Newly Leaked Minutes: Another high-level meeting of Khartoum regime officials (10 September 2014) stands revealed
Eric Reeves | 4 April 2015 (below appear an English translation with a link to the original Arabic text) | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Ff
I received early this morning (Khartoum time) another set of minutes recording yet another meeting of the most senior officials of the National Islamic Front/National Congress Party regime. The English translation is headed:
IN THE NAME OF GOD, MOST GRACIOUS, MOST MERCIFUL
THE SUDANESE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT
POPULAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION – INFORMATION SECRETARIAT
Minutes of the meeting between the Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement and the President of the Republic held in the residence of the President of the Republic in the Army General Headquarters. Wednesday, 10 September 2014
I will be posting the Arabic original as soon as possible—it is now in my possession in its entirety—but am posting first (because technically easier) the English translation. The minutes come from the same source in Sudan who provided to me the minutes of the 31 August 2014 meeting of senior regime security and military officials (available in English and Arabic) and also for the 1 July 2014 meeting (again available in English and Arabic). For a compendium of expert opinion on the authenticity of the former (leaked first), see | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1w5).
[ The Arabic text for the minutes of the 10 September 2014 meeting can be found at | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Fn ]
I will be commenting further on the highly revealing words and policies articulated in this meeting. What the brutal men of this regime say among themselves—thinking that their words will never leave the room—gives us extraordinary insight into minds of génocidaires.
I will focus in good measure on language that seems to be disturbing evidence of diplomatic malfeasance on the part of the African Union’s Thabo Mbeki, Haile Menkerios, and Mohamed Ibn Chambas. Their imbalanced mediation between the belligerents in Sudan’s ongoing civil wars, as well as their poisonous relations with South Sudan—particularly over Abyei—are put in a context not previously available from public sources.
Khartoum has obviously been well pleased by the efforts of the three men, as suggested by the comments of various senior officials:
“By the way, Haile Menkerios is cooperating with us fully and likewise are Thabo Mbeke and Mohammed Ibn Chambas who are so keen to serve and protect our interest, even more than us.”
Defense Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein completes his contribution to this theme in the discussion by declaring:
“When they visited Qatar they were accorded a good reception and treated generously; they [Mbeki, Menkerios, Chambas—ER] are now under our control. These are the ones we use to dismantle the rebellion… [W]e will also use them [again, Mbeki, Menkerios, Chambas—ER] to subjugate the South to our will and implement the agreement the way we want. All of these envoys promised to submit to the African Union and the United Nations positive reports on Sudan records on human rights and freedoms.”
Other members of the regime had strong words of praise as well:
“Let us bless the agreement politically in the media and keep our real position tightly held among ourselves, working to achieve our goal using the agreement itself. Since Mbeke and Mohamed Ibn Chambas are cooperating with us, let us use them to help us achieve the following things…”
“After that I met Mbeke and we agreed on the recommendations he should submit in his report to the AU Peace and Security Council and the report to UN Security Council. That should include a request concerning the lifting of sanctions and support to Sudan in addition, he should reflect a good image of the Government of Sudan. For now we have won the game.”
“But whatever we do to thank Mbeke will not be sufficient to reward him fully for the things he did for our sake and our behalf.”
“At this stage we must welcome the [Addis Ababa] agreement [September 2014] in order to give Thabo Mbeke and Mohamed Ibn Chambas the ability to be seen as productive and having achieved something. Accordingly, we must participate in the writing of the report that will be submitted by Mbeke to the African Union and the UN Security Council in order to ensure that it reflects the political transformation that is taking place in Sudan.”
This last excerpt is either extraordinary presumption, or reflects confidence that Mbeki will indeed allow members of the genocidal Khartoum regime to “participate in the writing of the report that will be submitted by Mbeke to the African Union and the UN Security Council in order to ensure that it reflects the political transformation that is taking place in Sudan.” While there are stirrings within a savagely repressed political opposition, as these and the other sets of minutes make abundantly clear, the National Congress Party regime is doing everything it can to forestall meaningful “transformation.”
These comments are especially disturbing in light of a statement made by General Ismat Ahmed Babikir, Under-Secretary for Presidential Affairs. It comes in the context of the political charade that is the September 2014 “Addis Agreement,” and by way of thanking Mbeke and Ibn Chambas for efforts that the regime clearly feels benefited them enormously:
“And I say you must give incentive to Mbeke, his people, and Ibn Chambas from the money of the Islamic Movement that is deposited abroad.”
After six years of representing the African Union diplomatically as a mediator in Sudan’s conflicts (first in Darfur, to no effect), Thabo Mbeke is well known to this regime. And they are presumably in a position to know whether he would accept “money of the Islamic Movement that is deposited abroad,” even though this is hardly a standard method of payment for what are to be neutral and impartial diplomatic efforts. This is no small matter, since the focus of much these minutes is on Mbeke, the September 2014 agreement in Addis he helped secure, and how that agreement will affect Khartoum’s domestic political and electoral plans.
I’ll conclude these prefatory remarks with the concluding words of the minutes themselves: President al-Bashir speaking of the tasks at hand (again, this meeting occurred on 10 September 2014):
“Prevention of any demonstrations in this month of September by means of the arrest of anybody reported to have an intention to participate in demonstrations. Any demonstration to be fired at with live ammunition.”
“Any demonstration to be fired at with live ammunition”—during the popular uprising in September 2013, Khartoum’s security forces were given, as Amnesty International has established, “shoot to kill” orders from the outset. This is what accounted for the hundreds of deaths of unarmed civilians, including innocent bystanders—in Khartoum, Omdurman, Port Sudan, Atbara, Wad Medani, and other cities. No census was permitted at the morgues of these cities, but it is clear from comments by medical personnel in Khartoum that some 200 people died there alone from bullet wounds. This hardly sounds like “political transformation.”
The text: I have highlighted this 6,000-word text in several ways:
Text in red italics is what I believe to be most important—there will certainly be disagreements, and I might not agree with my choices tomorrow. But in light of current political realities, and the impending national elections in Sudan, these passages are what I would emphasize. (Notably, there is virtually nothing about Darfur.)
Text in bold is for proper names, locations, dates, some institutions, as well as military organizations. The bold is used continuously throughout the text as a means of reading quickly for a particular topic;
Explanatory text provided by the interpreter—unknown to me—is in parentheses ( ) within the body of sentences;
Text in blue italics highlights my mainly brief notes of clarification, although there is some editorializing. I have also put asterisk ( *** ) at the beginning of paragraphs I think of greatest significance. This highlighting all presumes the authenticity of the document, which of course can’t be established by means of a “chain of custody.” My highly reliable and deeply honest Sudanese source communicated to me, indirectly but emphatically, that a number of people put their lives at risk to obtain and leak this document. Given the verdict on authenticity for the previously leaked minutes, I feel quite confident in assuming that these, too, are authentic—and a deep obligation to disseminate them.
For those who wish to see the text without color highlighting (only names in bold), see: http://wp.me/s45rOG-6399
I have edited the English translation I received to remove typos, proofreading lapses, misspellings, unidiomatic and ungrammatical constructions; in a few places I have sought to clarify what seemed opaque; I have regularized the transliteration of Arabic names and sometimes made them more consistent with common usage; I have not changed the meaning of the text at any point.
IN THE NAME OF GOD, MOST GRACIOUS, MOST MERCIFUL
THE SUDANESE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT
POPULAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION – INFORMATION SECRETARIAT
Minutes of the meeting between the Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement and the President of the Republic held in the residence of the President of the Republic in the Army General Headquarters. Wednesday, 10 September 2014
- Addis Ababa Agreement
- Security preparations for the elections
- Implementation of the cooperation agreement with South Sudan
- Field Marshal Omar al-Bashir – President of the Republic
- al-Zibeer Mohammed al-Hassan – Secretary General of the Islamic Movement
- Hasabo Mohamed Abdel Rahman – Vice President of the Republic
- General Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein – Minister of Defense
- General Khalafal al-Rashid – Deputy Director of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS)
- General Osman Tajasir – Director of the Central Security Corporation
- General Siddig Amir – Director of Military Intelligence and Security
- General Ismat Abdel Rahman – Minister of Interior
- Professor Ibrahim Ghandour – Deputy Chairman of the National Congress Party
- General Mustafa Ebeed – Sudan Armed Forces Chief of General Staff
- General al-Rashid Fagiri – Director of the Popular Security
- General (Police) Ismat Ahmed Babikir – Under-Secretary for Presidential Affairs
President [al-Bashir] opened the meeting by saying welcome to the attendance, then commended the role played by the Secretary General [al-Zibeer Mohammed al-Hassan] in rebuilding the Islamic Movement institutions that came back to life stronger than before, despite the conspiracies and plots of the enemies, and the retreat by many of her own narrow-minded sons. President al-Bashir appreciated the Secretary-General’s ability to reconnect the Sudanese Islamic Movement with the rest of the Islamic Movements in order to assume her leading role for all the Islamic Movements world-wide. The Secretary-General presented the Sudanese Islamic Movement as a model for good governance, saying it was copied by many Islamic Movements abroad. Today the Sudanese Islamic Movement is feared by the enemies.
President [al-Bashir] said in this meeting that he wished to hear the opinions on current events of those present. “This is because you represent our ears that we listen with, the eye we see through, and the hand we use to hit every conspirator working to bury the Ingaz Revolution (now known as the National Congress Party) and sue its leaders.
Defense Minister General Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein:
The Addis Ababa Agreement of September 2014 signed by the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), the Sudan Revolutionary Forces (SRF) and Sadig al-Mahdi constitutes a deception plan despite the apparent concessions made by the Sudan Revolutionary Forces seen in the light of their original hardline position.
[The “Addis Agreement” of 4 September 2014—between the “National Dialogue” external liaison team of the Khartoum regime and the Sudan Revolutionary Forces—reflected no change of heart on the part of Khartoum, nor does it do more than offer a vague outline for “national dialogue”; the confidence-building measures that are part of the Agreement have had no success. The reasons for this are made abundantly clear in the course of these minutes, where it is repeatedly described as a ploy, a maneuver for the benefit of an international audience (see immediately below Hussein’s comments). The full name of the agreement is “The Addis Ababa agreement on the national dialogue and constitutional process in Sudan”—ER]
It is clear that the opposition is aiming to use this agreement in order to dismantle the Ingaz in a benign manner through negotiations after they suffered major defeats in the military operations theatre; but we won’t allow that deception to work. As a matter of principle, we don’t agree with the idea of a transitional government or the holding of peace-talks outside the country anymore.
Instead we will use these peace talks to dismantle the rebel militias. But we will tell them that Addis agreement is accepted, with the aim to give the region and the international community the impression that Sudan is taking the political dialogue initiative seriously. But when it comes to the details we will ask the rebels to disarm and demobilize their forces [in other words, unconditional surrender—ER] in the event they refuse, we will turn public opinion against them. Meanwhile, the Decisive Summer Campaign military operations against them will continue until they surrender.
Haile Menkerios came to me in the office, and I discussed with him the issue of how we can demobilize and dismantle the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement-North (SPLA/M-N) and the Darfurian rebel forces. This is to enable them to catch-up with the National Dialogue that will take place from within the country. On the other hand, we must stop South Sudan from supporting these armed movements on the other side.
I also discussed with him the necessity of the implementation of the joint cooperation agreement (between the Government of South Sudan [GOSS] and the National Congress Party [NCP]), including issues such as security arrangements, harboring and support to opposition forces, creation of a demilitarized zone, zero-line border demarcation, and trade crossing points under the supervision of the African Union. The purpose here is to expose the position of the Government of South Sudan, which refuses to implement agreements made with the world. Moreover, in the event that the army of the GOSS is defeated by Dr. Riek Machar’s rebel forces, nobody should blame Khartoum. We will support Dr. Riek’s forces in order to take South Sudan by surprise, and make their defeat a lesson to others. We will establish for them a radio broadcasting station.
*** By the way, Haile Menkerios is cooperating with us fully and likewise are Thabo Mbeke and Mohammed Ibn Chambas who are so keen to serve and protect our interest even more than us. When they visited Qatar they were accorded a good reception and treated generously; they are now under our control. These are the ones[Mbeki, Menkerios, Chambas—ER] we use to dismantle the rebellion. In case the rebels resist, we will report them to the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council, and will depict them in the report as the party who rejected a peaceful settlement of the conflict. On the other hand, we will also use them [again, Mbeki, Menkerios, Chambas—ER] to subjugate the South to our will and implement the agreement the way we want. All of these envoys promised to submit to the African Union and the United Nations positive reports on Sudan records on human rights and freedoms.
This is an opportunity that we should not miss and we should allocate enough resources in order to exploit.
I recommend the establishment of a separate office to attend to our security and military relations with Iran that is far away from the eyes of all. We leave the diplomatic relations file only to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
General Ismat Abdel Rahmin, Minister of Interior:
*** Let us bless the agreement politically in the media and keep our real position tightly held among ourselves, working to achieve our goal using the agreement itself.
The regime has been as good as its word in these minutes, refusing to take the extension of the “Addis Agreement” seriously. Sudan Tribune reports (April 4, 2015):
The ruling National Congress Party (NCP) on 29 March refused to attend a meeting in Addis Ababa to discuss issues pertaining to the national dialogue conference and its procedures. Khartoum said the mediation didn’t coordinate with the government on who [would] participate in the meeting; also it said it would be held at the wrong time, arguing they are busy with the election of 13 April.
In a statement released on 1 April, the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) regretted the NCP refusal saying it had previously pledged to attend the consultations. The mediation also said the agenda of the two-day meeting were exclusively dealing with the dialogue process in line with its mandate refuting claims that it aims to postpone the elections.
Since Mbeke and Mohamed Ibn Chambas are cooperating with us, let us use them to help us achieve the following things:
[a] Lifting the blockade (sanctions).
[b] Get economic support.
[c] Alleviate the pressures on us.
[d] Dismantle the movements (Sudan Revolutionary Forces), since they showed no interest in dialogue through demobilization of their forces. After demobilization we will be able renege on implementing the agreement. The movements are pretending to be clever, but we can outwit them. Regarding the preparation for the elections we are now training 100,000 policemen from the various states. On the other, side we organized a special operations force to deal with riots expected to take place on September 23rd (memorial day of the victims of September 2013) with clear order to use gunfire against them, including any other saboteurs.
Those who want to express their views from the political parties or individuals are allowed to do so through the National Dialogue forums, not though demonstrations. The media must be controlled when it is covering the news of the armed forces (the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Response Forces). On the other side, any delay of the elections will demoralize our forces, so elections should take place on time and should not be connected to National Dialogue. The elections should take place on time, and the National Dialogue can continue for two to three years after the elections. It will make no difference.
Regarding our relations with South Sudan, we have expressed our opinion earlier that we should maintain and support an armed opposition to the government in the South in order to maintain the balance of forces. If they support our opponents, we will support their opposition. I agree to the idea of buying a radio broadcasting station for them. The Nuer tribe of Riek Machar are very close to us. They fought along the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) throughout the 1990s.
I recommend that you support them. Open for them channels of support from Iran, because of the presence of the Americans and Israelis in South Sudan.
General Khalafalla, Deputy Director of the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS)
The information we got was that the same countries that supervised the Paris Declaration are the ones who formulated the draft of the Addis Ababa agreement, though they took care in order not to offend the National Congress Party. They dropped some of the opposition demands, such as the demand for regime change and the International Criminal Court issue. That explains why Abdel Wahid al-Nur refused to sit with the Sudan government delegation.
Our agents who sat with the opposition in Addis reported that they saw French, British, Americans, and Israelis, plus others, who met with them. Each one of those foreigners has got his own agenda aimed at destroying the Islamic Movement, abrogate the shari’a laws, and take the nation’s leader and his aides to the International Criminal Court. Based on the above information, we briefed all the members of the leadership and accordingly, they decided to welcome the agreement. They encouraged Ghazi Salahaddin al-Atabani [who was expelled from the NCP in 2013 for a memo calling for the end to violent measures such as those used against demonstrators in September 2013] to sign.
Regarding the concessions made by the rebels, they are intended to achieve several goals through the idea of the transitional government:
 Leave the country without legitimate leadership.
 Put the fate of the president in the hands of the opposition political parties
 Neutralize the government in regards to the Decisive Summer Campaign military operations.
 Put the National Congress Party on [the defensive?] after they have succeeded in postponing the elections, releasing the political detainees, and gaining freedom for political parties and unite with them against us.
We managed to reach out to the sons of Sadig Al-Mahdi (Abdel Rahman and Bushra) through our agents. We told them if you allow your father to stay outside of the country, he will be [replaced by?] Nasaradin al-Mahdi. And Nasaradin will tell Sadig that his sons are supporting the regime. Automatically Nasaradin will inherit the party leadership from their father because he will have lost the support of the Ansar sect leaders and followers abroad [the Ansar sect is the primary base of support for the National Umma Party—ER].
Here Bushra asked how could he go to his father. We told him to inform his father that he (Bushra is going to protect him (Bushra is a Military Intelligence officer in the rank and file of Sudan Armed Forces [SAF]). We told Bushra that we want his father to return to the country, and in order to achieve that, let us work together. We told him to travel to Addis Ababa to stay with his father, but always to sit far away and not interfere with his business. You only keep records of those he meets, those who call him, and his destination if he is travelling. In Cairo you must stay with him, learn about his meetings, chat with him, and convey to us whatever information you get from him. We agreed to rescue your father from the hands of the rebellion and their foreign friends. In case he travels to any country or meets any VIP, you must attend the meeting.
Regarding the National Consensus Forces (NCF), they will not agree with the rebels or approve the Paris Declaration; this is because our elements within Arab Baath Party, whose vision is based on the central principle (One Arab Nation and an eternal Mission), and the movements (Sudan Revolutionary Forces, SRF) in their eyes are racists, because they are rejecting the Arabs and Muslims. On the other side, the Democratic Forces Movement (DFM) also plays a big role in ensuring disagreement within the National Consensus Forces concerning the rebels, because they belong to the leftist groups. We should increase the support to this political party in order to enable them replace the Communist Party, because the Democratic Forces Movement leadership is composed of the youth, and its chairwoman is very active. They used to bring live information from the rebels, and the rebels trust them.
It has become a necessity also to make change within the Sudan Congress Party, and that we replace Ibrahim al-Sheikh—the current leader—with his deputy Dr. al-Fatih Omer al-Sayid, who is our agent in that party. Recently, al-Fatih) played a decisive role in widening the gap between the National Consensus Forces and the rebels. In relation to Abu Eisa, we have infiltrated his office, by some of his staff and we get a copy of every e-mail or telephone call he makes. No fear from his side.
*** At this stage we must welcome the agreement in order to give Thabo Mbeke and Mohamed Ibn Chambas the ability to be seen as productive and having achieved something. Accordingly, we must participate in the writing of the report that will be submitted by Mbeke to the African Union and the UN Security Council in order to ensure that it reflects the political transformation that is taking place in the Sudan: the release of the political detainees, the release of Ibrahim al-Sheikh on request from the AU Peace and Security Council in September. We must see that this report, which is going to the UN Security Council, contains what we want in terms of recommendations and resolutions. That meets our interest.
*** In this manner we will get rid of the crisis between us and the international community, then we will play politics with the Sudan Revolutionary Forces as we infiltrate their rank and file. At the same time we guarantee that the National Dialogue is going on within the country and the elections are taking place. We shall call international NGOs to monitor the elections, and there will be no rigging because we don’t need to do it due to the fact that the voting will be done through the National Identification Number and the majority of those who got it are NCP supporters.
*** This is an opportunity that will not repeat itself. We will be in a position to dictate our conditions on South Sudan using Mbeke and Haile Menkerios, who can play this role to enable us control our borders. Additionally, we keep the peace-talks forums in Addis and Doha (Qatar) going on separately when we discuss the details of the agreement signed in Addis with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel (AUHIP).
We worked to change the form of coordination between us and the revolutionaries in Libya in order to avoid committing another mistake like the one took place when the plane went last time.
Let us stick to our position regarding Paris Declaration and never recognize it.
General al-Rashiid Fagiri, Director of the Popular Security
The agents we planted in the National Consensus Forces (NCF) who attended the meeting of September 10th managed to influence and convince the NCF to reject the Addis Ababa agreement and Paris Declaration. Today the NCF are at loggerheads with their allies in the Sudan Revolutionary Forces. Our agents succeed in doing this by engineering higher ceiling demands compared to the achievements of Addis Ababa agreement. Additionally, we managed to infiltrate and monitor the activities of all the foreign missions in our country, in addition to our ability to cover all the rebels’ activities. Through these agents we succeeded in discovering earlier that the Sudan Revolutionary Forces agreement with African Union High-level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) was a deception intended to embarrass our government. But thankfully we had information about the concessions they will make before time and what they said in their meeting with Sadig al-Mahdi to achieve their plan.
Accordingly, we decided to welcome the agreement and that the African Union High-level Implementation Panel can sign onto it; then, however, we leave the rest to be discussed when we come to the details of the agreement. This is because we need better relation with the regional and international communities. Our relation with South Sudan should be based on the degree of animosity: either they are friend to us or to the Sudan Revolutionary Forces. We will discover this in the upcoming meetings of the joint security committee. We will base our decisions on the outcome of that meeting as to whether or not to provide security and intelligence support to the fighters of Dr. Riek Machar. We should establish a radio broadcasting station for them [presumably the rebel forces of Riek Machar] in order to reach their voice to outside world, and we should supply them with all types of logistics through a remote channel that won’t be seen or discovered by anybody.
General Siddig Amir, Director of Military Intelligence and Security:
In order to get the demarcation of the [North/South] border and the demilitarized zone, Thabo Mbeke and Haile Menkerios are in agreement with us in regard to the necessity of holding the joint security committee meeting. Holding of that meeting will enable us to present our case and all the evidence we have on South Sudan’s support to the movements [Sudan Revolutionary Forces].
In regards to South Sudan, let us support both parties to the conflict: Salva Kiir politically, because his presidential term is coming to an end, and Dr. Riek on his legitimate demands, especially given that Dr. Riek declared that [his rebel forces] are allies to us. So even if a peace agreement is reached today, we will have allies within the South, contrary to the case if Dr. Garangs’ Boys are in power. I support the establishment of a radio broadcasting station to help them in the war propaganda against Salva Kiir. In addition to intelligence and logistical support to Dr. Riek, this will constitute the beginning of the end of the rebels [again meaning Sudan Revolutionary Forces].
*** Our 4th Division Command in Damazin has succeeded organizing a local militia in Maban from the sons of the area, under the command of Kamal Loma, a former R/S/M in SAF, with the aim to expel the refugees of Blue Nile from Maban area refugee camps. We supported the step and encouraged them.
*** Another attempt made by Abdalbagi Garfa (a Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army dissident) to establish a group from the sons of Shat tribe in Yida refugee camp and there is some progress reported on that. We have also some consultations with some Nuer sons in order to convince them to go there (Yida refugee camp in Unity State) to disperse the Nuba refugees and they said they are ready to go and execute the mission, because they don’t want refugees in Yida. In fact, the gap between the Nuer and the movements (Sudan Revolutionary Forces) is widening because the Nuer are accusing the movements of participation in the killing of their relatives. On our side we will support this hypothesis through the media.
General Mustafa Ebeed, Sudan Armed Forces Chief of General Staff:
We prefer the mechanism of dialogue from within. The Sudan Armed Forces are ready for the elections and the coming dry season military operations. The concessions made by the rebels and their decision to sign the agreement came out of fear from the coming Decisive Summer Campaign military operations. In the past they were not interested in peace negotiations; we understand the motive behind their current position and won’t be bluffed at all. Our plan is to continue with our strategy. If they accept disarming and demobilizing their militias, no problem. But we will not accept partial cease-fire or humanitarian assistance unless they demobilize their forces according to a full agreement. [In other words, surrender unconditionally and accept the genocidal consequences for the people of South Kordofan and Blue Nile—ER]
*** Let us use Mbeke to help us finish the rebellion for good. We don’t accept anything called a “transitional government” or “constitutional conference.” It is up to the politicians to welcome the Addis Ababa agreement in order to attract the rebel Sudan Revolutionary Forces to the National Dialogue according to our conditions, but only if any National Dialogue taking place is presided over by the president.
The greatest threat to us is coming from the South. The meeting with the Mechanism [for border delineation and demarcation] must settle all the suspended issues immediately. It is also important to dry-up all the sources of supply to the rebels, especially the Mountains Bank, that support the war.
We must support and strengthen the Nuer tribe; they are strong fighters and lack only the experience to operate tanks and how to manage missile-launching devices. They also need an FM radio broadcasting station to take their voice to the world, in addition to the organization of a strong military intelligence wing, qualified to lead and command military operations and political battles.
[Such support for the SPLA/In Opposition virtually guarantees a continuation of the enormously destructive civil war in South Sudan—something Khartoum clearly sees as in its interests.]
General Osman, Director of the Central Security Corporation:
The agreement which was signed by the rebels and Sadig with the Mechanism was arranged earlier in terms of content and objectives, but the question is: why did they make that concession at this specific time? It is clear that all is arranged by foreigners and it is not their own will.
We got the outcome of the opposition meetings with the foreign diplomats and we passed it to the members of the 7+7 team going to Addis Ababa in advance in order to sign the agreement and foil the opposition plan. The opposition conspiracy that was aiming to sabotage the internal National Dialogue and pit the National Congress Party against the international community giving them the impression that the National Congress Party is not serious about dialogue and peaceful settlement to the conflict in Sudan. We thought about how we can give concessions, but meanwhile work to allay the fears of our members in the National Congress Party. So the decision to release Ibrahim al-Sheikh was designed to coincide with Mbeke’s visit to Khartoum and prior to the submission of his report to the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council.
At the same time our agents within the National Consensus Forces will work hard to prevent the unification of the political parties under the leadership of the rebel Sudan Revolutionary Forces. The National Consensus Forces must not be used, as Dr. Garang used the National Democratic Alliance in the past.
Ibrahim Ghandour, Deputy Secretary General of the National Congress Party:
*** In fact, the concessions made by the rebels puzzled me, because the sons of the two areas (Nuba and Blue Nile) have not changed their positions for long time. After that we decided, with the security organs, to wait and monitor the situation until we got full information about the motive behind their new position. So we decided to sign since it is not a framework agreement and not binding to us, instead we have used their signature in propaganda that serves our party and to show that the National Congress Party is serious in regards to National Dialogue. That way we will be able to mislead the countries supporting them in order that they don’t influence the European Union’s positions. That is why we declared that the National Congress Party welcomes the Addis Ababa agreement of 2014. We decided to use the agreement for propaganda in the media, to be followed by the decision to release Ibrahim al-Sheikh.
Because we welcomed the agreement, our image has improved and we have won substantial support, which you can see from the statements issued by many international organizations commending our position. The proof is that the EU Ambassador and the American consul visited me and both commended the role of the mediation and our role in reaching that agreement. After that I met Mbeke and we agreed on the recommendations he should submit in his report to the AU Peace and Security Council and the report to UN Security Council. That should include a request concerning the lifting of sanctions and support to Sudan in addition, he should reflect a good image of the Government of Sudan. For now we have won the game.
When the time comes for negotiation, we shall use discussion of the details to dodge and buy time with aim to foil the rebels’ plans. Additionally, we will conduct internationally recognized elections, especially since the EU, AU and Carter Center will participate in the monitoring these elections. I have assured the American special envoy of our good will. He was so happy. [The Carter Center failed miserably in monitoring the 2011 gubernatorial elections in South Kordofan]. We also raised the issue of Abyei in the coming elections, in order to put pressure on the South to accept the implementation of the security agreements in the presence of Mbeke.
***But whatever we do to thank Mbeke will not be sufficient to reward him fully for the things he did for our sake and our behalf.
In regards to the elections, we are ready and have prepared for them.
I say that, you must properly cover the movement of the weapons you are transporting to Libya, so that we avoid embarrassment next time. There is a general consensus within the National Consensus Forces that they should maintain their position and not sign the Addis Ababa Agreement, or unite with the Sudan Revolutionary Front and Sadig al-Mahdi. We provide the National Consensus Forces with full freedoms as requested in their statement so that we use them in bargaining with the international community, which is currently supporting preparatory meetings in Addis Ababa for the National Dialogue to take place in Khartoum.
We must hurry to dry up the source of supply to the rebels, especially the Nuba Mountains Bank, because it is supporting the rebellion and currently this Bank has two branches, in Juba and Nimule. You said before that you managed to create a problem within this Bank that can lead to its collapse, but nothing has happened to this point. Yes the drying-up is going well, but this Bank has still not collapsed.
Kumundan Joda and Abdal-Ghani (ex-SPLM/A and currently pro-NCP politicians from Blue Nile) and told me that their contacts with their supporters in SPLM/A controlled areas of Blue Nile are going on well. But due to the rainy season and bad roads their supporters could not cross to National Congress Party-controlled areas yet. Also Daniel and his people (Daniel Kodi, an ex-SPLM/A commander from Nuba Mountains who defected and joined the National Congress Party). They said they are working to divide SPLM/A members in areas of the Nuba Mountains controlled by the SPLM/A. But we are also working on them on the other side, from a different direction. They are opposed to the Islamic Movement (they are Christians) and our campaign will continue until we liberate all our lands.
We shall activate both Doha and Addis forums to engage the rebels, but we will not recognize the Sudan Revolutionary Front or Paris Declaration at all. Additionally, the steps taken toward Sadig al-Mahdi are important: he must come back and get politically assassinated for good.
Dr. Hasabo, Second Vice President of the National Congress Party:
I agree with all that has been said. I say all the government institutions, the embassies and our presence abroad are collecting information about the movements and meetings of the opposition in Europe, Egypt, the Emirates, and Addis. This has enabled us to fashion down our strategy for dealing with the trap laid down for us and escape it. Regarding the international and regional staff, we must study their personal tendencies or weaknesses in order to use and engage them. For the time being we have taken the initiative and Mbeke will submit a report to the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council, praising us; and his report will include recommendations that we badly need.
Regarding the joint security committee meeting with the South let us use this agreement gradually and tactically in order to be able to cross to the other side of the river safely, meanwhile keeping the two negotiation forums (Doha/Qatar and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) separate from each other. Regarding Abdel Rahman (son of Sadig al-Mahdi), I was assigned by the president of the Republic to meet him. I found that he is against the step taken by his father and we want Abdel Rahman to take over as Umma Party Chairman in the place of his father.
Regarding the Bank of the Mountains, even the people of the Mountains said this Bank is supporting the war. We want this Bank to be dismantled and to stop its activities. The issue of this Bank must be raised in the joint security Committee meeting with South Sudan and tell them bluntly: this Bank is part of the support to the war.
Our economy will recover. [These men can’t speak the truth about the current economic implosion in Sudan, even among themselves; see | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1sa —ER]
In regards to corruption, we said in order to eradicate it, you don’t need to dismiss or expose a person, because our security organs know each and every case of corruption. If we adopted the policy of dismissal, we would dismiss the whole Party and disperse our members. By that I mean we will dismantle our party and ourselves. Then what is the benefit that we gain? Instead any corrupt person can be called secretly and be shown the documents that condemn him or the evidence, and he can be asked to resign or pay the money he embezzled confidentially. After that, if he makes any statement or changes allegiance or joins another party, we will tell him: “we will expose and defame you.” This way we succeeded and today big amounts of money are recovered, and we preserved the dignity of these people and they are staying with us as members in the party. We decided that all this recovered money (Tahlil money) must go to the security and intelligence activities.
General Ismat, Under-Secretary for Presidential Affairs
*** I agree with all that has been said. It is good that we accepted the agreement, which indicates political cleverness. I concentrate on the Mountains Bank, because many reports are talking about this bank’s activities. And I say you must give incentive to Mbeke, his people, and Ibn Chambas from the money of the Islamic Movement that is deposited abroad.
Al-Zibeer Mohammed al-Hassan – Secretary General of the Islamic Movement
“Praise be to Allah, Glory be to Allah, who has put this under our control though we were unable to control it” (end of quote).
This [Addis] Framework agreement was meant to harm us, so we must be grateful for the vigilance of our security organs and their correct estimations. And their advice that we accept [the Addis agreement] tactically, at this stage given the situation we are in, has allowed us to gain a lot. I also commend Qatar for the good job it did in giving the directions they did to the envoys (Mbeke, Ibn Chambas and their teams) and its continued support of us. Accordingly we must use all the Islamic movements’ money in order to win the battle in its various ways, some of which we have seen:
- First is the concession made by the rebels; they are decreasing the ceiling of their ambitions and this is evidence that they have been defeated on the battlefield; this is due to the effort made by our Mujahidin (Popular Defense Forces), the Sudan Armed Forces, and the Rapid Response Forces.
- Second is the bypassing the Paris Declaration.
- Third is the position taken by National Consensus Forces against the unity with the Sudan Revolutionary Forces in a clever political and methodological manner.
- Fourth is cleverness of our leaders and cadres in dealing with the agreement.
- Fifth is the wide international support to the agreement appreciating the role of the government.
- Sixth is maintenance of the two negotiation forums separately which will enable us to dismantle the agreement any time we want during the discussion of the details.
- Seventh is proper infiltration and control of the envoys. After this, elections can take place with recognition in a way that we will be mandated by the people and empowered to subjugate all the other political parties. At the same time, military operations will continue in order to liberate the land. It is also possible that the opposition may differ among themselves, when they discover that they were cheated. They may simply disintegrate, and we can continue with our media propaganda in favor of the agreement and an internal dialogue that will continue even after the elections.
It is a must that South Sudan stop its support for the rebels, and that we support the Nuer; they are closer to us and they fought together with our army before. The weapons and equipment going outside Sudan must be secured in addition to the necessity to ensure the safety of all the Islamists who are accommodated in different places outside Khartoum.
Regarding the Mountains Bank, you must involve it in failed (broken) commercial deals, through a third party to incur losses and collapse, and the Islamic movement can finance the whole deal and bear the consequences in terms of losses. That way we will rescue the country from a resource that is working to destroy us. Work hard in the infiltration and dismantling of our enemies, use all means including deception and money; and Halal is allowed, since it is intended to serve the interest of Islam and Muslims.
Field Marshal Omar al-Bashir, President
In the name of God most gracious, most merciful.
Our consent in signing the [Addis] framework agreement with the Mechanism came after consultation with all the relevant organs and supported with thorough information. Actually, we were in need for this agreement. Accordingly, we thank Mbeke, Haile Menkerios, Ibn Chambas, and Qatar for achieving this agreement. Regarding Mbeke, he is honest and we will work with him. The agreement will not deceive us, and our battle with the rebels is a long one and has not started yet. I salute the vigilance of our security organs and Military Intelligence. I don’t want to add more to what you have said, except that 1st Vice President Bakri Hassan travelled to Chad and I asked him to talk to [Idriss] Déby on the issue of our plane taking weapons to Libya. He has to make Déby understand and deny all of this before any further involvement of Sudan in Libya. So in Libya we must work secretly; it is all about the requirement of the situation in this country. We have political detainees and we released Ibrahim al-Sheikh; but the rest are sentenced before courts and their fate is connected to a political agreement with the rebels after we force them to demobilize their forces. This will be done by means of the Decisive Summer Campaign military operations on one hand and continuing the National Dialogue on the other hand. We will go anywhere wearing the hat of “dialogue,” and on this basis the negotiations will continue.
For our strategic relation with Iran we formed a security committee under First Vice President Bakri, with a membership of Abdel Rahim [Mohamed Hussein, Minister of Defense]; General Dalil al-Dhau, General Siddig Amir, Mohammed Atta [head of the National Intelligence and Security Services—ER] and Rashid Fagiri; the committee is under my direct supervision along with the Secretary General of the Islamic Movement.
We also formed three political and security committees on the basis of the recommendations of the meeting of August 31, 2014. These are:
 A security committee to monitor and deal with the movement of the rebels and dismantling of the alliance between the National Consensus Forces and the Sudan Revolutionary Forces. Member are: Ghandour, Mohamed Atta, Salah Al-Tayib, Mohammed al-Mustafa, Dr. Yusif Tibin, Dr. Hamid Siddig, Dr. Kamal Ebeed, and General Abdel Wahab al-Rashid.
 A committee to prevent the unification of the internal opposition and its external offices with the rebels. Members are: General Hashim Osman, Dr. Mustafa Osman, Kamal al-Sunni, Abdel Gadir Mohamed Zeen, Dr. Al Fatih Izzadin, General Malik Hussein, and al-Dirdiri Mohamed Ahmed.
 A committee on the evaluation and analysis of the local, regional and international political positions from security and military perspective towards Sudan. Members are Khalafalla al-Rashid, General Mustafa Ebeed, Dr. Ibrahim al-Karuri, Prof. Abdalla Ali Al-Naim, Prof. Ahmed al-Majzub, General Ismail Birema, General Ahmed Abdalla al-Naw, Dr. al-Muz Farug, and General Imad Adawi.
• Supervising the weapons of those working with us under supervision of the five security organs: National Intelligence and Security Services, Military intelligence, popular security, religious security and personal security.
• Finance deals that can lead to the collapse of the Mountains Bank.
• Finance the establishment of a radio broadcasting station for Dr. Riek Machar.
*** Prevention of any demonstrations in this month of September by means of the arrest of anybody reported to have an intention to participate in demonstrations. Any demonstration to be fired at with live ammunition.
“Any demonstration to be fired at with live ammunition”—this is the face of the elections that will take place in Sudan mid-April.