Summary translation of the minutes of July 1, 2014 meeting of senior military and security officials in Khartoum, including President and Field Marshal Omar al-Bashir
Eric Reeves | 17 February 2015 | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Bv
[NB: A more fluent and idiomatic rendering of this translation is available at | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Cb ]
[On 15 February 2015 I received from an unimpeachable source in Sudan the minutes of an important meeting of security and military officials in Khartoum. The meeting was held on 1 July 2014 and included Field Marshal and President Omar al-Bashir. This is yet another in a series of leaks of the minutes of highly sensitive meetings, often containing explosive statements and articulations of policy. In this meeting al-Bashir is speaking for more than half the time.
This document, here in summary translation form into English (21 pages), rivals in significance the leaked minutes of the August 31, 2014 meeting (Arabic original and English translation at | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1tC ). A series of analyses of the significance of this present document will be forthcoming, but presently it seems most important to put the texts in the public domain.]
ENGLISH SUMMARY TRANSLATION:
[ NB: all corrections, conjectures, glosses, alternative transliterations of the Arabic, and clarifications not in the original handwritten text appear here in italics; the word or phrase at issue is underlined. Everything else—including obvious orthographic, grammatical, punctuation, proofreading errors, and idiomatic mistakes in the use of standard written English—has been transcribed unchanged.
I will soon be producing a fully idiomatic and grammatical version of this summary translation for ease and speed of reading, clarifying phrasing where necessary. Emphases will also be provided for quick scanning.
The full Arabic text (33 pages) can be accessed at | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Bq. Parts of the document been seen by a number of native Sudanese speakers of Arabic, some of whom have great familiarity with the ways of the Khartoum regime. The view is overwhelmingly that the document is authentic. I have begun to assemble a compendium of commentary as the document is further assessed, and will keep it updated as needed at | http://wp.me/p45rOG-1Ca
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July 1, 2014
Meeting of President Bashir with SAF Generals
[page 1]
General Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hisen [usually transliterated “Hussein”]—Minister of Defense
—We won’t stop the war on Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The National Dialogue is just a maneuver to provide us with political cover for the continuation of the war against the rebelion. We instructed them (Air Force) to bombard any place, whether it is a school, hospital or an NGO [nongovernmental humanitarian organization] that is operating in rebel controlled areas without permission from the government it is offending and should be destroyed.
—RSS [Republic of South Sudan] is the greatest threat to our security but thanks that SAF [Sudan Armed Forces] maintains relations with the armed movements that are fighting against all the neighboring countries that constitute a threat to our rule.
—Our aim is to crush the rebelion and liberate South Kordofan and accordingly, this means the end of the war.
—Another security threat is the flow of refugees from the war in South Sudan into Sudan. But we
[page 2]
are not going to allow any NGO’s to come to their rescue. We will treat them as citizen in order to avoid the experience of the IDP [Internally Displaced Persons] camps in Darfur. On the other side, the Nuer elements can be of benefit to us in terms of intelligence.
First Lt. General (PSC) Mustafa Ebeed-COGS [General Mustafa Osman Obeid Salim]
—We are working to increase the production of all types of heavy and conventional weapons plus different missiles, in addition to diversification, aiming to achieve self-sufficiency.
—The assistance from friendly countries like Turkey, Russia, Bilo-Russia [Belarus], China, Koria [Korea], Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia. This because the current way is imposed on us by America, Israel, Uganda, South Sudan, Europe. And the church-based organizations.
—We are determined to see all Sudan borders are free from rebellion within six months. We are aware of the support extended by South Sudan to the rebelion.
Lt. General (PSC) Siddiq Aamir, Chief [illegible] [General Siddiq Amer, Director General of Intelligence and Security]
—Continuation of the Decisive Summer
[page 3]
—Campaign with the aim to deny the rebelion the change to regroup or reorganized its forces
—All the necessary information about the routes of advance to capture Kauda [in the center of the Nuba Mountains, and unofficial “capital” of the SPLA-N] are available
—All our military attachés abroad are following the movements of the rebelion leaders, especially in countries like South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Egypt where they are usually found… The regimes in host countries are known of this hatred of political Islam
—Iran trained for us a hundred officers in advanced technological fields and areas like de-coding, spying, in addition to M.I. [Military Intelligence]—and supplied us with all the necessary equipments for that information war
—All the necessary elements for winning the battle against the rebelion are guaranteed because we have our elements [agents] present in all these armed factions
Lt. General (PSC): Hasim Abdalla Mohd. [Mohamed] [Major General Hashim Abdalla Mohammed, Chief of Joint Staff]
—Our friends supplied us with the weapons so we are determined that no body [nobody] other than the members of the Islamic movement in SAF to rule this country.
—It is a must that we use our Intelligence agents to divide, the SRF [Sudan Revolutionary Front, a coalition of rebel groups] and weaken.
[page 4]
Lt. General (PSC) – Mohamed Jurham Omer Shadid/Inspector General [General Mohamed Graham Omer, SAF Inspector General]
—If we captured Kauda, the SPLA will collapse and by definition it means the end of the war.
—We opened four military training camps for training of Nuba youth in order to use them in the dry season to crush the rebelion.
—We managed to strike a deal with UNAMID, and that it started to coordinate fully with us now [This would be in addition to the deal struck between Khartoum and UNAMID in 2011 to roughly the same effect—ER]: That any statement going to the media must be agreed upon first so that we are not blamed by it. And SAF must get a copy of any report to be submitted to the UN and we specified the channels of collaboration between us according to a well-studied ways that will not cause harm to the interest of either party
[Note: On 29 January 2014 Sudan Tribune reported: “SAF’s inspector general, Mohamed Graham Omer, said in a meeting at South Kordofan’s legislative council on Wednesday that the Sudanese army has largely achieved its objectives, calling on political forces to unify ranks in order to bring peace to the state.”—ER]
Lt. Gen (PSC) Yahya Mohd [Mohamed] Kheer, State Minister of Defense [General Yehia Mohammed Kheir, Minister of State for Defense]
There is an Islamic movement in each and every neighboring country and our relation with these Islamic
[page 5]
Islamic movements is strong. So our security situation is better.
—The threat from South Sudan will come to an end once we secure the borders.
—SPLM/A-N [Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North] are forces belonging to the government of South Sudan in our eyes. If they are interested in peace let them put down their guns and after that treat them as sons of the areas.
—SPLA-N has no qualified cadres that can defeat us in any field—They are good in fighting only, while armies alone cannot win a war. The second aspect to be considered is the nature of the terrain they occupy and operate in
—Two third (2/3) Gaddafi’s sophisticated armament is in our hands and he didn’t use it, because he lack some technique, but our experts in collaboration with the Iranian experts managed to develop some missiles.
[page 6]
Lt. General Iammadiin Adawi [General Engineer Imadal-Din Adawy, Chief of Joint Operations
—In order to protect our land we have exploit the regional situation (political turmoil) and nothing prevents us from bringing any body to join and fight along with our forces
—The threat coming from South Sudanese represented in the two Divisions (9th and 10th) [These are the divisional numbers for the forces in South Kordofan and Blue Nile during the long civil war, 1983-2005; they were always manned by people native to the two regions, which were essentially left out of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005). As a result, the two divisions kept their weapons, organizational structure, and commitment to the people of the regions; but they are not part of the present Sudan People’s Liberation Army, either SPLA/Juba or SPLA/In-Opposition. Khartoum has consistently refused to accept this fundamental reality about the divisional forces they are fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, even as the regime refers to the “SPLA-North”—ER] plus the Ugandans. The aim of Ugandans in South Sudan is to supply logistics to the two Divisions in South Kordofan and Blue Nile [Khartoum has offered not a shred of evidence to support this claim; it is part of a peculiar self-deception that serves as an excuse for military failures, particularly in the Nuba Mountains of South Kordofan—ER]. Then the solution is to defeat the two divisions, secure our borders, then release the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) to Uganda, but the time for that is not ripe now.
—We have to train the Silika [Séléka] force of (CAR) [Central African Republic] to support us in our future war because their colour of skin looks like ours [,] contrary to the colour of the Arabs and Islamist groups.
—The National Dialogue role is to provide us with political cover. So continue with it because it will serve us our war
[page 7]
against the rebelion in the coming dry season.
Lt. Gen. Ahmed Abadalla al-Naw [General Daleel al-Daw Mohamed Fadlalla, Chief of Staff of the Navy]
—Abu Kashola battle was a big psychological blow to our forces, where officers, NCOs, and men used to desert the frontline, but now morale of our forces is high due to recent victories we achieved against the rebellion [in late April 2013, SRF rebels briefly took control of Abu Kershola in South Kordofan, a stinging military defeat for Khartoum—ER].
—We want to attack the rebels in the nearly possible time because we manage to secure all the needs of the forces.
Lt. Gen (PSC) – Mulah Ismail Brema [General Ismail Breima Abdel-Samad, Chief of Staff of the Air Force]
—Drone planes can go now as far as one thousand (1000) kms [kilometers] in spying missions over forests and mountains.
—Kenana airbase is place underground and designed with highly advance technologies and proper security measures. This is where we store all the cargos of weapons we receive from our friends. [Kenana Air Base is in White Nile, south of Khartoum—ER]
[page 8]
Lt Gen (PSC) Navy. Dalid al-Daw Mohamed [General Daleel al-Daw Mohamed Fadlalla, Chief of Staff of the Navy]
—No one other than the Sons of the Islamic movement could rule Sudan. Today SAF is an Islamic movement. Starting from the Chief of Staff of the Army to the most junior officer—We reject any attempt to make a transitional government or holding of a constitutional conference—
—our own material and technological resources should be directed to spying
Lt. Gen. (Physician): Ali Sis al-Rhatam [?]
—In each and every one of the neighbouring countries that suffer from political instability we have presence and we have allies there, so the don’t constitute a threat to us
*** FIELD MARSHAL AND PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, OMAR AL-BASHIR***
—From what I have heard, I am now convinced that we managed to create a leadership for this country and we will strengthen in power until the hereafter whatever the challenges may be—
[page 9]
—The aim of the National dialogue and the peace talks is to achieve consensus in order to conduct the elections and after them to share power but also it was intended to provide political cover for the Constitution and the decisive summer campaign, unfortunately, they mistook it for a weakness—
—The rebels have no cause. They are an army that belong to another state, but staying in our land illegally
The other armed movements they also receive support from the same country. This fact is present to the whole World including Mbeki [Thabo Mbeki, the African Union’s senior diplomat in charge of the various Sudan files; he has proved continuously, disastrously inept; Khartoum officials have expressed confidence elsewhere that they have Mbeki effectively in their pocket—ER]
I’ve rejected National Call June 25th agreement because because it recognizes SPLM-N as a political party and calling for a political partnership between SPLM-N and the NCP. This one constitutes a threat to the future life of the Islamic movement in the Sudan. [It is unclear what al-Bashir is referring to here; I see nothing of note that bears any relation to this reference in the detailed chronology from Small Arms Survey for 2014:
Despite al-Bashir’s declaration, the National Call, actually “Sudan Call,” has gathered momentum; on 15 December 2014 Sudan Tribune reported that:
The alliance of opposition parties, National Consensus Forces (NCF) endorsed on Thursday the “Sudan Call” and decided to mobilise peaceful demonstrations to bring down the government of president Omer al-Bashir. The political declaration, signed the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa on 3 December, is the first agreement gathering all the opposition parties, civil society groups and the rebel coalition Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF)—ER]
—We refused to give the SPLM the state of South Kordofan in the elections of April 2011 due to its position and strategic importance for us in the relation with South Sudan. [Credible post-election analyses of the April 2011 gubernatorial race between Ahmed Haroun—Khartoum’s candidate, and a man indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity in Darfur—and the very popular Abdel Aziz al-Hilu make clear that the election was rigged in Haroun’s favor. The monitoring of the election by the Carter Center (Atlanta) was disastrously incomplete—ER]
—We attended the six [African Union] negotiating sessions [attempting to resolve conflicts in South Kordofan and Blue Nile] just to appease the international community
[page 10]
and not to make them think we are against peaceful settlement. But we use negotiations as tactics in order to mislead the supporting countries.
To the rebelion that their dream to see the Islamist rule is wither away is still there and we use it also to manipulate the public opinion.
—The main problem is the SPLM because the are experts in interpreting the international imperlists [imperialists’] agenda and whatever we do to them, they will not respond to peace until they see the Islamists defeat. So they are endeavoring to destroy us.
—The people of Blue Nile don’t like Malik Agar [the people of Blue Nile elected Malik Agar as governor] and historical leaders of the Nuba don’t like Abdel Aziz al-Hilu also [al-Bashir is apparently referring to men such as Daniel Kodi, Telefon Kuku as the “historical leaders of the Nuba”—ER].
—We don’t allow relief assistance to their areas. We said if they want an agreement let them dissolve the SPLA (army) and this one is connected to their political future—We will not allow any party to keep armed forces according to the position of the political parties [parties’] law.
[page 11]
—Salva Kiir denied any support to the rebels but I insisted because you have the evidence on that. My advise is that, don’t ignore any piece of information, whether big or small, so that we can pass it to the countries supporting them including the USA and that will serve to buy time to fight them (rebels).
—Garang boys were distanced. Now we are not facing any problems in getting information on the South in regards to the movement of the rebels.
—We don’t negotiate outside the country, and if it happened we use it as a means to take us to the elections in April 2015. Also there [is] one army only and if there is relief to the rebel controlled areas it should be according to our agenda and under our control. No partnership with any rebel again—Also we have no intention to agree on a transitional government or
[page 12]
or hold a constitutional conference or give any concessions. We suppress the ambitions of the political parties and push them to participate in the government according to our agenda and the national dialogue should lead to an agreements of holding the elections and drawing the constitution. Regarding the armed movements, they should give-up their guns individually on the basis of Doha [referring to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, July 2011—to date, another meaningless agreement on Khartoum’s part—ER] and Addis Ababa forums [which have yet to yield any agreement between Khartoum and the SPLM/A-North—ER]. We are going to table this position so that we don’t loose the support of the AU—for it constitute a political option for us. We have [assembled?] a plan to crush the rebelion and control the International borders—
—The armed movements are used by the R.S.S. [Republic of South Sudan] and other countries to destabilize us. The danger
[page 13]
was real when the South was united. But then the SPLA split into three groups—So we have to follow the situation closely, because it has something to do with the end of the rebellion (SPLA/SRF). Let us give the southerners hope so they don’t discover what we will do—
—We really benefit from the Gadddafi’s armament which is in our hands, we can develop it. Our allies from the Islamic movements are strong—We shall contribute in training the Libyan army. I’ve advised them to ensure that all the army and security to be loyal to the Islamists. You must continue the coordination with them. Then the Libyan political decision will end up in our hands and under our control in case the Islamic movements succeeded to crush Haftar [the General Haftar that Bashir wishes to “crush” is operating per the authority of the internationally recognized government of Libya—ER]. Say that we would secure the oil reserves. It is
[page 14]
clear that the Islamists will win due to the serious support from Qatar and Iran, as you know. Today the Libyans have joint forces with us and we are supporting them with armaments and intelligence. Tchad [Chad] is an strategic ally and we have joint forces with them. Also—on top [,] the Tchadian opposition is also under our control and we can benefit from them by keeping them as a reserve force.
—Regarding Central African Republic (CAR). We are the ones who established and created the Silika [Séléka] movement, and we worked with its chairman and today they are a force to reckon with [the Séléka Islamist movement in the Central African Republic (CAR) plunged the country into lawlessness and vast human suffering and destruction following Séléka’s seizure of power from (Christian) President Bozizé in March 2013. Much of CAR is now in near total chaos—ER] and no body can overlook them. When the new government of CAR visited us we told them that, they must negotiate (Séléka and anti-balaka [the name of Christian militias that have been formed to fight Séléka) and we signed agreement with the CAR Government.
[page 15]
South Sudan used to constitute the biggest threat to us due to interventions from Western Countries, America and the Zionists, armed movements and the international monitoring forces. But now the danger from the south is zero due to balance of forces that tilting in our favour. The Western countries will not be able to stay in South Sudan due to the conflict between Salva and the International Community.
—The majority of leaders around Salva Kiir are collaborating with us, and the former NCP members are the ones Ruling the South today. No problem in in terms of getting any information from the South now. We have the card of oil, and if we stop it, shut it down, the Ugandans will quit and Salva will be defeated. This situation helped us a lot in terms of getting all the informations about the rebelion.
[page 16]
which enabled us to achieve many victories against the rebels. Things that we never expected—so we must continue the Decisive Summer Campaign in the coming dry season and prepare for it in a proper manner that can lead to the final defeat of all the armed movements.
—Our relation with Ethiopia is more than good. They know the common interest between us and we keep many cards against them in our hands. The cooperation between us is going on, and I consider our relation with them as the best in the region after Tchad [Chad]. Continue with them to the creation of the joint military forces and military pacts with them to cover all areas of interest and especially the border issue—
—Regarding Eritrea, we have a good
[page 17]
coordination with them that cover all fields including the security ones, and jointly with Iran. We are the ones who nominated or recommended them to Iran and that gained a lot from the relation with Iran, military, economically.
—Regarding Saudi-Arabia the relation is generally good, but strategically is not good, due to their fear from our relation with Iran and the Muslim Brothers and the Salafi-Jihadist movements that are financed by Iran and Qatar. Also the majority of Arab countries are counting on the West and counting on the Western countries is a loss and we can not change our relation with Iran and our brother with useless relations.
—Regarding our internal situation the political parties misunderstood our call for National Dialogue.
[page 18]
We paid a deer price (thousands of martyres) for the protection of our belief and the country—And our aim is to hand-over the flag to coming generations and the Sudan is under the rule of the Islamists and it’s Armed Forces monitoring and supervising the political work, and SAF can intervene at the right time in case of any threat to the country.
—We will not accept to stop the war, and the solution is military victory, that is in the Decisive summer campaign you are now instructed to crush the armed movements in all the three fronts (Nuba Mountains, Darfur and Blue Nile)—The war to continue against the rebelion.
—If the war stopped the support of the civilians to our rule will diminish. The NCP will not find any reason to mobilize the support of the people behind it.
[page 19]
We are Islamic resistance revolutionaries and we refuse the domination of America in the Arab world and African continent. Our religion teach us and encourage us to fight and terrorise the enemy plus preparing force to confront him—Our martyres to heaven and their dead to hell. No way to stop the Jihad. They say comprehensive solution; we say partial solution or piece-meal solution.
—We cleaned and purched [purged] SAF (Sudan Armed Forces) from any person who is not Islamist. There is no other political party who can take power from us through a coup-de-tat [coup d’état]. All the Senior officers in the Army are loyal because they are members of the “secret organization” cells of the Islamic movement, and the fate of the Army (SAF) is tied to the fate of the Islamic Movement.
[page 20]
They don’t know why we organized the rapid Support Forces (Janjawid)—It is because the (Ingaz) NCP faced war on many front during the 1990s in Eastern Sudan, South Sudan and the two areas. This time our war (objective) is South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains. The other fronts we crush or deal with them by Air Force. Let them talk and we prepare to execute our plan to regain control over our international borders with South Sudan—I am glad for what I, heard and we agree on the following: —
[1] – Preparation for the Decisive Summer Campaign is to continue.
[2] – Elections to be held on time April 2015.
[3] – Increase the security and military (cooperation) with Iran
[4] – mandate rhe C-in-C [Commander in Chief] and the President of the Republic to contest for the Presidency, but in case he [i.e., al-Bashir—ER] is not ready, he has to nominate an officer from within SAF.
[page 21]
[5] – Maintain the Islamic Identity of the State
[6] – Only one Army in Sudan and continuation of development and modernization and improve the efficiency of the military equipment production industries.
[7] – Formation and organization of Rapid Support Forces in all the states under the supervision of the SAF and Sudan Intelligence and Security Services (S.I.S.S).
[8] – No holding of any constitutional conference or formation of a transitional government.
[9] – Ending the war on the rebellion depends on surrender and disarmament of their forces.
********
End of Quote.