The minutes of the Security and Military Committee meeting held on the premises of the High Academy of Security, 3 June 2014 (Part 2)

General Bakri, First Vice President:

The proliferation of the armed movements in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile constitutes a real threat to Sudan’s national security. It is a continuous threat, especially after their decision to unite under the SRF. When you look at these movements you will find that they are divided ideologically, ethnically and militarily, and agree only politically. Hence they will not be able to achieve their agenda. [The factual claims here are problematic and the logic entirely unclear—ER] Still, they remain a source of threats to national security, given the fact that they are supported by some countries hostile to Sudan. So in order to maintain the security of the state and the gains achieved so far, we have developed a cluster of policies and measures to take against our enemies, whether internal or external.

Recently the concept of national security became wider, comprising issues not necessarily of a military or security nature. Broadly speaking, national security is a basic requirement for the survival of the state—through its use of economic, military, and political strengths, in addition to proper diplomacy. [This expansive sense of “national security” should again remind us Orwell’s 1984—ER] But the concentration should be on the building of the military force, which is for us a better guarantee of the maintenance of the state security: [No ambiguity here—ER]

National security means that we must own the strategic elements of power or part of them—those that enable the state to have the power to dictate and impose its will in order to achieve its strategic national interest. We must have the ability to protect our interests through military power using various kinds of offensive tactics, as well as a diversification of weapons—this in order to limit the mobility of the SPLA/M-N and the other armed movements.

We convened after the arrival of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) in Um Ruwaba [North Kordofan] to evaluate the situation and the direct threat to the center of power. We found that our vulnerability lay in a lack of manpower because the youth were not interested in enlisting in the army. [This has long been the case, given the endlessly brutal wars Khartoum has waged, often using young, ethnically marginalized, and insufficiently trained men as little more than “cannon fodder”—ER] Additionally, we were mistaken in overlooking the armed movements; we must ensure that they don’t have the capacity to surprise us again.

After the evaluation we decided to shift to a new style to fight. The plan was to recruit from the SRF by training 200,000 of their men, provided that they came from the same areas and the peoples of the SRF—people who know the nature of the terrain. Additionally, we called for a general mobilization of the Popular Defense Forces; and the Mujahidin supply enough quantities of weapons, in addition to the use of our relations with many Islamic organizations. Qatar and Iran, who contributed and are still contributing, support our evolving military industry, which resulted in the big victory achieved by our forces against the rebels on [land?] and air, to the extent that the UN Security Council actually took a decision to condemn the Rapid Support Forces. [One of the perverse ways Khartoum assesses its military successes; Iran and Qatar have long been instrumental in assisting Khartoum militarily and otherwise—ER]

We know that it was all planned to foil our campaign to crush the rebellion, but all their endeavors failed. and we succeeded in securing the President’s approval for the elevation of the Rapid Support Forces [i.e., the brutal “new Janjaweed” who are wreaking terrible havoc throughout Darfur—ER], as well as the NISS defense corporation in assisting our fighting forces as they confront internal enemies. This includes the political parties, as well as the crushing of the armed movements, and securing the coming elections. [The utter ruthlessness of the regime in its efforts to maintain a monopoly on Sudanese national wealth and political power is clear here—ER] These efforts are also part of the preparation for a probable transformation in the region, because most neighboring countries have adopted a stance of opposition to the Islamic movement project and have shown a general hostility against the Islamic movement.

In regards to Libya situation, the victory of General Hafter represents a threat to us, but let us hope that the Islamists win. [Khartoum has actively supported, militarily, the Islamist Libyan New Dawn movement—ER] For Egypt our position is strong in regards to many files still in our hands. South Sudan it is collapsing and the war will continue there. We created alternatives and wrote off the oil of the South from our annual state budget. Regarding the crisis in Central African Republic, we are the ones holding all its strings. [This is a chilling sentence when one contemplates the terrible human suffering and destruction that defines CAR in recent months and years—ER]

We said there are three options in the National Dialogue. Either it is boycotted by all the opposition parties and we consider it a failure (the government will not engage in dialogue with those parties already affiliated with it). Second, a considerable number of parties may participate, and we will continue the process of Dialogue as the majority force. [i.e., controlling the “National Dialogue” completely in terms of process and outcome—ER]

The third option that we wish and work for is to see all the opposition elements agree to dialogue and come without pre-conditions. For that purpose we started with consultative meetings in order that both parties go directly to the dialogue before we achieve the consensus around the dialogue. [meaning of the previous sentence not entirely clear—ER] I engaged opposition parties twice and met many of their demands; they also asked me to intervene and release Sadiq al-Mahdi. After that we asked the parties who agreed to the National Dialogue to take the responsibility of talking with the other opposition forces who rejected the National Dialogue, including the armed movements, because they are closer to them.

After four months from the beginning of the National Dialogue it has become clear that the opposition parties who rejected the dialogue are maintaining their position. They are continually setting more conditions on beginning the dialogue, starting with stoppage of the war, basic freedoms, a transitional government, release of political detainees, and cancelling of the courts sentences against the leaders of the SPLA/M-N. This is so even as the SPLA/M-N leaders were condemned for violating individual rights, declared war against the State, and called for regime change, including dismantling of the State. All this in the interest of the enemies of the Sudan.

The President told them to put down their guns and they will be allowed to participate in the National Dialogue. It became clear that the dialogue was being used to exert pressure on us to offer concessions as if we are defeated. Also, an attempt was made for the unification of the negotiation forums with the armed movements, so we sat with Brother and Bahar Idris Abu-Garda and asked them to consult with (UNAMID head) Mohammed Ibn Chambas in order to convene the Darfuri-Darfuri conference, provided that we will be among the attendees. The conference was held and the recommendations of the popular initiative of the people of Darfur was submitted to us in the presence of Mohammed Ibn Chambas, and we managed to visit areas attacked and controlled by the movements.

[The suggestion that Ibn Chambas has any understanding of the aspirations of the people of Darfur has been roundly rebuked by his quiet sacking—ER]

This conference was supportive to Um-Jaras, and ended any attempt for the unification of the negotiation forums (Doha/Addis Ababa) [This remains the major concern of the regime in negotiating with the rebel groups, now united as the Sudan Revolutionary Front—ER]. That document was submitted to us by Massalit chief Saad Bahar-al-Din, which was a practical message and a strong blow to our internal enemies. Accordingly, we are preparing ourselves from now to confront the probability of the National Dialogue and Addis Ababa talks, and are going to build peace from within. So we must strengthen our affiliated political parties on one side, and unify communication channels and language with those interested in defecting from the SPLA/M-N and joining us in the Two Areas.

I would like to bring your attention to the fact that there are leaders from the rebels who prefer to deal with the politicians instead of security organs. For example you have Abdal-Bagi Garfa who was contacting Al-Tayib Hassan Badawi; and it was Al-Tayib who told us about the interest of Garfa to return and join. Then after that we connected Garfa with the security organs. Accordingly, any politician who has contact with the rebels, let him inform the Political Secretariat of the NCP in order to deal with that piece of information quickly. We have to involve the strong cadres of our affiliated political parties in the security, military and political files by representing two of them in each committee with the popular security, Military Intelligence, and the Political Secretariat—or we leave each party to do the contact on its own, with concentration on the parties that did split from the SPLA/M-N and the Darfurian movements. This will enable us to destroy them and expel rebellion out of Sudanese lands. This is because our military campaign in the coming dry season will be stronger in order to get rid of them completely.

[This year the SAF has again succeeded more in killing civilians than in fighting the SPLA-N; the army and air force have been more successful against rebels in Darfur—ER]

Major General Tajasir Abdel Rahman – Commissioner of Security Arrangements in the Transitional Authority (Darfur):

The forces of the rebel movements who joined us are not fit for military service because they do not meet SAF requirements for enlisting and absorption. Still, we are going to use them against the rebellion, because they know the rebel style of fighting. We are going to deploy them and disperse them far from each other in different units so that they do not stay together and become a force. We are going to create differences between them and their political leadership. Also we will change their military doctrine.

[“Divide and rule” has been the mantra of the regime in confronting internal military and political opposition; there appears to have been some success with some elements of the SRF—ER]

Dr. Mustafa Osman – National Congress Party Political Secretary:

My own reading is that the National Dialogue will not produce any result because the understanding of the parties, the international community, and the armed movements is that the President’s call for National Dialogue came out of weakness and a desire to avoid internal differences within the NCP. This is why the armed movements raised the ceiling of their demands, which was clearly evident in the last negotiations with the SRF; both internally and externally, politicians said the National Dialogue is an opportunity for them to dismantle the Ingaz/National Congress Party. That of course was not our aim. We wanted the National Dialogue to help us with a vision on how to tackle the problems facing Sudan, and enable us to write a Constitution and hold to the schedule for elections in 2015.

This is why they launched a campaign depicting the National Islamic Movement as corrupt, including the President. My view is that we should work to hold the election on time and also work to infiltrate and dismantle the political parties opposing us; at the same time, we should endeavor to dismantle the SPLA/M-N and cover all its offices abroad. This is because the dismantling the SPLA/M-N means dismantling the SRF. [This is certainly true, and distinguishes Mustafa Osman as one of the cleverest of NCP politicians, a man who often sees with a clarity that escapes others. This makes him even more dangerous and ruthless in his policy recommendations—ER] We should start now and allocate all the required money to achieve that. And the security organs should submit their reports regarding their infiltration, dismantling, and discouragement on daily basis; psychological war and pressure should be exerted on the political parties who rejected the National Dialogue.

Let us disperse their work in the universities and criminalize everyone who deals with the rebellion. The committee in charge of communication with the movements should determine whether they are interested in peace and ready to abandon the SRF and the two articles in the framework agreement—or not. We should push the SPLA/M-N to expel the other movements from the two areas if they want to have humanitarian relief.

[This is a highly revealing example of the regime’s ready willingness to hold the lives of innocent and desperately needy civilians hostage to political/military demands made by Khartoum of the rebel groups—ER]

The government is not concerned about Darfur movements, they are the ones who brought Darfur movements. [Meaning of previous sentence not entirely clear—ER] It is possible to create differences between them in order to fight each other, which will weaken them and make them lose the international sympathy and support. But the creation of differences between them is an important track.

[The “divide and rule” strategy again in full display—ER]

We belong to a political party that has a lot of connections; anyone who thinks he can topple us is somebody who suffers from delusions. Any attempt from whomever must be crushed. Even our leaders and cadres who make wrong utterances should be subjected to accountability. The current situation in the region requires militarization of greater numbers and allocation of more revenues to develop and advance our military industries—and to strengthen our relations with Iran in all spheres. [Utter ruthlessness on display—ER]

I met the new Iranian Ambassador/ Shabiib Juweyjiri and we agreed to hold joint meetings on weekly basis in order to set the priorities.

The Rapid Support Forces are a “red line.” Targeting them is a political deed, intended to criminalize the Islamic Movement. Anybody who talks about these forces must face the law, whoever he may be.

[This barbarically brutal militia force has been consistently and unstintingly supported by the most senior regime officials; the RSF are doing the dirty work of genocidal counter-insurgency in Darfur, and the regime has no patience with those objecting to the extraordinary cruelty, suffering, and destruction suffered by the people of Darfur—ER]

The RSF was successful in dealing with any move taken by the opposition political parties.

[This is an explicit pitting of a militia force against opposition political figures, something boasted of in the next sentence—ER]

It succeeded in crushing the September [2013] demonstrations in less than an hour. This has taught the rebellion a lesson as well. We say to the NISS: increase the recruitment and training until we reach the level to have in each and every town its own RSF.

[The dream of a fully militarized state—there are no limits to the aspirations of the NCP regime—ER]

General Mohammed Atta – Director, National Intelligence and Security Services:

Sudan is facing challenges in the form of intervention and a war imposed on it. Foreign intelligence services are financing the opposition political parties. These parties are beating the drums of war and giving the type of information to these foreign embassies in order to generate condemnation of the regime. They target the National Dialogue to make it fail. This information was obtained from within the opposition parties. We detect and get every word of what they say; and we are able to learn the names of those who, in addition to condemnation of the Rapid Support Forces, have raised issues of corruption. They also raised the issue of the girl who was accused of apostasy, despite the fact that the government had nothing to do with the issue of this girl; it is her own relatives who filed the complaint against her.

[But of course it was a regime-sanctioned court system that allowed the woman to be condemned to be hanged for renouncing her Muslim faith; this is part of the “hudud,” or penal code, in Sudan’s particularly brutal version of shari’a (Islamic law)—ER]

A loose grip and lack of accountability have allowed these enemy agents to go too far with the aim to destroy the state, even to the extent of threatening national security. We have said that “national security” comprises all the [security?] components of the country internally and abroad. If we control them, then the State will be able to confront all the challenges.

The measures taken to maintain the national security are strong:

Continuous coordination between the various security organs. (Popular security, Military Intelligence, Internal security, external security, personal security, social security and religious security); [An extraordinary litany of security purviews—ER]
Coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and using the consulate department as a cover for diplomatic activities to monitor any threat to our interest;

Activation of the economic security branch to attract more investment and follow our enemies in order to get to them through [“business window”: business opportunities?] and transfer of technology;

Big infiltration into the armed movement’s offices, in 34 countries.
Concentration on the areas of threat where the opposition senior leaders stay in order to learn about their movements, meetings, the logistical support and the governments that support them plus their real intentions and plans; [this ¶ as received—ER]

Promotion of the operations department [reference unclear—ER] to upgrade it to a fighting force under the management of SAF; this will contribute to the strengthening of the SAF;

Coordination with 80 government satellite political parties;

Infiltration of all the opposition parties;

Control, manipulation and recruitment of newspapers internally and abroad;

Monitor activities within the foreign NGOs;

Maintain presence within the sports sector;

Full control over the cell phone companies and the Internet web; [this control is likely to be a major weapon in the impending battle with civilian insurgencies as the economy collapses—ER]

Maintenance of effective armed forces;

Implementation of civil defence measures and preparations for emergency situation and ability to alert concerned bodies;

Use of intelligence organs to discover and avoid spying and protection of classified information; [the public existence of this document indicates the efforts by the regime were not sufficient—ER]

Develop the use of counter-intelligence devices and services, as well as private security for the protection of the country from internal and external threat. [the reference here is not clear—ER]

Dr. Hamid Siddig:

I can summarize all that has been said in one point: that there is a conspiracy hatching against Islam and Muslims, and the political parties and the armed movements are used to execute it with finances from the Church’s Council [?] in an attempt to convert the Sudanese people to Christianity. [A revealing paranoia—ER] The second financers are the Americans, Europeans, Jews, and some Arab countries that are enemies to the Islamists and, additionally, fear an Iranian power expansion. In this context of hostility we took all the measures to hit the enemy, whether internal or external, in complementary coordination with the Islamic Movement. Nobody other than us [will rule] Sudan and we are ready to mobilize and bring thousands of Mujahidin from all over the world. [There is no reason to doubt Dr. Hamid on this score—ER]

There will be no dialogue or negotiations until we divide the rebel forces into small groups. The more we delay and time passes [in actually negotiating with these small groups—ER], then the more suffering and the bigger the differences will be among them. From now on we must deal with the political parties using the law only. It is possible that the courts can sentence them to imprisonment without need for the NISS to intervene and detain them.

We must open the door for more recruitment to enable us crush the rebellion completely before the election date. Regarding the National Dialogue, whether started or not, we should see the elections take place as scheduled.

[This sentiment is repeatedly expressed in the minutes of the meetings on July 1, 2014, August 31, 2014, and September 10, 2014—an early signal that the regime never intended for there to be integrity in either the elections or the so-called “National Dialogue.”—ER]

On the other side we must assist our brothers in the neighbouring countries (Islamists) through undetected means.

Some of the racist movements constitute part of three tribes, and the majority of those tribes are against the war [an extraordinary attribution of “racism” by a regime that routinely speaks in racist terms and whose racism is evident in the treatment of the Africans of Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan, and—during the long civil war—the people of South Sudan, tens of thousands of whom were literally enslaved—ER] We don’t presently have power-sharing with tribes; their issues and demands should be tackled at the level of their states (regions) as we demobilize their militias.

The issue of corruption and the media should be treated decisively, because if we allow the media to talk about it, then it will discourage the investors from coming to us. [Dr. Siddig seems blissfully unaware that Sudan’s ranking on corruption indexes is among the very worst of all the countries in the world; Transparency International ranks Sudan 173 out of 175 countries surveyed–ER] The entire membership of the Islamic Movement are commending the role played by the SRF and the victories they achieved against the rebellion in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile.

[In fact, the RSF has taken a number of severe beatings in South Kordofan, and these (essentially mercenary) forces have in many cases returned to the easy pillaging available in Darfur—ER]

And the rebellion must be expelled from Sudanese territories, and creative means found to enable our forces enter these caves of the rebels, or ways to destroy these caves by air force: these must be through devastatingly destructive weapons that will force them to flee.

[Of course, as Khartoum well knows, a great many civilians have fled to these caves and would be killed if Khartoum’s Air Force were to obtain the prodigious explosive capabilities its so lusts after—ER]

We don’t want to hear about an armed movement. Any relief assistance to the needy in those areas must be under our control. I suggest that all the organs should prepare themselves to attend to the next phase. I mean the elections and other missions after the elections. Have you understood what I mean? [All is too grimly clear, Dr. Hamid—ER]

Dr. Kamal Ebed:

I agree with what has been said by brother Hamid. We must work to build up a big force to send a message to the political parties internally, as well as to the armed movements and their means of support.

[Astonishingly, nowhere in this extended discussion is there any realistic acknowledgement of the disastrous condition of the Sudanese economy, and how relentless, expensive war-making has worked so consequentially to bring about this dire state of affairs.]

We must hit them and their supporters hard, and we should not concede or submit to their demands or pressures. They think the Islamic movement is finished, but they don’t know and they depend on limited information. They don’t know the style of decision-making within the structure of the Islamic movement. They said the president wants peace and they can dictate their terms during my participation in the peace talks. [meaning of previous sentence not fully clear—ER] I discovered that the SPLA/M-N wants self-rule for the Two Areas, with the aim to divide the remaining part of Sudan the same way they used and then separated South Sudan. The SPLA/M-N does not represent anybody, and the Darfur movements are composed of two tribes only and their tribes are against the war. [meaning of previous clause not fully clear—ER] But they are using the rebellion as profitable business of these days while they are roaming Europe. Yasir Arman joined them in Europe and all are begging [the Europeans?] in the name of the citizens who are our opponents.

The NCP [SRF?] also are begging in the embassies these days, and they raise problems in order to get something from the embassies. [meaning of previous sentence not fully clear—ER] We should start now to take measures that weaken them, given the victories achieved by the SRF. We will destroy them through the use of the law.

[“The law” is ultimately viewed as a political, even military tool to destroy opposition parties—ER]

They say the Islamic movement is about to collapse. But they forgot that we ruled before the Arab spring and we will continue to rule after it. We managed to change governments and assisted in change of governments [in other countries?—ER]. We cannot be defeated by a group of rebels. These groups deserve nothing other than to be crushed by our policies; these policies must be based on our interests, insofar as our relation and alliance with Iran is the strategic one. We must remember that when they ganged up against us—the Americans, Zionists, the SPLM, and the National Democratic Alliance—during 1990s nobody stood beside us except Iran. They trained our security military and political cadres. Accordingly any leader of the NCP who speaks out against Iran must be dismissed. Iran is ready to fight alongside our forces if need be.

General (Navy) Daliil Aldaw Fadhlalmula:

The Sudanese Navy continues to supply its units with modern electronic armaments and systems. It continues the development of its tactics and is observing and learning from the experiences and lessons from wars taking place in the various regional areas. This will make the Navy more suitable in the theatre of the greater Middle East (the Persian Gulf, Oman Gulf, Aden Gulf and the Red Sea). At the time the Sudanese Navy considers that the tactics and style of asymmetrical war is the cornerstone in its strategy; but besides this we have adopted other concepts within our Navy forces including passive defense and the benefit from geographical features of our marine theatre. Besides, we take care to keep high morale, along with the slogans of Jihad and martyrdom which may lead to conduct of suicidal operations against the enemy.

The Navy field units that belong to the army received new missile systems that are locally made in Iran. These systems are fixed by Iranian technicians and currently they are training Sudanese technicians in Khartoum within the framework of the security cooperation agreement. They aim to enable Sudan to maintain its wide sea boarders; in addition to this, the Iranian Navy industries corporation of the Iranian Ministry of Defense is currently working on preparing and producing various coastal missile launching pads, whether medium or long range missiles. It is to be emphasized that the new missiles system is only one of many advanced joint military projects that are implemented in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Sudan with the aim to achieve self-sufficiency.

It worth mentioning that these coastal missile launching pads are able, through unified command, to detect and destroy a group of enemy targets at the same time. The production of the modern and advanced devices that is characterized by accuracy and destructive power will strengthen the ability of these modern Sudanese forces on the coast and at sea to defend Sudan. We allocated many sites for the execution of this project outside the big cities to keep them away from the reach of espionage. We formed a joint operation room with popular security for the purpose of camouflage requirements. I request that this should not be spoken about in the media. We have deployed the experts and the work is ongoing.

General al-Rashid Fagiri:

Today the security situation in the country is better compared to last year. The National Dialogue initiative had confused us, and we could not implement our plans. We lost grip of security and kept reports without taking action on the information they revealed. Our way was to provide the opportunity to achieve consensus. But unfortunately it was the contrary: they opponents, military and political thought the dialogue would cause the government to collapse and they would come to power. Accordingly we should follow the activities of the cadres of each party on daily basis, because these parties’ activities changed into a real threat.

So we are going to use two ways to deal with them: first by sowing divisions; second, by involving their active cadres in criminal cases in addition to rumors plus distortion of their image. [How the Khartoum regime operates—ER] Regarding the SPLA/M-N presence abroad, we have five plans to dismantle it. We started earlier by planting many cadres in their offices abroad with concentration on the tribal, religious, and ideological elements; the plan was approved by the executive office of the Islamic movement and arranged by the NISS and Military Intelligence. The plan is very well conceived and its implementation will take place step by step.

The use of legal measures will contribute in the dismantling because once started it will create a vacuum in positions within the party; then we encourage them to compete and we push the competition out of context and track using the media and hearsay.

Some time earlier we recruited many detainees, using various means. Once upon a time we heard that Yasir Arman claimed to have detainees released from prison. So Yasir Arman was having underground activities, but he doesn’t know that we pre-empted him in recruitment. A number of those cadres are now with Yasir and the opposition. But we have contact with them since Abdalbagi Garfa came over: we recruited many of the opposition cadres because their financial situation is bad.

Our concentration currently is on South Kordofan and through our NGOS we are working with the civilians who are liberated from the rebellion; they constitute a source of useful and reliable information. We learned from them the movement of the enemy, the type of mobilization, and the presence of the Darfurian movements. We encouraged many of them to contact their relatives in order to know their whereabouts.

Our coverage is continuous under various covers and titles, including the majority of the social activities starting from the societies’ committees that are all over the towns of Sudan; with concentration on Khartoum, we know what is occurring in every quarter and who is who: his job, political activity, original home, with special attention to people who hail from areas with active rebellion, and whether they have contact with the rebels. We do this by means of highly sophisticated and accurate devices. This is in addition to our ability to cover all the meetings of the parties in a comprehensive manner, even the person-to-person chatting between them; we do this by means of our qualified cadres who are selected annually from different corporations to play roles that are difficult for a commoner to do.

Dr. Mohammed Hussein Abu Salih:

From what I heard it is clear that we are now in two war situations—one that is open war, the other that is a covert war. It is connected to the agendas of other countries with other interests. Accordingly, and as a ruling party, we have to carry many tasks and play many roles at the same time. The major part is connected to security and little of it is political. We should prepare the State and party organs to be able to rise to the level of the challenges and adopt a foreign policy that responds to events and can cope with new developments. We need to think from the perspective of the collective mind of the West, and the work to build our economy on the basis of principles of self-reliance that depend on the resources we have. We should declare general mobilization among the people and alert the supporters and the party cadres of the dangers expected. In addition, we should have periodic revisions within the operations theatre to know about the enemy morale and capabilities, in case the enemy acquires new weapons systems. On top of this we must infiltrate the enemy rank and file in a direct manner, putting in mind the necessity to make maximum use of the events taking place in the Republic of South Sudan.

We must prevent the flow of supplies to the SPLA/M-N whether it is food or medicines, through individuals or organizations; in addition, we must commit to the full destruction of their weapons stores by aerial bombardment. The recruitment of the sons of the war areas to the RSF is important because they know the terrain in those areas. Let us develop plans and strategies that suit the requirements of this stage. We should impose the will of the State by force and the law, in addition to development of weapons industries to achieve self-sufficiency. We must take into account the necessity of securing our weapons in underground stores to safeguard them from any external hostility.

Dr. Amin Hassan Omer:

I commend the speakers’ ideas. We have strategic relation with Justice and Liberation Movement [sic], and our relation with al-Tijani Sese and Bahar Abu-Garda goes back to date before the signing of the agreement. They used to come to Khartoum before signing the agreement. Even the decision of Abu-Garda to go to the International Criminal Court was done with our consent and an agreement between us. We shall dismantle the Darfurian movements in order to compete with them in the future. We are going to integrate the movements who signed in one political party under the chairmanship of Sese and Abu-Garda to give strength to the elections. We asked them to nominate a person to contest to the Presidency in order to give impetus to the elections. [A craft ploy to give the presidential election some specious appearance of legitimacy—ER] This is because they have the legitimacy that emanated from the agreement. Then our partnership with them will continue after the elections. This is because we are sticking with the Doha Forum. Any other movement must come under the leadership of our allies.

Dr. al-Fatih Izzadin:

It has become a necessity to increase the sources and channels of information. Let us all concentrate on getting information from the enemy and their intentions in order to be able to make sound decisions. Even in the legislative work we need information. I have to disclose to you that the legislation committee had submitted the names of Dr. Ghazi Salah and his wife Dr. Samiya Habbani, Dr. Fadhlalla, and Musa Hilal, with a recommendation to dismiss them from the Parliament on the pretext that they were absent for a full session or forming separate political parties. But I refused to submit the recommendation to the previous assembly to dismiss them because of information I received: they are repenting, and this was expressed in a chat with people close to them. Regarding Musa Hilal and according to our agents who are staying with him, he is looking for reconciliation with the NCP. Concerning Musa’s contacts with the SRF, it is taking place under our eyes and ears.

We are now going for the elections. We are going to pass the electoral law. We know the parties that are going to contest the elections are many. We are going to leave those parties who are interested in the transitional government to wait.

General Yahya Mohammed Kheer:

The strategy of the government and the party is to crush the rebellion within this year; [This “strategy” has manifestly failed, particularly in South Kordofan and parts of Blue Nile—ER] as an executive body, we have our own considerations. The crushing of the rebellion is the strategic objective for SAF security and political organs. And that is why we launched the Decisive Summer Campaign (phases one and two—[and both have been failures—ER]). Our goal was either to see the rebellion crushed by the end of the dry season—or the rebels’ acceptance of demobilization through negotiations. These are the options given to them. Next year, if they do not surrender, we in the SAF and our various organs will continue with our plans and strategies.

[Again, these have clearly failed; in frustration, the regime’s air force has increased its bombing of civilian targets: villages, churches, mosques, hospitals, schools—ER]

General Siddig Amir:

The effort of the Military Intelligence Committee, internally and externally, is directed to wipe out and destroy the strongholds of the rebellion in the Two Areas; we are in the process of expelling them from the areas where they have an active presence. These are areas with international and regional organizations; military support, food and medicines are passed to them through foreign NGOs and missionaries. Those NGOs enter and leave the Two Areas freely without providing information to the government. That assistance to the rebellion [I know from a number of highly reliable sources that the assistance reaching the Nuba Mountains is for civilians, not the SPLA/M-N—ER] is prolonging the war and has led to intransigence in the negotiations. In Blue Nile, the presence of the rebellion is limited to a narrow belt along the Ethiopian border in Ulu, Mufo, Shali and Yabus [southeastern Blue Nile State—ER], where their threat to us is less.

But South Kordofan is a stronghold for all the armed movements and has become a source of continuous threat. They occupy important areas. These are Heiban and Um Doreen Counties. If our forces entered Atmur and Hamra, then it will be possible to liberate the whole of Um Doreen County plus Buram County and parts of Dallami County, such as Tunguli, Mardees, and Dare. We should concentrate on the ranges of the mid-mountains. The most strategic positions are Atmur, Hamra and Um Sirdibba in order to control the border and enemy stores and equipment. We must clean Buram County, Tees, Buram, Al-Dar, Anggolo and Tarogi. We have different options to choose among them in order to enter Kauda [the unofficial “capital” of the Nuba Mountains—ER]:

Through Ngarto, Mandi, and Talodi from the South;

Through Gadiir, Tusi, al-Kuk, and Kalkada;

Through Um Diheliib, Mihela, Timbera, and Tajura;

al-Gidel and al-Farish;

al-Azrag and Konjo from the west;

al-Dandoor, Agab, Abri, Heiban from the north;

Dallami, Heiban also from the north;

We are doing all this work benefiting from the information provided by the sons of the area. We also got from them information about all defenses of the rebels. Before we start the battle for Kauda we must ensure the destruction of the two thirds of the rebel’s manpower and their armaments. And we must prepare forces necessary for six routes of advance with heavy air force bombardment and cover. This is the objective for consultation and use of all the information to achieve it. We are going to hold a meeting with the Peace High Committee of South Kordofan, which is composed from the sons of the mountains, some of them were former rebels. We shall evaluate after that.

Dr. al-Mu-iz Frug:

The attempt to re-unite the opposing factions of the SPLM/A in the South is failing. The balance of forces is tilting to our side, and we have a strong card to use in order to force our will on the South.

[This may mean many things, but in the minutes of the August 31, 2014 meeting we see clear statements arguing for support of Riek Machar, Taban Deng, and the SPLA-In Opposition (SPLA/IO). It is clear that at this time (April 2014) no one within the regime foresaw what we are witnessing today: the SPLA/IO threatening the main oil fields of Upper Nile. If oil production in the South is halted, Khartoum would lose a key source of hard currency: oil transport/transit revenues. This would be a disaster given the almost total lack of Forex in the Central Bank of Sudan; imported goods, already extremely difficult to finance, would become impossible to obtain—ER]

This is because of changes in regional and international politics, and Juba’s loss of support from the international community, as well as the ineffectiveness of Salva Kiir’s supporters. According to my experience with them, I found that in the political and security committees between the two countries they lack experience, but still think they are clever. Control of the border constitutes the end of the rebellion in South Sudan, so let us use the cards in our hands today against Juba. These cards may prove useful tomorrow also.

[The assumption here, that Juba is providing significant military assistance to the SPLA-N, is simply not borne out by the evidence. Moreover, even if Juba were willing to be of assistance, its precarious military situation in Upper Nile would preclude all efforts of significance—ER]

General Hashim Abdalla Mohammed Hassan, Air Force Commander

The Sudan Armed Forces constitute a respected institution; but today it is subjected to criticism by the political parties when it makes any attempt to react to rebel attacks.

[Predictably, there is no mention of the deliberate military targeting of civilian non-combatants, which is the primary form SAF “reactions” take—ER]

They intervene in the affairs of SAF by demanding an end to the war on the rebellion. It is none of their business. [Nothing could be more revealing of the attitude toward civilian participation in national governance, and the utterly farcical nature of the so-called “National Dialogue”; fully in character, the Air Forces General who signs off on continual aerial assaults on civilians also declares that “Nobody other than the NCP is qualified to rule this country” (see below)—ER] Sometimes they say the Rapid Support Forces are not an organized force, and there are foreigners and mercenaries in it. That is ok. But these parties [unspecified] themselves are agents who are paid by the embassies of foreign countries with the aim to destroy Sudan. [No names or evidence is provided—ER] They spread rumors that the army, security, and police officers are dismissed and they are affiliates of so and so. Nobody other than the NCP is qualified to rule this country, and we will not allow any enemy agent or mercenary to rule this country.

The criticism directed to the RSF resembles the one directed to the Popular Defense Forces during the 1990s. [This is a true statement, and the criticism is made for the same reasons: complete disregard for civilian lives and livelihoods—ER] But both forces have supported the SAF. The real intention of the parties is to criticize the NISS and not RSF, because they found it very difficult to infiltrate the NISS. And the NISS has destroyed all the traitors and enemy agents. [Not all “agents”—see Sudan Tribune of May 21, 2015—and ponder the significance of what you are reading at this moment—ER] We still have many security organs that they have never heard of or know nothing about. We have managed to identify our enemies when they criticized the RSF; but all these forces are part of the larger fighting forces and they fall under the unified command and the Joint Defense Council. The orders to all these forces are issued after consultation; regarding those people who criticize the security forces, we intend to use the law against them. They will be surprised when we declare the formation of the Reserve Forces. [An ominous warning, whose import is probably surmised by many…]

All of us agree to reject the formation of the transitional government or any negotiation in regard to the armed forces and all its formations. The rebel forces must be demobilized according to the armed forces regulations. We have learned from the experience of Naivasha and will not allow that to repeat itself.

[Again, the Naivasha process culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005—giving both Sudan and South Sudan the opportunity to put more than two decades of war behind them; to suggest that this was a failure, and not to be repeated, is all too revealing—ER]

As of today we have signed agreements with Ethiopia, Libya, Chad, and Central African Republic despite its problems. Our commanders are busy visiting the various units with the aim to boost the morale of the RSF. Lt. General Ahmed Annur went to South Kordofan, and the Minister of Defense is on a tour of the Darfur states. These visits have been welcomed and left a positive impact on the forces. The victories are recorded daily and we are determined to crush the rebellion for good.

[Simply war propaganda—ER]

General Mullah Ismail Birema Abdal-Samad:

Thanks to the Iranian cooperation we have increased the capacity of our air force to one thousand strikes, plus reconnaissance and local maintenance and manufacturing of planes by Sudanese expertise. We are able to hit all the rebellion strongholds and we can crush them completely. The problem is that the rebels are using the civilians as human shields. We are trying our best not to harm the civilians.

[This is truly despicable mendacity—civilians are relentlessly targeted by the various military branches of Khartoum’s armed forces. Yet again, this sounds very much like a “talking point” to be taken away by all in attendance—ER]

Recommendations:

Continuation of the DSC to the end;

Target the rebels headquarters in Kauda and Yabus and any other site;

Charge anybody who talks about the RSF; [this is a truly extraordinary injunction—ER]

Continuation of the training of the RSF;

Reject any talk about the partisanship of SAF and the NISS;

Reject any dialogue or negotiations that may lead to formation of a transitional government;

Make all the necessary preparations for the capture of Kauda and Buram Counties as strategic objectives;

Maintain security and military cooperation with Iran;

Direct all the loans from Qatar and Iran to finance the military Industries;

[Given the dire state of the Sudanese economy—including an inability to import sufficient quantities of wheat to be ground into flour for bread—this seems a truly extraordinary and ruthless arrogation of national resources by the military—ER]

Demobilization of the forces is a necessity in any agreement with whatever rebels;

The specialized security organs committee is required to integrate the Darfur movements into one political party;

Use of the forces of the movements who signed agreements in the war against the rebellion;

Use of information obtained from civilians liberated from the rebellion;

Follow the situation in Libya closely;

The holding of meetings by the Security Committee should continue to follow the incoming reports from various stations;

Holding the elections as scheduled, secure them, and detect those who stand against them;

Rejection of any agreement that resembles Naivasha or any partnership with the rebels in the Two Areas;

The Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement-North is an outlaw organization and should not be allowed to operate as a political party or participate in the national dialogue until they surrender their guns to the State and declare this fact openly.