal campaign against the Kurds in the late 1980s.

And any comparison of how “gruesome” death is by means of chemical attack on the one hand, and the shrapnel-inflicted wounding of children, women, the elderly on the other, will inevitably be invidious.  Histories of the First World War have given us many images, narratives accounts, even poetry representing the agony of mustard gas inhalation; it is without question horrific, indeed “gruesome.”  But can this justify implicit claims that the nature of death from shrapnel exploding out of crude barrel bombs, inflicting ghastly wounds, is any less “gruesome”?  Indeed, it is a pointless and misleading comparison.

•  Humanitarian Conditions in Darfur: Relief Efforts Perilously Close to Collapse (in two parts)

Eric Reeves, 16 August 2013

Part 1:    http://wp.me/p45rOG-15l

Part 2:   http://wp.me/p45rOG-15f

Without an urgent investment of major political energy and commitment, the international community is soon likely to preside over a catastrophic contraction of humanitarian capacity and access in Darfur.  The world must put Khartoum on notice that there will be significant consequences if the regime does not permit unfettered humanitarian access and movement of relief supplies.  The regime must also face real pressure to provide meaningful security for increasingly threatened camp areas, an effort that will entail bringing various militia forces under military and police control.

Senior officials of the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party (NIF/NCP) must also face strong pressure to cease exacerbating ethnic tensions as part of an ongoing counter-insurgency campaign of unspeakable brutality.  These political efforts to pressure Khartoum must come from the UN Security Council and UN Secretariat, as well as from those countries—especially in Europe, Africa, and the Arab world—whose continuing economic and diplomatic support enables the regime to cling to power amidst an economy that is imploding.

None of this is likely and suggests that the current downward trajectory of humanitarian conditions will become steeper, as it has for the past year and more.  And yet despite the immense threats to human lives and livelihoods, we have far too little systematic or global data about issues of mortality, morbidity, malnutrition, and the availability of primary medical care.  Further, there have been no recent broader evaluations of educational resources, mental health treatment, or pre- and neonatal care.  Nothing is said of the epidemic of rape that continues to ravage Darfur, causing outrageous physical and emotional trauma, as well as rending families and communities.  All UN officials are essentially silent or perfunctory in their comments out of deference to Khartoum’s sensitivities over this issue.  We know far, far too little, at least if we rely on UN sources, international news coverage, or the intimidated International Nongovernmental (Humanitarian) Organizations (INGOs) that continue to operate in increasingly threatening circumstances.

There are a host of issues defining the dramatic increase in threats to humanitarian relief for Darfuris who have now endured more than ten years of conflict, displacement, deprivation, and loss.  Nearly all relate in one way or another to insecurity in the region, an issue I have recently addressed in a separate analysis:

(Humanitarian Conditions in Darfur: A Climate of Violence and Extreme Insecurity, 4 August 2013, http://www.sudanreeves.org/?p=4153)

•  The Killing of Seven UNAMID Peacekeeping Personnel in Darfur: a terrible tragedy, a clear warning

Eric Reeves  |  July 15, 2013  |  http://wp.me/p45rOG-14u

On July 13 seven personnel from the UN/AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) were killed and seventeen wounded north of Nyala (South Darfur) in a brutal, sustained armed assault distinguished by heavy machine-gun fire, the use of rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), and the deployment of powerful anti-aircraft weaponry mounted carried or mounted on approximately ten vehicles. The attack was almost certainly carried out by militia proxies of the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime in Khartoum.

Despite promises, the likelihood that the regime will allow a thorough investigation is virtually non-existent, and prosecution even less likely.  Just ten days earlier (July 3, 2013) unidentified gunmen ambushed a UNAMID patrol near Labado (South Darfur), 50 kilometers to the east of Nyala.  Since January 1, 2008 there have been countless assaults on the UNAMID and more than 50 of its personnel have been violently killed, with many more seriously wounded.  And yet there has not been a single prosecution for any of the attacks on these “blue-hatted” peacekeepers that make up UNAMID.  In turn, the failure to push adequately for such prosecution by Khartoum only increases the sense of impunity throughout Darfur, and represents yet another failure of the international community in supporting UNAMID politically.

The Mission has also been badly constrained by a lack of adequate transport and communications equipment, as well as military fire-power: the only helicopter gunships deployed to the region for UNAMID were withdrawn by Ethiopia many months ago.  Militarily capable nations have been content to watch Darfur disintegrate rather than provide critical equipment for a UN Security Council-sanctioned peacekeeping mission.

Moreover, the political leadership of UNAMID, particularly the Joint Special Representatives, has been a series of disastrous failures, dressed up as personal achievements by the likes of Rodolphe Adada and Ibrahim Gambari.  Their failures have done much to create the climate in which UN peacekeepers have become such frequent targets.  Their insistence that violence in Darfur has largely ended, that they have brought peace to the region, and that security prevails has done much to prevent the international community from understanding how violent a place Darfur remains.  For its part, the international community has been quite prepared to accept inaccurate, even nonsensical accounts of the situation on the ground in Darfur.

An egregious example of the distortions offered in place of difficult but honest accounts is provided by Hervé Ladsous, the head of the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Last April (2012) he declared that UNAMID was preparing to reduce its force by over 4,000 troops and police. The justification?  Security had improved sufficiently to justify the drawdown, and UNAMID force size should reflect “reality on the ground,” Ladsous asserted.  In fact, this was really a tacit admission that UNAMID was failing and that DPKO did not wish to fund a failing Mission at such high levels.

But the timing of this statement could hardly have been worse.  Though violence has ebbed and flowed throughout ten years of conflict in Darfur, Ladsous spoke just as violence was again surging to levels not seen since the earliest years of the genocide.  Aerial bombardment of the eastern Jebel Marra region—subject to Khartoum’s humanitarian embargo for three years—intensified.  Attacks on camps became more frequent and violent, extortion schemes more brutal, the epidemic of rape continued undiminished, those returning to their lands were attacked with growing impunity by Arab militia groups, and humanitarian reach diminished as violence accelerated.

July 2012 was a turning point in the upsurge of violence that was already well underway throughout Darfur: in the displaced persons camps, in rural areas, in the towns, even in the city of Nyala, capital of South Darfur and the largest city in all of Darfur. On July 31 scores of student demonstrators were gunned down in Nyala down by Khartoum’s security forces using automatic rifles.  Elsewhere intense fighting between rebel groups and Khartoum’s Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) was reported as well, especially in eastern Darfur (see “Forgotten Darfur: Old Tactics and New Players,” Small Arms Survey, July 2012).  

And various paramilitary elements, including the Abu Tira (Central Reserve Police), and Border Intelligence Guards—often divided along Arab tribal lines—became engaged in increasingly violent killings and looting.  A well-placed, highly informed source on the ground in North Darfur reported in early August 2012 that:

Kutum town has been overrun by Arab militia since last Thursday [August 3, 2012]…all of the INGOs [International Nongovernmental Humanitarian Organizations] and UN offices in the area have been thoroughly looted and their staff relocated to el-Fasher.  All of the IDPs from Kassab IDP camp have been displaced.  The markets in Kutum and in Kassab have both been thoroughly looted. (e-mail received from Darfur, August 5, 2012)

• “Taking Human Displacement in Darfur Seriously”

Eric Reeves | Sudan Tribune, 3 June 2013 |  http://wp.me/p45rOG-12V

OVERVIEW

[December 17, 2014 update: as of December 2014, the UN estimates that approximately 400,000 were newly displaced from January through August of this year alone.

[April 6, 2014 update: as of early April 2014, the UN estimates that 480,000 people were newly displaced in 2013; beyond this, more than 200,000 people have been displaced in the first months of 2014.  This brings the number of civilians newly displaced since the deployment of UNAMID in January 2008 to well over 2 million.]

[December 13, 2013 update: as of mid-November 2013 the UN estimates that 460,000 people have been newly displaced in Darfur.  Using the figures below from the June 2013 calculation, this brings the number of civilians newly displaced since the deployment of UNAMID in January 2008 to approximately 2 million.]

A brief moment of shocking clarity accompanied confirmation by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) that some 300,000 Darfuris have been newly displaced in the first four and a half months of 2013, an estimate first reported by Radio Dabanga on May 16, 2013, a week before other news sources:

In its latest report, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) confirms that more than 300,000 people have been forcibly displaced in Darfur since the beginning of this year. It attributes the displacement to inter-tribal fighting and conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and armed rebel movements.

[In this brief, numbers (including for mortality), names, dates, and locations are in bold throughout; italics are used for emphasis, which has always been added in quotations; spelling, transliteration, and the punctuation of quotations have often been regularized for clarity.  I have also continued to use the division of Darfur into three states: West, South, and North Darfur states.  This division is preserved in the highly detailed UN Field Atlases for Darfur: http://www.sudanreeves.org/?p=3938 ]

It is worth noting a peculiar use of this staggering figure for human displacement, by both Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and OHCA head Valerie Amos, in comparing it with the previous two years:

“The United Nations estimates that 300,000 people have fled fighting in all of Darfur in the first five months of this year, which is more than the total number of people displaced in the last two years put together,” Amos said [in Khartoum].” (Agence France-Presse [Khartoum], May 24, 2013]

The statistical claim here is highly dubious, as the data collated here suggest (see Section One below).  And to the extent the claim is meant to suggest that 2011 and 2012 were not years of extraordinary levels of violence and displacement, this was simply disingenuous.

Moreover, displacement continues at a shocking rate: even subsequent to the mid-May figure reported by OCHA, tens of thousands of additional people have been displaced.  Nor does the Secretary-General or any other voice of consequence in the international community offer meaningful and realistic proposals for halting this displacement, which over the past ten years has correlated highly with mortality.  Indeed, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has done nothing to signal that it plans to change course in beginning to draw down the UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), which has a UN Security Council mandate to protect civilians—including from displacement.

In their comparisons, the Secretary-General and OCHA chief appear to be continuing a pattern that has been evident since UNAMID first took up its civilian protection mandate (January 1, 2008), viz., trying to overstate previous “successes” in the face of ongoing catastrophe.  But UNAMID’s inability to provide civilian and humanitarian protection has been conspicuous from the beginning, and was all too continuous with that of the preceding and grossly inadequate African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), UNAMID’s primary source of men and equipment early on.

There is simply no sign that violent displacement will end or even diminish, or that aerial bombardments of civilians—rarely investigated by UNAMID—will cease to be a primary agency of human displacement, despite the wildly mendacious protestations of the Khartoum regime:

“‘It is absolutely not true that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) bombed civilian targets in the two regions, or in any other areas of Sudan,’ said on Thursday [May 30, 2013] foreign ministry spokesperson, Abu Bakar Al-Siddiq.” (Sudan Tribune, May 31, 2013)

[ I will soon be updating “They Bombed Everything that Moved”: Aerial Military Attacks on Civilians and Humanitarians in Sudan, 1999 – 2011
(analysis and bibliography of sources, 80+ pages with accompanying Excel spreadsheet, at www.sudanbombing.org).]); analysis and data spreadsheet previously updated June 5, 2012.  More than 2,000 such aerial attacks on civilians and humanitarians have been authoritatively reported since 1999. ]

Section One below offers the data and reports—from the UN, non-governmental organizations, and news reports—that support the following summary of findings about human displacement in Darfur over the past six and a half years:

2007:                         300,000 civilians newly displaced

2008:                         317,000 civilians newly displaced

2009:                         250,000 civilians newly displaced

2010:                         300,000 civilians newly displaced

2011:                          200,000 civilians newly displaced

2012:                         150,000 civilians newly displaced

2013:                         320,000 civilians newly displaced as of June 1, 2013

The total for civilians newly displaced, 2007 – June 2013, is more than 1.8 million.

[Part 2 of this overview may be found at http://wp.me/p45rOG-12S ]

وقفات مع التعتيم على دارفور

اريك ريفز

• [Arabic translation] “Some reflections on the invisibility of Darfur”

Eric Reeves  |  May 2013  |  http://wp.me/p45rOG-12z

كثيراً ما يسألني الناس, “هل لا زال الوضع مريعاً في دارفور؟ هل لا زالت درافور أزمة إنسانية؟” إنه لأمرمؤلم أن يضطر المرء للإجابة على مثل هذا السؤال, حتى لو كان ذلك فقط بسبب الصعوبة في إعطاء صورة  ولو مبتسرة عن حجم الدمار والمعاناة الإنسانية الهائلة, أو عن وحشية حرب الاستنزاف التي تقودها الخرطوم ضد جهود العون الإنساني, أو عن السيل الضخم والمتواصل من النازحين المدنيين, الذين فاق عددهم المليون وسبعمائة ألف منذ عام 2007. بذات القدر سيكون من الصعوبة بمكان تقديم سجل يناسب ما قام به نظام الخرطوم في دفع الأوضاع إلى ما أسمته هيومان رايتس ووتش قبل عدد من السنين “الفوضى المقصودة”. في الحقيقة, لا زالت الأزمة في دارفور أزمة “مصممة” –تغذيها حالة من الإنكار وإعاقة وصول العون الإنساني؛ وإصرار الخرطوم على منح الحصانة لمليشياتها بالوكالة المنخرطة في الابتزاز والقتل، ومصادرة الأراضي، وفي ظل هجمات عسكرية لا هوادة فيها من القوات المسلحة السودانية النظامية والقوات الموالية لها,حيث تواصلالقوات الجوية السودانية على وجه الخصوص اعتداءاتها الوحشية -والعشوائية إلى حد كبير- على أهداف مدنية، تأكدت منها عدة مئات حالياً (www.sudanbombing.org).

“لماذا اختفت إذاً من الواجهة؟”, هذا هو السؤال الثاني الملحق. “ماذا عن حملة المناصرة النشطة والقوية في بداية عملية الإبادة؟ لماذا لم نعد نقرأ اليوم شيئاً عن درافور في الأخبار؟” هذه -بدون شك-  حزمة من الأسئلة الصعبة, ولكن من المؤكد أيضاً أن هناك بعض الإجابات البديهية عليها:

[1] لا تسمح الخرطوم بدخول الصحفيين إلى دارفور, إلا في ظروف مقيدة بشدة, ومن الممكن أن ينتج عن هذا التقييد تقارير غير دقيقة بشكل فاضح, من قبل حتى أولئك الصحفيين الموهوبين؛ (انظر مقالي الصادر في 15 أبريل 2012, عن تقرير خبري مضلل تماماً لصحيفة النيويورك تايمز من غرب دارفور).

[2] لا يُسمح بتقارير حقوق الإنسان المستقلة في دارفور لعدة سنوات الآن, في المقابل لم يفعل معظم مقرري حقوق الإنسان التابعين لمختلف وكالات الأمم المتحدة شيئاً يُذكر بهذا الخصوص. وكان فريق الخبراء السابق للامم المتحدة حول دارفور قد انجز عملاً ممتازاً, ولكن النتائج المدروسة جيدا لذلك العمل لم تجد مستمعين كثيرين، وبحلول عام 2010، أصبح الفريق مسيساً بصورة كاملة تقريباً, وصارت تقاريره غاية في السوء (أنظر سودان تربيونو 28 ابريل 2013). على سبيل المثال حُذف شهر سبتمبر 2010 –وهو الشهر الذي شهد مجزرة كبيرة وغاية في الوحشية للمدنيين من غير العرب ارتكبتها مليشيا عربية في بلدة تابارات بشمال دارفور-  حُذف هذا الشهر بعناية من تقويم كل من الفريق السابق والذي جاء بعده ,حيث بدأ هذا الأخير تقويمه بشهر اكتوبر 2010, على الرغم من أن تقارير الفريق السابق تغطي الفترة حتى شهر اغسطس 2010. ولا زلنا نفتقر إلى تقرير من الأمم المتحدة حول المجزرة الإثنية في تبارات, وذلك برغم صدور تقرير متزامن ومفصل لرويترز, التي وجدت حتى وقتاً لإجراء مقابلات مع الناجين من المجزرة.

[3] حرفت الأمم المتحدة، سواء في الأمانة العامة أو في مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية، بشكل سيء حجم الأزمة في دارفور، بل  ذهبت إلى حد الكذب الفاضح بشأن وصول المساعدات الإنسانية إليها. كذلك أذعنت الأمم المتحدة لطلب الخرطوم بالامتناع عن نشر البيانات والتقارير الإنسانية. كما أن قوات اليوناميد، التي يرفض المسؤولون في الخرطوم بشكل روتيني السماح لها بالوصول إلى أماكن عملها، هي بعثة تعاني تدن في الروح المعنوية, وأصبحت تقاريرها تافهة وغير مكتملة بصورة فاضحة.

وفي تقديري فإن كثير من الناس من خارج دارفور أصبحوا يعتقدون أن الأزمة ببساطة قد استمرت لفترة أطول بكثير من أن تكون أزمة حقيقية ­ -وهي نتيجة لا تعدو أن تكون صحيحة من وجهة نظر ظرفية- ولكن من المؤكد أن الاهتمام ذوى شيئاً ما. ونال الإجهاد من كثيرين من الناشطين والمناصرين- أساسا للأسباب المبينة أعلاه.

ولكن هناك سبب آخر أقل بداهة وضوحا لأن تصبح الأزمة في دارفور غائبة غير مرئية. ذلك أن المعاناة والدمار الذي حدث قد تم -في بعض الأحيان- تحريفه بصورة خطيرة من قبل أولئك الذين يدعون معرفة أفضل وأوثق بالمنطقة. والمثال الأبرز هنا هو اليكس دي وال، الذي أدان مراراً  وبحدة حملات المناصرة المدنية لدارفور في الولايات المتحدة وأماكن أخرى من العالم -بوصفها جاهلة، ومضللة، وأخيراً, مدمرة-  فبعد كارثة اتفاق السلام في دارفور عام 2006 (أبوجا، نيجيريا)، ذهب دي وال ليصبح “الخبير في شؤون دارفور” لفريق الاتحاد الأفريقي رفيع المستوى حول دارفور (AUPD) والذي بدأ عمله  في عام 2009، وترأسه السياسي الطموح ثابو امبيكي، الرئيس السابق لجنوب أفريقيا. وقد أصدر الفريق تقريراً مطولاً تضمن مواضع زائدة عن الحاجة بشكل لا يطاق (بدون الاقتباس ولا مرة واحدة من أعمال أخرى، بما في ذلك تلك التي كان من الواضح أنهم اعتمدوا عليها)، وتوصل في الختام إلى “خارطة طريق للسلام في دارفور.” .

غير أن تنفيذ “خارطة الطريق” حوّل -كما هو متوقع-  فريق الاتحاد الافريقي رفيع المستوى حول دارفور إلى الفريق  (الغامض جغرافيا) رفيع المستوى للإتحاد الأفريقي للتنفيذ (AUHIP)، برئاسة امبيكي مرة أخرى. سيذكر كثيرون أن امبيكي  هو الذي رفض قبول دليل علمي راسخ بشأن فيروس نقص المناعة المكتسب / الإيدز، وعرض بذلك مواطني جنوب افريقيا إلى وباء وحشي لا زال يفتك بالبلاد. كما أن امبيكي هو الذي مدّ شريان حياة دبلوماسي حاسم لروبرت موغابي في زيمبابوي، وليس هناك من هو أشد قسوة أو مستبد فرد أكثر تدميرا في أفريقيا من موجابي. وكما كان متوقعاً تماماً في مثل هذه الحالة –بالنظر إلى الوسائل والاجراءات المعيبة والقيادة الأكثر عجزاً-  فشل فريق التنفيذ فشلاً ذريعاً في دارفور. فكان أن هاجر نتيجة لذلك إلى قضايا سودانية أخرى, محتفظاً بذات الإسم الغامض الفخيم: فريق الاتحاد الافريقي رفيع المستوى للتنفيذ. وبالمثل حمل معه  ذات العجز إلى أماكن أخرى في السودان الكبير.

لذلك يثور السؤال: ما هو إذاً نوع المشورة  التي كان يتلقاها امبيكي من دي وال؟ وما هي صورة  دارفور التي  تشكلت لدى الإتحاد الافريقي بالنتيجة؟ بالنسبة لشخص ناقد بهذه الدرجة للجهل المزعوم لمناصري دارفور، يقدم دي وال في عام 2009 -وهو العام الذي بدأ فيه الفريق عمله- وجهة نظر لافتة للنظر حول دارفور. ففي معرض حديثه عن قرية عين سيرو بمحلية كتم في شمال دارفور، يعلن دي وال بطريقة مفعمة بالنشوة:

“إن قضاء بضعة أيام في عين سيرو هو تذكير بما كانت عليه الحياة في دارفور. فالقرية تحتضنها سلسلة التلال التي تمتد شمالاً من جبل مرة إلى الصحراء. وفي ظل الحماية التي توفرها الجبال سيطر جيش تحرير السودان على المنطقة على مدى السنوات الأربع الماضية، وأتاح بالنسبة لكثير من الناس في المنطقة المجاورة العودة لنوع من الحياة الطبيعية. فأعيد بناء القرى، وقامت خدمات صحية أساسية, وفتحت المدرسة أبوابها للتلاميذ”.

“وتكشف عين سيرو عن كيف أن الناس من جميع الأطراف قد تعبوا من الحرب، وكيف أنهم قد يخطون خطواتهم الصغيرة ولكن المهمة نحو السلام والعودة إلى حياتهم الطبيعية إذا سنحت لهم الفرصة. وعندما كتبت جولي فلينت لأول مرة في عام 2007 عن عين سيرو التي”أنقذت نفسها’، ظل كثيرون متشككين في أن ذلك كان يمثل شيئا ذا بال. ولكن بعد مرور سنتين، لم تنجو عين سيرو، فحسب, بل أصبح نموذجها في العون الذاتي أقل استثنائية مما كان عليه من قبل”(29 مايو 2009, في موقعه على الرابط:http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/2009/ 05/28/a-taste-of-normality-in-ain-siro /)

في الوقت الحاضر تقف عين سيرو والمناطق المحيطة بها عالقة في منتصف دوامة واسعة من العنف المتصاعد في ولايات دارفور الثلاث –وهو عنف ظل في حالة تصاعد لعدة شهور الآن، على الرغم من أنه كان يفور وينحسر على مدى السنوات العشر الماضية. وتقع القرية على بعد حوالي 30 ميلا من معسكر كساب بمحلية كتم ، حيث جرت بعض أسوأ أعمال العنف التي شهدها العام الماضي. ولكن حتى في ذلك الوقت الذي كتب فيه دي وال انطباعاته، لم يكن العنف في دارفور قد توقف بأي حال من الأحوال؛ فلم يفتر بالتأكيد النزوح وتشريد البشر، بل ظل يتصاعد بمعدلات مفزعة. (انظرhttp://www.sudanreeves.org/؟p=3970)؛ كما ظلت نية الخرطوم في سحق التمرد في دارفور بطريق الإبادة الجماعية واضحة جلية وفي ظل  توجه جديد تحت القيادة الوحشية المعروفة لكبير مستشاري الرئاسة نافع علي نافع  (هذا بعد وفاة سلفه، مجذوب الخليفة، في يونيو 2007). بالتأكيد تغيرت الأساليب عن قمة فترة عنف الإبادة الجماعية (2003 – 2005/2006)، غير أن العنف واسع النطاق، والموجه ضد جماعات عرقية محددة ظل حقيقة من حقائق الحياة بالنسبة لشعب دارفور. فالمثال المذكور عن تابارات (سبتمبر 2010) -على مقربة من عين سيرو الكس دي وال في شمال دارفور-  لا يترك مزيداً لكشفه (http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/17/ozatp-sudan-darfur- الناجين-idAFJOE68G0BJ20100917).

علاوة على ذلك، في مايو 2009 كانت معظم أنحاء دارفور لا تزال تعاني من طرد الخرطوم الكارثي, في مارس 2009, لثلاثة عشر منظمة من منظمات الإغاثة الدولية، واغلاق ثلاث منظمات إنسانية وطنية. وقدر حينها كبار مسؤولي الاغاثة داخل المجتمع الإنساني أن ذلك مثل ما يقارب نصف القدرة الكلية للإغاثة لكافة أنحاء دارفور. هل كان دي وال يعتقد بصورة ما –بعد شهرين من هذه الأحداث-  أنه لن تكون لها عواقب وخيمة؟ في الواقع، أصبحت هذه العواقب, وبشكل مطرد, أكثر وضوحا في السنوات التالية. فالأوضاع الإنسانية الفقيرة أصلاً، ظلت تتدهور بشدة، بينما تقلصت الطاقات الإنسانية وفرص إيصال الإغاثة. في الواقع، قد يكون الناس في عين سيرو خارج متناول العون الإنساني؛ إذ ظلت الخرطوم ترفض بشكل منهجي إيصال المساعدات الإنسانية لمناطق تتركز فيها مجموعات عرقية بعينها, حيث أجبر على النزوح حوالي 100000 من سكان دارفور, من هذا الجزء من شمال دارفور وحدها, خلال العام الماضي.

في ظل تشجيع قوي من قبل عدد كبير من أبناء وبنات درافور, كما ظللت أحظى به لما يقارب عشر سنوات الآن, واصلت الكتابة عن واقع المنطقة كما أطلعني عليه أهل دارفور أنفسهم, وعلى نحو متزايد كما ظل ينقله في تقاريره راديو دبنقا, وهو جهد استثنائي مشترك للدارفوريين مقره هولندا. وقد فعل راديو دبنقا أكثر بكثير من الأمم المتحدة أو الصحافة الدولية في الإبقاء على الحقائق في دارفور مرئية ومعروفة (وأصبحت تستشهد به على نحو متزايد  مصادر أخبار أخرى، بما في ذلك شبكة المعلومات الاقليمية المتكاملة التابعة للأمم المتحدة، ايرين). ولقد استفدت أيضا من مصادر خاصة في العمل الإنساني جاءت تقاريرها من الأرض في دارفور، ومن مصادر داخل مكتب تنسيق الشؤون الإنسانية التابع للأمم المتحدة، وكذلك من مجموعة من المصادر الخاصة الأخرى. كذلك قرأت كل ما كتب حول دارفور من المنظمات غير الحكومية الدولية وجماعات حقوق الإنسان (عادة ما تستخدم هذه مصادر وطنية سودانية)، ومنظمات السياسات، وغيرها. فحتى العام 2009 ومن بعده ظلت هذه التقارير والسجلات مواد ضخمة تستغرق وقتا طويلا للاطلاع عليها، على الرغم من أنها كانت في الغالب مجزأة وغير مكتملة. لكنني بالتأكيد لم أكن الوحيد الذي رأى شيئاً آخراً غير تلك المشاهد الشاعرية لعين سرو التي وردت في تقرير دي وال, والتي يفترض أنها شكلت نصيحته إلى فريق الاتحاد الأفريقي رفيع المستوى الذي كان بدأ أعماله حينها.

ولقد انعكس ما سمعت به وقرأته في تعليقاتي الراتبة  (نُشر معظمها في سودان تريبيون، التي يرفضها دي وال بوصفها “متحيزة”) حول الأزمات الإنسانية والأمنية في دارفور. ويجب أن أعترف صراحة هنا أن دي وال كتب مؤخرا رافضاً لهذه الجهود: “أولئك الذين كانوا بالكاد [في السودان] لن يجدوا صعوبة في كتابة “رزم” هائلة من النصوص …” (AllAfrica.com، 9مايو 2013). ما لن يخلص المرء إليه من هذا التوصيف, هو: ما حجم الاقتباسات والإحالات في هذه “الرزم من النصوص”, اقتباسات وإحالات كثيرة وذات قيمة صادرة عن أوسع نطاق ممكن من المصادر الموثوق بها. لقد كان هذا الجهد في أحد معانيه محاولة لأرشفة المعرض بشدة لمخاطر الضياع أو النسيان أو –ببساطة- للتجاهل، كما يفعل دي وال على نحو واضح.

قد يكون من المفيد، من ثم، مقارنة تقرير دي وال الحماسي عن مايو 2009, مع تقاريري  الأكثر توسعاً, من الفترات السابقة واللاحقة لتلك اللحظة. أنا لن أقدم هنا لمحة موجزة عن تلك التقارير؛ فالكارثة في دارفور ليست بسيطة, وليست قابلة لإيجازها بسهولة –وهي في حالة تطور مستمر. لذلك فإن فهم الطيش العميق الذي يغوص فيه دي وال يتطلب, في الواقع, قدراً كبيراً من القراءة المتعمقة, عوضاً عن هذه الحذلقات اللسانية التي اشتهر بها دي وال.

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php/article30643

وفي وقت قريب, وبما يعطي صورة أوضح عن حجم التضليل في تقديرات دي وال, والذي كشفت عنه الأحداث:

  • الأوضاع الإنسانية في دارفور: أخر التقرير تكشف عن تدهور مستمر, سودان تربيون, 12 فبراير 2013,http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article45480
  • الإبادة الجماعية في دارفور بعد 10 سنوات, سودان تربيون, 20 ابريل 2013

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article46392

  • تقرير رئيسي لفريق خبراء الأمم المتحدة حول دارفور يُحكم عليه بالنسيان, سودان تربيون, 28 ابريل 2013,

, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article4637

والكثير من هذه وغيرها من الأعمال، بما في ذلك المنشورات الأكاديمية، التي تم تجميعها بطريقة أرشيفية في كتاب: المساومة مع الشر: التاريخ الأرشيفي للسودان الكبير، 2007 – 2012 (www.CompromisingWithEvil.org).

لقد  قيلت الكثير من الكلمات السخية حول هذا الكتاب؛ ولكن ليس منها ما يعني بالنسبة لي أكثر من تلك التي قالها الدكتور محمد احمد عيسى, المدير السابق لمركز الأمل لعلاج ضحايا التعذيب والاغتصاب (نيالا، جنوب دارفور), وما قاله روبرت كينيدي  الحائز على جائزة حقوق الإنسان لعام 2007.  وتعكس تلك الكلمات, كما صرت أعتقد بعد اتصالات متكررة, وجهات نظر عدد كبير من سكان دارفور، الذين يمكن فهم حيرتهم حول الصمت الذي يضربه المجتمع الدولي على قضيتهم, والذي يبدو أنه اتخذ تقارير دي لوال بوصفها الكلمة الأخيرة بشأن الأوضاع في دارفور:

“على مدى السنوات القليلة الماضية، وفي حين كان العالم صامت بشكل مذهل، واصل اريك ريفز الكتابة عن الفظائع والسياسات الهدامة للغاية التي تمارسها الحكومة السودانية.  فقد أعاد كتابه الصادر في 2007: ’يوم طويل من الموت‘، كثير من الجرائم الوحشية في دارفور لدائرة الاهتمام الدولي. وفي حين كان بعض المتشككين أو المنكرين، من أمثال محمود مهمداني، يزيحون كتاباته جانباً،  واصل الناشطون في دارفور وأماكن أخرى من العالم التزامهم بفضل البحوث التي تضمنها ’يوم طويل من الموت‘.

“كذلك يقدم كتابه الاليكترونى المطول الجديد [مساومة مع الشر]، والذي يحتوي جزءا كبيرا من كتاباته بدءاً من عام 2007 وحتى وقتنا الحاضر-  قدرا كبيرا من المعلومات المفتاحية بشأن الأزمات الناشئة في دارفور وجبال النوبة والنيل الأزرق، والمنطقة الحدودية بين شمال وجنوب السودان. وإذ اختار المجتمع الدولي في السنوات الأخيرة أن يغض الطرف عن ما يحدث في دارفور والسودان عامة. فمن جانبه، واصل اريك ريفز كتاباته بلا هوادة لفضح فشل المجتمع الدولي في إحلال السلام في السودان، سواء من خلال تنفيذ اتفاق السلام الشامل لعام 2005 أو عن طريق بعثة اليوناميد في دارفور.

“هذا الكتاب الاليكتروني الجديد لريفز يحتوي على 14 مرفقاً، يتناول كل واحد منها أحد المواضيع المحددة المثيرة للجدل مما يتطلب القراءة. و أحث بقوة كل المعنيين بالشأن السوداني على قراءة هذا الإصدارة الجديدة، التي تقدم وجهة نظر واقعية للوضع المتدهور في كل من شمال وجنوب السودان “.

ولا شك أنني لم أنفق الكثير من الوقت “على الأرض” في السودان كما فعل اليكس دي وال، ولكن للأسف، وكما تكشف كلمات دي وال نفسه عن ذلك بطرق مختلفة، فإن أولئك الذين أمضوا وقتاً طويلاً على الأرض قد لا يزالون بحاجة إلى رؤية الأماكن الصحيحة أو إلى تدقيق النظر في ما هو أمامهم بكل وضوح, حتى إن لم يكن يسرهم أو يناسبهم.

May 2013

•  THE DARFUR GENOCIDE AT TEN YEARS: A Reckoning

Eric Reeves  |  19 April 2013  |  http://wp.me/p45rOG-10z

There is in Darfur no end in sight for conflict, murder, rape, assaults on displaced persons camps, agricultural and village destruction, brutal extortion schemes, and continuing violent human displacement.  The primary targets of this mayhem overseen by the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime in Khartoum continue to be primarily civilians from African tribal groups surviving tenuously in an increasingly chaotic Darfur; it is the cruelest of counter-insurgency strategies, since the military opponents of the regime are rebel groups that refuse to accept a peace agreement contrived in Doha (Qatar), not ordinary farmers and landholders.

Moreover, for several years an increasing number of Arab tribal groups have been drawn into the fighting, often pitting one Arab group against another; this has produced rapidly growing “collateral damage” as Khartoum seeks to subdue Darfur by means of a war of attrition in which impunity, chaos, and inter-ethnic violence serve the regime’s ultimate military and political purposes.  The insecurity consequent upon such polices threatens international relief organizations, many of which have already withdrawn or been expelled, and many more are contemplating withdrawal.

International civilian protection—publicly called for since 2003—has been disastrously inadequate.  Since January 1, 2008 the UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has failed miserably in providing basic civilian protection, even as it began as the most expensive peacekeeping operation in the world (and is now only one of three in greater Sudan). Throughout Darfur, even as humanitarian assistance is increasingly attenuated and severely threatened, neither the UN nor the AU will speak honestly about these realities, or risk any confrontation with Khartoum and its primary supporters: the Arab League, China,  Russia, the Organization of Islamic Conference, and sadly many within the AU.

On countless occasions public statements by officials from both the AU and UN have been marked by either disingenuousness or outright mendacity, particularly concerning levels of violence, displacement, and humanitarian conditions and access.  Of human mortality totals the UN has long ceased to speak for fear of angering Khartoum; in fact, the extant evidence and data, while certainly incomplete, strongly suggest that half a million people have died from violence and its consequences: exposure, dehydration, disease, and starvation.

The international community, long unwilling to act meaningfully, pretends that a raft of ignored UN Security Council resolutions—filled with “Chapter 7 authority” and various “demands” that have gone entirely unmet by Khartoum—is an adequate diplomatic response.

Peace negotiations, under myriad auspices, produced first the disastrously ill-conceived and ill-fated “Darfur Peace Agreement” (2006, Abuja)—an agreement that ensured the fragmentation of Darfur’s rebel movement.  More recently (July 2011) the “Doha Document for Peace in Darfur” (DDPD) has served as the diplomatic point of departure, and touchstone for all comments about ending violence in Darfur.  This is so even as the DDPD has been overwhelmingly rejected by the major rebel groups and Darfuri civil society, and whose terms have been almost entirely ignored by the Khartoum regime since the time the agreement was signed twenty-one months ago.

The “Responsibility to Protect” (unanimously ratified in the UN General Assembly “Outcome Document” of September 2005 and UN Security Council Resolution 1674 [April 2006]) is among the most serious and conspicuous casualties of the Darfur genocide, and for evidence we need look no further than current international failure to halt Khartoum’s ongoing campaigns of civilian annihilation in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan and in Blue Nile.

The impunity that sustains the Khartoum regime in its serial atrocity crimes in these two southern states grows directly out of the impunity that has prevailed from the beginning of major violence in Darfur.  The deliberate destruction of agricultural production in the Nuba and Blue Nile should remind us of the systematic destruction of food-stocks and seed-stocks, the poisoning of water sources, and the looting or killing of livestock during the Darfur genocide.  These are all actions that continue to be reported in Darfur, along with relentless aerial bombardment that directly violates the UN Security Council “demand” (Resolution 1591, March 2005) that all aerial military assaults in Darfur be halted.

And it is of course indiscriminate bombing of civilians and civilian targets that for almost two years has defined Khartoum’s military assault on the Nuba and Blue Nile, where the regime permits no humanitarian relief efforts to reach civilians in rebel-held territory.  The bombing attacks—primarily conducted by highly inaccurate Antonov cargo planes from which crude, shrapnel-loaded barrel bombs are simply rolled out the cargo bay—are all war crimes under the Rome Statute that provides the statutory basis for the International Criminal Court.

Collectively the attacks constitute crimes against humanity under the Statute.

So many and so great are the Khartoum regime’s violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Darfur that a detailed retrospective seems urgently required as violence reaches a new crescendo throughout the region, and the prospects for peace rapidly recede.  This brief is the first of several accounts focusing on specific violations of international law—on this occasion analyzing the tactic of deliberately disguising of military aircraft so as to be either unidentifiable or appear to be those of the UN or humanitarian organizations.

[In addition to this lengthy analysis, there is an equally lengthy Appendix at | http://wp.me/p45rOG-10o ]

• Human Security in Darfur Enters Free-Fall

UNAMID continues to prove powerless in the face of growing violence, with humanitarian access and capacity at greatly increased risk

Eric Reeves | 20 March 2013 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-ZU

The relentless stream of news from Darfur makes clear that what is occurring is not an “uptick” in violence, as some would have it, but a massive increase in the threats to human security, including to the humanitarian personnel who continue to sustain the lives of so many Darfuris displaced into camps or living tenuously in rural areas.  Nearly all these personnel are now Sudanese nationals, many highly skilled and deeply dedicated; but there is a clear lack of medical physicians, water and sanitation specialists, and those with expertise in the logistics of what is still a staggeringly large humanitarian operation.

And yet after ten years without an end to the violence, “donor fatigue” has set in at the very moment in which humanitarian needs are peaking.  Oxfam declared on the tenth anniversary of the outbreak of violence in the region that “sources of funding—from individual supporters to major foundations—have turned their attention elsewhere. Our Sudan programs are in jeopardy at a time when the humanitarian needs are once again on the rise.”  Unmentioned here, for fear of creating a pretext for their expulsion, is the fact of Khartoum’s continuing, deliberate, and systematic obstruction of humanitarian relief efforts—and the tremendous cumulative toll this has taken on these efforts over many years.

Violence and the need for humanitarian assistance typically rise in tandem in Darfur, as elsewhere in the world.  Massive new displacements—likely exceeding 150,000, including a new surge of refugees into eastern Chad—are the surest harbinger of this rising violence and increasing human need; accelerating displacement goes back many months, but has sharply escalated since January 2013.

Just as disturbing, however, are reports of displaced persons camps actually  under violent siege by Khartoum-allied militia forces, roads closed by these same militia forces and the paramilitary Abu Tira and Border Intelligence Guards, relentless aerial bombardment of civilian targets, extortion schemes with murder as a threat, the forced, often violent appropriation of African lands by Arab tribal groups, and a continuation of the most brutal use of rape as a weapon of war.

The connection between violence and humanitarian need is also emphasized in a March 12, 2013 dispatch from Radio Dabanga concerning Shangil Tobay, in North Darfur:

The “lack of medical services” in two North Darfur camps is forcing its residents to travel to El Fasher amid the ‘poor security situation’ on the roads, according to the displaced. The population of Shangil Tobay and Shadad, located in Shangil Tobay, said organizations responsible for the camps’ medical services left almost one year ago, which created the services’ disruption. Besides the poor security conditions between Shangil Tobay camp and El Fasher, the displaced noted that the traveling costs between both areas is “unaffordable.” One of the camps’ sheikhs told Radio Dabanga on Monday [March 11, 2013] about the prevalence of diarrhea and coughing among children and the “suffering of the women in labor” who cannot resort to health centers. (all emphases in quotes have been added—ER)

The Darfur Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD, July 2011) continues to prove itself yet another worthless agreement signed by Khartoum, an assessment belatedly rendered by the top U.S. diplomat working on Darfur, outgoing Dane Smith.  Even el-Tigani Seisi, coopted by Khartoum to be director of the Darfur Regional Authority, has been obliged to assume a posture of disingenuousness and groveling, implicitly acknowledging that he and his “Liberation and Justice Movement” have no real authority, no resources, and exceedingly little support from the meaningful rebel groups or Darfuri civil society.

And yet still the international community continues to flog the DDPD as a viable solution to the Darfur crisis; the Obama administration has repeatedly indulged in this cynical diplomatic expediency, including in its most recent statement, marking the tenth anniversary of extreme violence in Darfur—what President Obama has previously described as genocide (U.S. Department of State press statement, February 26, 2013).  The statement is cynically punctuated by “demands”—”demands” that work only to convince Khartoum that nothing is in fact really being demanded. The AU, UN, and EU are no better.

It is thus all the more remarkable that Dane Smith rendered such an accurate assessment on the occasion of his departure, here in an interview with Reuters:

“My biggest disappointment, a year and a half after the signature of the Doha agreement, is that we have seen very limited implementation, particularly of those provisions that bring tangible benefits to the IDPs (internally displaced people) and refugees,” he said. He pointed to the lack of money for a fund set up for reconstruction and development in Darfur, and the government’s lack of action to disarm militias as the treaty requires.

Militias were “more and more seemingly out of control,’” particularly in North Darfur, Smith said, although other ‘disturbing’ incidents had occurred in Nyala in South Darfur and Misterei in West Darfur this month. The Doha treaty suffered another blow last week when the Liberation and Justice Movement [el-Tigani Seise’s small and unrepresentative rebel group that is the sole signatory to the DDPD] accused the government of attacking its forces and spreading false reports about the assault. “We have to say, quite honestly, that the rule of law is absent from Darfur,” Smith added….  The government had shown “very little interest” in seriously investigating the crimes and bringing perpetrators to justice, he added.  (Reuters [Khartoum], December 12, 2012)

• Humanitarian Conditions in Darfur: The most recent reports reveal a relentless deterioration (Part 1) (Part 2 at http://www.sudanreeves.org/?p=3922 )

Eric Reeves  |  10 February 2013  |  http://wp.me/p45rOG-Z8 

Context

Violence continues to rage throughout Darfur, indeed has dramatically accelerated in recent weeks.  This has created an insecurity that endangers not only millions of civilians—within and outside the camps for displaced persons—but humanitarian personnel.  Most transportation corridors are unsafe without the heaviest of escorts.  Whole sections of Darfur—e.g., Jebel Marra—remain subject to Khartoum’s humanitarian embargo.

The National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime relentlessly obstructs not only humanitarian personnel and operations but any meaningful investigations of atrocity crimes attempted by the UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).  Dismayingly, humanitarian assistance now faces another disturbing obstacle.  The US Agency for International Development (USAID) warned on January 25, 2013:

The moratorium on restrictions on humanitarian aid in Darfur is expected to expire on January 31, potentially complicating the delivery of emergency assistance and implementation of early recovery programs in Darfur.  Renewed annually by HAC since 2007, the moratorium expedites bureaucratic approvals that allow international organizations to conduct humanitarian assistance activities in Darfur, including processing of travel permits and visas for international staff. (USAID Fact Sheet #2, FY 2013, January 25, 2013)

The moratorium has in fact expired according to several sources within the humanitarian community.  This is most likely to affect international nongovernmental humanitarian organizations registered only in Darfur (as opposed to Sudan generally).  But a number of these organizations are key implementing partners for both the UN’s World Food Program and USAID.  It is once again “open season” for Khartoum in the harassment, abuse, obstruction, and denial of access to those working to provide food, primary health care, shelter, and clean water to desperate civilians.

[ In early February 2013 NIF/NCP President Omar al-Bashir pardoned Mubarak Mustafa, a man convicted of assisting in the escape of four men who in 2008 brutally murdered USAID official John Granville and his driver, Abdurrahman Abbas Rahma.  The message to the U.S. in al-Bashir’s pardon was clear, as was the regime’s complicity in the escape of the assassins.]

International response to Khartoum’s most recent decisions is unclear and indecisive.  But unless the moratorium is renewed—at least nominally securing what are in fact standard humanitarian operating conditions in virtually all countries—we may be sure that people will suffer and die as a consequence.

For its part, the U.S. issued yet another perfunctory statement, “calling on the Sudanese government to grant UN agencies unrestricted access to all areas of Darfur [in order to meet humanitarian needs, State Department spokeswoman Victoria] Nuland said” (Statement of February 8, 2013, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC).   Nuland also urged Khartoum “to cease aerial bombardments,” an urging that will have as little impact on the regime’s thinking as the many previous such perfunctory statements. Indeed, as with all such “urgings,” there is no evidence that Khartoum hears or cares about U.S. statements, since they have never amounted to more than posturing when it comes to Darfur.

The fact that all military flights in Darfur have been banned by the UN Security Council (Resolution 1591, March 2005) is equally inconsequential.  Unless there are clear and credible consequences to continued indiscriminate aerial attacks on civilians, they will continue—as they have for more than 20 years (see www.sudanbombing.org).

Already we have seen signs of what is to come with international failure to secure renewal of the moratorium on restrictions of humanitarian assistance:

As of 1 January 2013, the government of Sudan halted the work of 50 percent of the NGOs working in El-Geneina camps, West Darfur’s capital, several sources told Radio Dabanga on Wednesday. Five out of the 10 foreign organizations were informed by the government in mid-2012 that they could no longer exercise their activities at the camps [beyond the end of the year], sheikhs from 10 different sites affirmed. They emphasized the organizations were not expelled from Sudan. Instead, [the sheikhs] continued, organizations were ordered to stay in El-Geneina, hand over their resources to camps’ residents and focus their programs on voluntary return villages.

The emphasis on returns by Khartoum has a grim but simple logic: if there are no longer displaced persons in the camps, the rationale for an international humanitarian presence disappears.  Moreover, the regime has not hesitated to restrict, re-direct, or expel organizations that don’t follow this re-fashioned mandate, even organizations such as these:

The Swiss Human Being’s Earth, the French Triangle, the International Medical Corp, and the Canadian War Child are the organizations ordered to alter their programs. While working at displaced camps, these NGOs offered services such as health, education, medicine, distribution of non-food items, kindergartens, water services and livelihood programs.”

Again, Khartoum has re-defined these critical humanitarian tasks, “ordering [these organizations] to stay in El-Geneina, hand over their resources to camps’ residents and focus their programs on voluntary return villages.”  (“Sudan government halts work of 50 percent NGOs in West Darfur capital,” Radio Dabanga, el-Geneina, 23 January 2013).

Compounding the challenges facing humanitarian efforts in Darfur, the Jebel Amir area of North Darfur has recently seen extremely intense clashes between two Arab groups: the Beni Hussein (who for the most part have sought to stay out of the Darfur conflict and Khartoum’s genocidal assault on non-Arab populations) and the Northern Rizeigat, particularly the Um Julal subsection from which a great many Janjaweed were drawn, including the most notorious of Janjaweed leaders, Musa Hilal.  The fighting has been over the newly significant gold mines that lie in Beni Hussein land, but which—according to one Darfur expert who has recently been on the ground in Darfur—

“…Hilal’s ‘Border Guards’ consider it their own. It’s not unsimilar to the latest Hashaba incidents—according to local sources, the Um Jalul Border Guards killed 80 civilians there, but most [of them] were not from the area but gold searchers from other parts of Sudan.” (email received February 4, 2013)

[For a detailed account of the Hashaba fighting, see: www.sudanreeves.org/?p=3525]