A chronology of international responses to the Darfur genocide over the past year provides a deeply dispiriting time-line, and suggests how unlikely it is that security for civilians and humanitarians will improve any time soon. Despite current debate in the UN Security Council over a resolution that would authorize, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, deployment of the so-called UN/African Union “hybrid force,” there are few reasons to believe that Khartoum will actually allow this force to deploy in effective form, or in any remotely appropriate time-frame. The backdrop for current debate continues to be massive human suffering, destruction, displacement, and insecurity on the ground in Darfur (an overview the most recent reports appears below). Despite upticks in international sound and fury, there is too much evidence that they signify nothing.
The critical voice at this juncture, dismayingly, belongs to China—a veto-wielding member of the Security Council, and longtime enabling partner of the Khartoum regime. Last August, in a highly significant and revealing moment, Beijing ordered its UN ambassador to abstain on the crucial vote for UN Security Council Resolution 1706; and even this abstention (as opposed to a veto) was secured from China only by including language in the Resolution that “invited the consent” of Khartoum’s gnocidaires for the UN-authorized force. The “invitation” was resolutely refused and no movement was made toward deploying the 22,500 civilian police and troops authorized by Security Council Resolution 1706 under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which confers enforcement authority. The mandate of the force was to have been civilian protection, protection of humanitarian personnel and operations, and to staunch the flow of genocidal violence from Darfur into eastern Chad and Central African Republic, countries now experiencing a tremendous increase in ethnic violence and displacement.
In recent months pressure has mounted on the Chinese government over its relationship with Khartoum, as advocacy efforts have linked ever more forcefully Beijing’s complicity in the Darfur genocide and China’s hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. The key question, however, is whether this pressure is now great enough to secure from the Chinese government support for Chapter 7 authority in the current resolution, which is critical to the effectiveness of the deploying “hybrid force” of African Union and UN personnel, some 26,000 troops and civilian police. Again, Chapter 7 would confer enforcement authority, and is essential for both self-protection and the protection of civilians and humanitarians in violence-wracked Darfur. Potential troop- and police-contributing nations will not send their personnel into such an extremely dangerous environment without Chapter 7 authority and robust rules of engagement.
Public support from China on this linchpin issue of force mandate would have been a welcome sign that Beijing is beginning to understand the obligations that come with hosting the Olympics. Conversely, Beijing’s reported efforts to strip Chapter 7 authority from the draft resolution suggest that what we have seen to date is merely an ambitious diplomatic public relations effort around Darfur. China’s ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, declared yesterday (July 26, 2007) that even the revised draft of the resolution still presents problems. Agence France-Presse reports from the UN (New York):
“Wang stressed that some members still had problems with the draft, particularly the reference to Chapter 7 of the UN charter, used in cases of threats to international peace and security and to reinforce the mandatory nature of the text. [ ] ‘It is the view of many members that there is no need to bring other unnecessary elements into this resolution which might in a way delay the process, Wang said, stressing the need to keep the focus on authorizing the deployment of a 26,000-strong AU-UN force to be known as UNAMID in strife-torn Darfur. ‘Chapter 7 is a sensitive element in the current draft resolution and we have to be very careful how to handle that particular portion of the text which is under Chapter 7,’ Wang said, taking note of objections raised by Sudan, a close ally and energy supplier of Beijing.” (AFP, July 26, 2007)
More bluntly, Reuters reports from Beijing (July 27, 2007), citing “a Western official familiar with negotiations,” “that China had objected to having Chapter 7 in the resolution.”
But Chapter 7 authority for a Darfur peace support operation is the opposite of what Ambassador Wang suggests is an “unnecessary element”; on the contrary, such authority is of fundamental importance to the viability of the mission. China’s language concerning Chapter 7 authority would seem to be laying the groundwork for an abstention, even a possible veto of the resolution that formalizes a force to which Khartoum nominally gave “unconditional” acceptance on June 17, 2007.
This has become the defining moment for Beijing, particularly given China’s past record at the UN and its harsh words about Chapter 7 authority on the occasion of other Darfur-related resolutions. There is little that does more to explain Khartoum’s obdurate defiance of international efforts in the past, or to explain the recent history of human suffering and destruction in Darfur. China’s refusal to accept Chapter 7 authority for the proposed “hybrid force” to Darfur could mark the demise of any meaningful effort to improve security in the region.
DARFUR SECURITY TIMELINE:
Failure to adopt the current draft resolution with Chapter 7 authority would complete a dismal year of international failures to improve security in Darfur:
July 2006: then-Secretary General Kofi Annan belatedly charges the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations to provide a set of detailed recommendations for a UN peace support operation to Darfur; this comes as the African Union force continues its long decline in effectiveness. Violence and insecurity have increased dramatically since the signing of the disastrous Darfur Peace Agreement (May 5, 2006; Abuja, Nigeria).
August 28, 2006: UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland gives a final Security Council briefing on Darfur, declaring:
“Our entire humanitarian operation in Darfur—the only lifeline for more than three million people—is presently at risk. We need immediate action on the political front to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe with massive loss of life. [ ] If the humanitarian operation were to collapse [because of insecurity], we could see hundreds of thousands of deaths. In short, we may end up with a man-made catastrophe of an unprecedented scale in Darfur.”
Late August 2006: Khartoum launches a major military offensive in North Darfur against those rebel groups that are not signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement. Violence escalates throughout Darfur, and the UN Panel of Experts on Darfur reports that Khartoum is arming its brutal Janjaweed militia more heavily than ever.
August 31, 2006: the UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1706, authorizing deployment of 22,500 UN civilian police and troops, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The force is to have a robust mandate for civilian and humanitarian protection, as well as to staunch the flow of genocidal violence into Eastern Chad and Central African Republic. Significantly, China abstains on the vote.
September 29, 2006: Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan, capitulates to Khartoum’s defiance of the authorized UN force: “Mr Pronk has meanwhile told the Associated Press news agency he does not expect Khartoum to accept UN peacekeepers any time soon. ‘The international community should instead push for the African Union’s mission to be prolonged and reinforced'” (BBC, “UN ‘must drop” Darfur peace force,” September 29, 2006). All evidence at the time suggests that the AU is failing badly and simply could not absorb effectively significant additional resources in ways that would allow for meaningful protection of millions of vulnerable civilians.
October 2006: insecurity proceeding from Khartoum’s military offensive and the fragmentation of the non-signatory rebel groups intensifies. Elements from Minni Minawi’s faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)—the only signatory to the Darfur Peace Agreement—align with Khartoum’s forces, becoming known as the “new Janjaweed.” UN Security Council Resolution 1706 is now a dead letter, and yet there is no progress in discussions of security or in re-starting a peace process. Instead, there are expedient suggestions of an “African Union-Plus” peace support operation.
November 16, 2006: A “High Level Consultation on the Situation in Darfur” is convened in Addis Ababa, AU headquarters. Though there is substantial international attendance, including from the UN, Western democracies, the AU, and the Khartoum regime, no agreement is reached. A vague and incomplete “Conclusions” document is released, but Khartoum makes no firm commitments (see my detailed analysis of the “Conclusions” document [November 19, 2006] at http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article135.html). It is in this document that the notion of a “hybrid” UN/African Union “operation”—not, significantly, a “force”—is first mooted. Violence continues to escalate, threatening acutely vulnerable humanitarian operations and civilians. Reuters (dateline: el-Geneina, West Darfur) reports on an upsurge in Janjaweed attacks on children and women in Darfur (http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/CrisesArticle.aspx?storyId=L16927226&WTmodLoc=World-R5-Alertnet-6).
November 30, 2006: the African Union Peace and Security Council, unwilling to challenge or confront Khartoum, ratifies the “Conclusions” document of the November 16 “High Level Consultation on the Situation in Darfur.” Insecurity escalates yet further on the ground, and African Union performance in various security roles deteriorates, as does the relationship between AU forces and the Darfur population. Despite these realities, Khartoum’s National Islamic Front President Omar al-Bashir feels sufficiently emboldened to remain defiant:
“Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, speaking after a closed-door AU summit, rebuffed African leaders advocating a compromise proposal for an expanded peacekeeping mission that would include blue-helmeted UN soldiers in Darfur. ‘We can take technical, advisory and financial support from the UN, but no UN force,’ al-Bashir said. ‘We want an Africa force.'” (Associated Press [dateline: Abuja, Nigeria], December 1, 2006)
December 2006: A number of humanitarian organizations withdraw, suspend, or severely attenuate their operations in Darfur because of insecurity. Humanitarian access becomes so limited that Manuel Aranda da Silva, humanitarian coordinator for Sudan, reports that, “in November [2006] relief agencies had managed to reach only 62 percent of the 4 million or so people who needed food and other aid to survive.” UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs Egeland warns that aid operations in Darfur are “in free fall.”
Jean-Marie Guehenno, UN head of peacekeeping operations, invokes a time-frame of “several months” as reason for not relying on a peace support operation to Darfur: “‘It would take several months in the best of cases because it would be a huge deployment in the most difficult part of Africa—completely landlocked, no infrastructure—so logistically it’s an enormous challenge.'” (Voice of America [dateline: Addis Ababa], December 21, 2006)
Over seven months later, neither the time-line for deployment nor the logistical difficulties have changed.
January 2007: Desultory and unproductive talks continue with the Khartoum regime on issues of make-up and command structure for the AU/UN “hybrid operation” (Khartoum still refuses to accept the phrase “hybrid force,” which would imply the inclusion of UN troops). No progress is made in efforts to improve security. At the same time, humanitarian organizations, both nongovernmental and UN, declare that they face intolerable levels of insecurity. In an unprecedented “joint statement,” all 14 operational UN humanitarian organizations declare:
“In the face of growing insecurity and danger to communities and aid workers, the UN and its humanitarian partners have effectively been holding the line for the survival and protection of millions. That line cannot be held much longer. Access to people in need in December 2006 was the worst since April 2004. [ ] If this situation continues, the humanitarian operation and welfare of the population it aims to support will be irreversibly jeopardised.” (January 18, 2007)
The following week a similar joint statement is made by six distinguished nongovernmental humanitarian aid organizations operating in Darfur.
February 2007: No progress is registered either in improving security on the ground or in securing from Khartoum a commitment to a peace process or a cease-fire. On the contrary, much of Khartoum’s military activity is a direct assault on the peace process—an attempt to bomb and kill the rebel commanders who are seeking, amidst inordinate political and logistical difficulties, to unify. Reuters reports (February 13, 2007):
“Government forces have attacked Darfur rebel positions ahead of a critical meeting between rebel leaders and African Union and UN envoys trying to revive a stalled peace process, rebels said on Tuesday [February 13, 2007]. [ ] The rebel conference has been delayed many times, twice because of government bombardment, but Darfur rebel commander Jar el-Neby said commanders had begun to arrive from all over Darfur and the meeting should begin on February 19, [2007].” (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], February 13, 2007)
The UN Integrated Regional Information Networks reports (February 12, 2007) on the meaningless response of the UN Security Council to these calculated bombing attacks:
“[The Security Council] denounces in particular the bombing of areas in Northern Darfur by the Sudanese Air Force, which disrupted the preparations for a meeting of Sudan Liberation Movement commanders despite the fact that the Sudanese government had earlier declared its consent to the meeting.”
March 2007: President al-Bashir sends a defiant letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, rejecting a UN/AU “hybrid force.” Professing himself “stunned” by al-Bashir’s letter, US special envoy Andrew Natios declares following his own meeting with the National Islamic Front leader that “there was still no agreement on allowing non-African peacekeeping troops to assist a cash-strapped and inexperienced African Union mission in Darfur.” (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], March 8, 2007)
Violence continued to rage throughout most of Darfur, and the African Union force reaches a nadir of ineffectiveness.
April 2007: Khartoum finally accepts the second element of the three-part “hybrid operation” first discussed in Addis Ababa in November 2006. The so-called “heavy support package” is designed in part to augment the crumbling AU forces but primarily to prepare for the large follow-on force (i.e., the actual “hybrid force,” to which Khartoum has still not given its assent).
By late July 2007, very little of this “heavy support package” has been assembled, let alone deployed. Problems in composition loom large as Khartoum still refuses to accept non-African personnel as part of the “heavy support package,” except in technical roles. Moreover, even the “light support package” (some 200 UN technical personnel) has taken many months to deploy. All seems to hinge on the Security Council resolution that is only now under discussion.
In an April 4, 2007 statement to the Security Council, Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes declares ominously:
“Over the past six months, nearly a quarter of a million more innocent civilians have been forced to abandon their homes, seeking refuge mainly from Government [of Sudan]-supported militia attacks. [ ] Well over a third of the population of Darfur is now displaced,” [and at the current rate of displacement] “the same could be true for over half the population in another 18 months or so. This is a horrifying prospect. Meanwhile, politicization and militarization of camps have become a fact of life, creating a future time bomb just waiting to go off.”
A UN report in late July 2007 declares that “in May and June [2007] a further 25,000 people fled their homes,” and that “aerial bombings by the [Khartoum] military continued to be reported in North Darfur up to late June, while clashes between the military and rebel factions continued to be reported in various locations” (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], July 24, 2007).
May 2007: There is still no agreement from Khartoum to accept the actual “hybrid force,” half a year after the notion of a “hybrid” AU/UN “operation” is first broached in the Addis Ababa “High Level Discussion”—a “Discussion” disingenuously hailed at the time by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan as an “agreement.”
Humanitarian organizations remain poised to evacuate, withdraw, or suspend operations. At the end of April 2007, Oxfam/UK, Save the Children/Spain, and Mercy Corps withdraw from the Um Dhukun area in West Darfur. Coming in the wake of violent attacks on aid workers in the area, this action immediately affects 100,000 civilians, including refugees from Chad and Central African Republic. Khartoum’s refusal to rein in its brutal Janjaweed militia forces remains painfully clear:
“The African Union (AU) peacekeeping force in West Darfur told the United Nations on Wednesday [April 25, 2007] that Arab militias were killing and pillaging in the region without arrests by the Sudanese authorities. [ ] ‘Arab militias believed to be employed by the (Sudanese government)…roam freely in our area of responsibility, threatening and killing anybody against the interests of the government,’ [AU Major Harry Soko] told Antonio Guterres, the visiting UN High Commissioner for Refugees.” (Reuters [dateline: el-Geneina, West Darfur], April 25, 2007)
June 17, 2007: In Khartoum, National Islamic Front President Omar al-Bashir promises a UN Security Council delegation “unconditional” acceptance of the terms of reference specified by the Security Council for an AU/UN “hybrid force.”
Even so, issues of command-and-control, as well as force composition, clearly remain unsettled. At the same time, insecurity continues at intolerable levels, even as the number of conflict-affected civilians continues to grow. By the end of June 2007, the figure for the greater humanitarian theater of Darfur and eastern Chad stands at approximately 4.7 million human beings, according to UN agencies. For an extensive overview of security conditions as of mid-June 2007, see my two-part analysis:
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article172.html
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article171.html
July 11, 2007: A first draft of a Security Council resolution is readied by Ghana, France, and the UK, under Chapter 7 authority of the UN Charter. The mission would thus be able “to use all necessary means in the areas of deployment of its forces and it deems within its capabilities.” “All necessary means” includes the use of military force.
The resolution “decides that there will be unity of command and control which, in accordance with basic principles of peacekeeping, means a single chain of command, and further decides that command and control structures and backstopping will be provided by the United Nations.” The issue of command-and-control of the operation has been consistently vexed, and this belatedly unambiguous statement will certainly be resisted by Khartoum.
July 24, 2007: In the face of opposition from South Africa and other African countries, as well as China, Britain and France drop from the resolution a threat of sanctions against Khartoum, and also “drop a specific condemnation of Sudan for failing to ensure humanitarian aid is reaching refugees in the vast desert region” (Associated Press [dateline: UN/New York], July 25, 2007).
Of course all leverage, including that of sanctions, will be necessary to ensure that there is any chance Khartoum will accept actual deployment of UN/AU security personnel. And the obstruction of humanitarian aid by the regime has been so extensively documented, by so many different organizations on the ground and within the UN, that deleting this passage is transparently an effort to mollify Khartoum. This seems not to discomfit UK ambassador to the UN Emyr Jones Parry:
“‘We’ve been listening, we’ve had discussions … with the African members of the council,’ Parry told reporters. ‘We changed the text quite considerably. The tonality has changed, certain provisions have been altered considerably, there’s less threatening language in there. It’s more of a conciliatory text.'” (Associated Press [dateline: UN/New York], July 25, 2007)
“Conciliation” seems a peculiar ambition when such desperate circumstances obtain on the ground in Darfur and eastern Chad, and when the agent of insecurity is so readily identifiable. But even so, Khartoum’s response to the draft resolution—which now simply embodies al-Bashir’s June 17, 2007 “unconditional” acceptance of the terms of reference for a UN/AU “hybrid force”—could not be more defiant or condemnatory:
“Sudan’s UN ambassador, Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem Mohamad, blasted the document outside the Security Council chambers, saying it still contained ‘hostile language’ and ‘insinuations.’ ‘It’s very ugly,’ he said. ‘It’s just awful.'” (Associated Press [dateline: UN/New York], July 25, 2007)
Ambassador Abdalhaleem is of course taking his cues from Khartoum, where the regime-controlled “news” media have been heating up in their commentary, going so far as to suggest that the “agreement” offered on June 17 by President al-Bashir has been “misinterpreted”:
“Interior Minister Zubeir Bashir Taha said Western governments appeared to have misinterpreted Khartoum’s acceptance of the mission that would allow foreign troops into Sudan. The draft resolution for the mission includes the UN’s Chapter 7 mandate which authorises ‘all necessary means in the areas of deployment of its forces’ to protect its troops, secure a peace agreement and seize arms.”
“‘We have reservations regarding interpretations made by other parties… regarding the hybrid operation,’ Taha told Reuters. Asked if he rejected the UN’s Chapter 7 mandate, Taha said: ‘Yes of course. That is a problem. There’s no way they can enforce anything on us. This is a free state.'” (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], July 22, 2007)
So much for “unconditional agreement” from Khartoum on the UN/AU “hybrid force.” What we have in these words from Interior Minister Taha is a clear indication that the regime, now in a full-on survivalist mode, will never create a consensual environment for deployment of military or police forces. In short, there has been no progress whatsoever in almost a year since the Security Council adopted Resolution 1706. The argument then was that 1706 should be abandoned because Khartoum had made clear that it would create a non-consensual environment for deployment of any force, thereby vigorously dissuading potential troop- or police-contributing countries from participating.
Out of this capitulation came the “African Union-Plus,” which led to the notion of a “hybrid operation,” which only after many months became the “hybrid force” to which al-Bashir supposedly gave his “unconditional agreement.” But the tenor of commentary from Khartoum makes clear that there is no agreement, nor is there any likelihood that Khartoum will allow for consensual deployment of forces. We have come full circle, during which time many tens of thousands of lives have been lost, hundreds of thousands of additional civilians have been displaced, security has become worse than ever, and humanitarian reach is more constricted at any time since April 2004.
Instead of increasing pressure on Khartoum, the revised draft of the Security Council resolution eliminates the threat of sanctions as well as the richly deserved criticism of Khartoum’s obstruction and harassment of humanitarian personnel and operations. And given China’s stance, passage with Chapter 7 authority seems far from assured.
KHARTOUM’S RESPONSE
The “Sudan Vision” is the National Islamic Front regime’s most fully controlled propaganda organ, and thus serves as a useful indicator of NIF thinking. On July 23, 2007, Sudan Vision “reports”:
“The Sudanese government warned the UN Security Council from adopting a resolution on the UN-AU hybrid force without its approval. Sudan’s permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem said in press statements that his government submitted a list of its reservations on the proposed text of the resolution.” [ ]
“The Sudanese government objected to the mandate allowing the force to use all necessary means to protect civilians.” [i.e., “objected” to Chapter 7 authority for the force—ER]
“Abdalhaleem said that the proposed text brings back the same controversial issues that caused disagreement between Khartoum and some UNSC members. Sudan’s envoy said that the text of the resolution places the force under the UN command against the will of Khartoum which insists on the African nature of the force.”
“Abdalhaleem cautioned that unless Sudan’s concerns are addressed the resolution will have the same fate as resolution 1706.”
While it has been expedient for many in the international community to ignore the grim fate of Resolution 1706, not so with Khartoum. On the contrary, emboldened by the weakness of Jan Pronk, Kofi Annan, and other international actors of consequence, the NIF regime remains convinced that it can pull off a reprise of its stonewalling act. Part of this strategy entails recasting Darfur’s realities, the entire point of a recent (and rare) trip by al-Bashir to Darfur. Sudan Vision again reports (July 23, 2007):
“[al-Bashir] explained that the Cabinet meeting in Al-Fasher [North Darfur] came as a symbolic gesture to stress the government concern about the states of Darfur, dismissing foreign media reports portraying the situation in Darfur as the worst human tragedy as false, citing what he saw on the ground during his current visit to the region.”
“Referring to the situation in Darfur, he said it has been exaggerated by the media and refuted the circulated reports on security disorders and continued violence in the region.”
SUNA, another propaganda organ of the NIF regime, offers its own contribution to the “big lie”:
“Interviewed by SUNA on the outcome of the President [al-Bashir’s] visit [to Darfur] and the meeting of the federal Cabinet in Al-Fasher, [Federal Minister Abdul-Basit] Sabdarat said that the visit was a message to the world and to those circulating false claims and lies that Darfur is safe. He said that in the last two years the government has managed to make great accomplishments in the economic, development, political and services’ fields in Darfur, besides restoration of the social fabric in the region.”
“Sabdarat said that convocation of the federal Cabinet in Al-Fasher affirmed that Darfur States has made advanced strides toward realization of peace, adding that the few past days witnessed the signing of a peace agreement with the faction of Ibrahim Yahya. [ ] He pointed out that a big number of displaced people are willing to return to their home areas in Darfur.” (SUNA, Khartoum, July 25, 2007)
Given Khartoum’s willingness in the past to move aggressively toward forced returns of displaced persons, this last sentence is certainly ominous, particularly in the context of the regime’s directive to the walis (governors) of the three Darfur states not to build additional IDP camps, even in the face of massive additional displacement.
Voice of America ([dateline: Nairobi], July 23, 2007) reports on other details of Khartoum’s aggressive propaganda campaign:
“[al-]Bashir also lashed out at aid groups. He accused them of collecting money in the name of Darfur and spending it elsewhere. He also suggested that the groups were turning refugee camps into museums where human misery was put on display for the rest of the world to see.”
In short, in the picture Khartoum would paint there is simply no need for an international security presence in Darfur. And given the regime’s strenuous assertion of national sovereignty, there would be no “legal” justification in any case. Here we should recall again the words of powerful Interior Minister Zubeir Bashir Taha:
“Interior Minister Zubeir Bashir Taha said Western governments appeared to have misinterpreted Khartoum’s acceptance of the mission that would allow foreign troops into Sudan. The draft resolution for the mission includes the UN’s Chapter 7 mandate which authorises ‘all necessary means in the areas of deployment of its forces’ to protect its troops, secure a peace agreement and seize arms.”
“‘We have reservations regarding interpretations made by other parties… regarding the hybrid operation,’ Taha told Reuters. Asked if he rejected the UN’s Chapter 7 mandate, Taha said: ‘Yes of course. That is a problem. There’s no way they can enforce anything on us. This is a free state.'” (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], July 22, 2007)
These words are designed most conspicuously for Chinese ears, and this accounts for the words of Chinese ambassador to the UN Wang Guangya: “I still think in a number of areas, that members still have difficulties, including China.” But this understated language belies the fact that this is a moment of truth, a moment of critical decision for the Chinese authorities: either they support the current resolution fully, and signal as much to the regime, or they will have consolidated their position as the chief enablers of Khartoum’s gnocidaires. This position has already been highlighted by the “Genocide Olympics?” campaign (see www.DreamforDarfur.org), and will receive much greater highlighting in the very likely event that China does not support fully this essential resolution.
REBEL RE-UNIFICATION EFFORTS AND A DARFUR PEACE PROCESS
As important as it is that Darfur’s rebel factions unify, and as daunting a task as negotiating unity has become in the wake of more than four years of genocidal violence and the terrible effects of the Darfur Peace Agreement, this is hardly the only step in moving a peace process forward (see fine analysis by Opheera McDoom of Reuters, July 25, 2007 at http://africa.reuters.com/wire/news/usnMCD543985.html). Khartoum must be persuaded, over its currently strenuous refusal, to re-open the issues negotiated in the Darfur Peace Agreement, particularly issues of compensation, international guarantors of security agreements, and regional governance for Darfuris. Even more urgently, the regime must first be persuaded to end its largely continuous aerial bombardments of rebel meetings and strongholds, now over many months and despite promises given to the AU and UN that it would halt such attacks (see my recent [July 10, 2007] overview of Khartoum’s bombing campaign of the past eight months at http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article176.html).
A recent gathering in Tripoli, Libya (July 15-16, 2007) was attended by “18 nations and organizations, including Chad, China, Libya, Norway, Russia, Sudan, the United States, the European Union and the League of Arab States,” and predictably “pledged their unequivocal support and commitment to the AU/UN-led Darfur peace process, in partnership with regional leaders” (UN News Center, July 19, 2007). Ban Ki-moon dutifully “welcomed the ‘constructive outcome’ of a well-attended international meeting on the situation in [Darfur].” But of course no representatives of the people of Darfur were present at the Tripoli meeting, and no mention was made by Ban of the nefarious activities of Libya in Darfur and eastern Chad over many years. Nor was it judged diplomatic to register the reprehensible collusion of the Arab League—merely an extension office of the Egyptian foreign ministry on Sudan issues—with Khartoum in fending off international pressure and downplaying the Darfur crisis.
What was accomplished at this meeting in Tripoli? The two part-time Special Envoys—Jan Eliasson of the UN and Salim Ahmed Salim of the AU—agreed to convene another meeting, this time in Arusha, Tanzania (August 3-5, 2007). Attendance is dramatically uncertain, although Eliasson seems prepared to accept the word of the Khartoum gnocidaires, who “assured” the UN envoy that they had been in touch with the rebel leaders and that “a ‘great majority’ of the non-signatories [to the Darfur Peace Agreement] are prepared to enter negotiations.” Credulous acceptance of such “assurances” gives Khartoum the benefit of appearing to be genuinely willing to engage in good faith negotiations with the non-signatories, when in fact there is no evidence whatsoever of such good faith.
Notably, Khartoum will not be represented at the Arusha talks, only the rebel leaders. Eliasson and Salim have declared that this will be the last opportunity for rebel leaders to meet before invitations are issued for the formal beginning of renewed peace talks (whose timeline is quite unclear). But the rebels themselves remain divided and fractious, with unfortunate jockeying for positions of power and competing claims of how representative given factions would be at the negotiating table. For example, Associated Press reports from Asmara, Eritrea (July 15, 2007):
“Five Darfur rebel groups have agreed to join forces ahead of a meeting Sunday in Libya to push for a solution to the four-year conflict in the western region of Sudan. The new coalition, calling itself the United Front for Liberation and Development, said Saturday it wanted to establish ‘a united front to deal with the crisis in Darfur and the Sudan; and appeal to all other movements to contribute to unity efforts.'”
But as the Associated Press dispatch also reports:
“The five rebels groups who agreed to unite Saturday [July 14, 2007] are among more than a dozen relatively obscure splinter factions that emerged in the aftermath of last year’s peace deal. Experts say they do not represent a significant military force on the ground in Darfur.”
And this highlights a key question among Darfuris, on the ground and in the diaspora: what significance should military force on the ground have in determining who represents the people of Darfur. Are those in the diaspora as committed to security and protection of civilians as those who have remained on the ground to resist Khartoum’s military onslaught and the predations of the brutal Janjaweed militia? (See an important Reuters dispatch on precisely this issue, “Darfur mediators must not forget rebels in field,” at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L26630714.htm)
What is the relative standing of, for example, Jar el-Neby, perhaps the most important and principled of the rebel commanders on the ground? And what to make of Abdel Wahid el-Nur, founder and in some sense still chairman of the original Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA/M)? Abdel Wahid—a member of the Fur tribe, the largest ethnic group in Darfur—has tremendous name recognition in the camps for displaced persons, and an unquestioning following among Darfur’s civilian population. His refusal to sign the ill-conceived Darfur Peace Agreement has had the effect of making him a hero to many.
But Abdel Wahid has lost virtually all military and political following among the rebel commanders and Darfuri leaders. As a consequence, in a perverse effort to ensure his relevance at the rebel conference, Abdel Wahid has taken to issuing demands that cannot possibly be met before the convening of a peace conference:
“Abdel Wahed Mohamed el-Nur said his group would not go to Arusha or peace talks until demands were met, including compensation for victims and a no-fly zone over all of Darfur. ‘We will not be a part of Arusha until an oil-for-food programme is in place with money going to humanitarian aid,’ Nur said in a statement sent to Reuters.” (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], July 21, 2007)
But a “No Fly Zone” is militarily impracticable. Nor is there is a willingness on the part of militarily capable nations to impose a highly resource-consumptive NFZ (see my extended discussion of the military difficulties at http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article157.html). Moreover, the risks to humanitarians posed by enforcement of a NFZ are intolerably great, as is any “stand-off” military action that affords no means of protecting civilians and humanitarians from severe reprisals by Khartoum in response to such actions.
Compensation issues are of course critical in any renewed negotiations, but without a specific set of proposals to negotiate, “compensation” is simply a vague gesture toward what are certainly overwhelming grievances. Similarly, does Abdel Wahid really intend to hold peace negotiations hostage to the creation of an “oil-for-food program,” something that is utter anathema to Khartoum? These are issues to be negotiated, not set as preconditions. Security is urgently necessary for Darfur; but Abdel Wahid should be concentrating his energies on the UN Security Council resolution, pushing for a cease-fire, and doing the hard work of engaging with fellow rebel leaders. He is moving ever more dangerously into the role of spoiler.
But the ultimate obstacle to rebel unity is Khartoum. This is revealed clearly in the regime’s relentless and authoritatively chronicled bombing of rebel convening sites. Khartoum’s obstruction of rebel unity is also reflected in the continued imprisonment of Suleiman Jamous, former humanitarian coordinator for the largest rebel faction and the man most responsible for humanitarian access to remote areas in Darfur through 2006. Jamous—who fell afoul of Minni Minawi, whose faction alone signed the Darfur Peace Agreement with Khartoum—is a figure of immense stature in the rebel movement and a truly conciliatory figure. Because he has no blood on his hands and no political aspirations (he is elderly and in poor health), Jamous could serve as a highly effective conciliator among the rebels. But for precisely this reason, Khartoum keeps him imprisoned in Kadugli, southern Kordofan Province. Disgracefully, the international community allows Jamous to languish, refusing to put effective pressure on Khartoum for his release in time to help rebel unification efforts.
HUMAN SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS IN DARFUR
The time-frame for deployment of the “hybrid force” authorized by the current UN Security Council draft resolution is alarmingly dilatory. Before the force can begin to deploy, the “heavy support package” must be in place: indeed, this “second phase” of the three-part deployment is the essential preparatory stage for the large follow-on force. And yet the key elements of the “heavy support package” have not been secured or assembled, let alone deployed. Both the UN and the AU are waiting for passage of the Security Council resolution before moving to this key next stage of deployment. It is thus impossible to believe that significant deployment of the actual “hybrid force” will begin until 2008 unless there is an urgent, rolling deployment of the contemplated contingent of civilian police—almost 4,000 personnel (for a discussion of the importance of “front-loading” these key elements of a security force in Darfur, see my analysis at http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article176.html).
For the foreseeable future, Darfur’s realities will be those I describe in detail at
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article172.html
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article171.html
But events on the ground are continuous, and the threats to human and humanitarian security only grow and proliferate. Recent dispatches from the region and from aid organizations highlight some alarming developments:
[1] Human displacement continues at a highly dismaying rate, both in Darfur and in eastern Chad. A new UN report is cited in a Reuters dispatch from Khartoum (July 24, 2007):
“Violence and insecurity in Darfur has forced 25,000 more people from their homes and is straining the capacity of camps swollen with refugees fleeing conflict in western Sudan, the UN said in a report on Tuesday. ‘Aerial bombings by the [Khartoum] military continued to be reported in North Darfur up to late June [2007] while clashes between the military and rebel factions continued to be reported … in various locations,’ the United Nations said in a statement.”
“The report said in May and June a further 25,000 people fled their homes, bringing the number of camp residents in Darfur to 2.2 million. [ ] ‘A very visible consequence of the increasing pace of displacement is the increasing population of IDP camps—many of which can no longer absorb new arrivals,’ the report said.”
“The report said one aid agency was asked [by the Khartoum regime] to leave Kutum in North Darfur and that the number of aid workers in Darfur had fallen to 12,300, down 2,400 from a year ago. Access to those affected fell to 68 percent from 78 percent last year. ‘At the same time the caseload of conflict-affected populations has increased by more than half a million, to 4.2 million,’ [the report] said.”
But even the staggering figure of 2.2 million displaced into camps does not tell the full story. Approximately 240,000 Darfuris have fled to Chad as refugees, where some 175,000 Chadians have been displaced internally—most because of Khartoum-orchestrated violence. Even more significant are those Darfuris who are displaced but never end up on a camp census. The UN Integrated Regional Information Networks reports from el-Fasher, North Darfur (July 20, 2007) on the telling example of Al Salaam camp:
“Displaced people living in squalid shelters on the fringes of an official displacement camp in Sudan’s North Darfur region lack relief services as the official camp is full. Efforts by a visiting British official this week to persuade local authorities to open a new site to accommodate the overflow of Al Salaam camp near El Fasher, capital of North Darfur state, failed.”
“Dozens of displaced families said they came here about 14 months ago from villages in North Darfur, fleeing renewed fighting in the region, but were not allowed to settle in the Al Salam camp proper, which already hosts 50,000 IDPs. Humanitarian officials in the camp said it had reached its maximum capacity and could not accommodate the new arrivals, who have been reluctant to go to other sites. The additional internally displaced people (IDPs) are not entitled to the same assistance as other Al Salam residents.”
And the brutally cynical attitude of Khartoum-appointed officials? —
“The governor [of North Darfur State], claiming an improvement in security, told [British Secretary of State for International Development Douglas] Alexander ‘we want to see the camps close and the people return to their villages. These people were not displaced by recent fighting as they claim.’ ‘They moved to Al Salam from Zamzam [another IDP camp on the outskirts of El Fashir] because of administrative problems caused by some international NGOs interested in a new camp,’ the governor alleged. ‘There is no justification, logic or reason to open a new camp,’ [the governor] continued.”
We have from the British official a refreshing honesty about these viciously preposterous claims:
“Alexander felt the security concerns of the IDPs were real. ‘These people are living in genuine fear and I understand the concern that they must feel given the continuing security incidents that are taking place in the environs of this camp and more broadly across Darfur.'”
Alexander would go on to articulate the fundamental truth of the crisis in Darfur:
“‘Obviously there is continuing violence here in Darfur,’ Alexander added, pointing out that humanitarian efforts could only do so much. ‘I have also been left with a very clear sense that the humanitarian effort, important as it is, is not itself sufficient,’ he said. ‘We need to have security here on the ground in Darfur that requires both the international force … but also clear action by the government of Sudan.'”
These truths have been conspicuous for years now, and have been at various times articulated fully—by former UN Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland in particular. And yet still they do not inform the decisions of international actors.
[2] There are very recent and highly alarming reports that Khartoum is attempting to change the demography of Darfur. In fact, this effort has been in evidence for several years. Julie Flint and Alex de Waal note in their “Darfur: A Short History of a Long War”:
“The ultimate objective in Darfur is spelled out in an August 2004 directive from [Janjaweed paramount leader Musa] Hilal’s headquarters: ‘Change the demography of Darfur and empty it of African tribes.’ Confirming the control of [Khartoum’s] Military Intelligence over the Darfur file, the directive is addressed to no fewer than three intelligence services—the Intelligence and Security Department, Military Intelligence and National Security, and the ultra-secret ‘Constructive Security,’ or Amn al Ijabi.” (page 39)
But the Independent (UK) reports on July 14, 2007:
“Arabs from Chad and Niger are crossing into Darfur in ‘unprecedented’ numbers, prompting claims that the Sudanese government is trying systematically to repopulate the war- ravaged region. An internal UN report, obtained by The Independent, shows that up to 30,000 Arabs have crossed the border in the past two months. Most arrived with all their belongings and large flocks. They were greeted by Sudanese Arabs who took them to empty villages cleared by government and janjaweed forces.”
“One UN official said the process ‘appeared to have been well planned.’ The official continued: ‘This movement is very large. We have not seen such numbers come into west Darfur before.'” [ ]
“‘Most have been relocated by Sudanese Arabs to former villages of IDPs (internally displaced people) and more or less invited to stay there,’ said the UN official [from the UN High Commission for Refugees]. The arrivals have been issued with official Sudanese identity cards and awarded citizenship, and analysts say that by encouraging Arabs from Chad, Niger and other parts of Sudan to move to Darfur the Sudanese government is making it ‘virtually impossible’ for displaced people to return home.”
The genocidal “change in demography” has in many places in Darfur entered its final phase. But as The Independent also notes, these demographic ambitions could spark extremely dangerous new violence:
“If Khartoum is moving Arabs from abroad to replace them, diplomats fear that Darfur rebels may try to remove them forcibly. ‘It could be quite explosive,’ said one western diplomat. ‘It is a very serious situation.'”
This conclusion was echoed by General Martin Luther Agwai of the AU mission in Darfur:
“[Agwai] said he noticed that some villages, abandoned due to the ongoing violence, are now being occupied by cross-boarder tribes. The original inhabitants, meanwhile, live in IDP camps. He said, ‘Reoccupation of some abandoned villages by alien communities may threaten IDP’s return rights and future stability in the region.'” (The Sudan Tribune [dateline: el-Fasher, North Darfur], July 20, 2007)
But of course there is no force on the ground or in near-term prospect that can halt the brutal demographic ambitions Khartoum has made so conspicuously evident as the fifth year of genocidal counter-insurgency warfare grinds on.
[3] Famine conditions are now looming in Darfur. A recent European Union fact-finding mission issued a stark warning:
“A famine is looming in Darfur, according to members of the European Parliament who have just returned from a visit to the war-ravaged Sudanese province. [ ] This [assessment] follows a visit by five Members of the European Parliament [MEP] to Darfur from June 30 to July 6 [2007], where they witnessed first-hand the precarious conditions in which those uprooted by terror are living. Frithjof Schmidt, a German Green MEP, said that the security situation is imperilling the distribution of food aid to the 2.5 million people who have been displaced since 2003. [ ] ‘If the security situation cannot be quickly stabilised, then the aid organisations will no longer be able to provide even basic food supplies,’ said Schmidt. ‘A famine of dramatic extent is looming.'” (Inter Press Service [dateline: Brussels], July 11, 2007)
Debilitating insecurity in Darfur is daily chronicled by the UN and other humanitarian organizations, but a recent UN News Center dispatch (July 25, 2007) offers stark numbers, with terrifying implications for overall food security in the region:
“Condemning a sharp escalation in attacks on humanitarian staff and relief convoys in Sudan’s Darfur region, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) warned today that violence is hampering its ability to deliver assistance to millions of hungry people there.”
“‘In the last two weeks, nine food convoys have been attacked by gunmen across Darfur,’ said Kenro Oshidari, World Food Program Sudan Representative. ‘WFP staff and contractors are being stopped at gunpoint, dragged out of their vehicles and robbed with alarming frequency.'”
“Mr. Oshidari called on all parties to the conflict in Darfur to guarantee the safety of humanitarian workers so that the UN food agency and other aid organizations can continue helping Sudanese who rely on outside assistance for survival. ‘These abhorrent attacks, which target the very people who are trying to help the most vulnerable in Darfur, must be brought under control,’ he added.”
“So far this year, 18 WFP food convoys have been attacked by gunmen and four of WFP’s light vehicles carjacked. Six WFP vehicles, including trucks and light vehicles, have been stolen and 10 staff, including contractors, have been either detained or abducted. [ ] A lack of security has prevented WFP from reaching 170,000 people in June in what the agency termed in a news release a ‘sizeable increase from the lowest point last March [2007] when 60,000 could not be reached.'”
Finally, an overview of the security conditions in Darfur was recently provided to this writer by Eltigani Ateem Seisi, the exceedingly well-informed former governor of Darfur:
“The security situation [in Darfur] has deteriorated rapidly. This morning [July 24, 2007] more than 30 people have died as a result of clashes between the Ababal and the Tarjam [tribes]. The major towns are now effectively under the siege of the Janjaweed. Gunfire during the night in the big towns is a common phenomenon and the Janjaweed are now openly marauding in towns with their 4×4 Landcruisers. The Arabs from West Africa have moved in thousands into Darfur with the help of Government of Sudan and have occupied the Fur lands.” (email to this writer, received July 24, 2007)
CHINA/KHARTOUM
This is the context in which to understand China’s cynical calculations about how much it must appear to do concerning Darfur to avoid incurring additional advocacy wrath over its complicity in ongoing genocide. That such cynicism is so conspicuously the driving force in China’s “Darfur policy” only encourages Khartoum to cleave to its present course of intransigent refusal to allow the international community to protect those civilians the regime remains bent on destroying or displacing.
But the broader international community, which has no excuse for not seeing precisely what is occurring, must bear ultimate responsibility for this ongoing catastrophe. Indeed, continuing posturing and diffidence and rhetorical bluster at this point simply confirm moral failure. And before the year is out, if security conditions do not improve—in ways nowhere in evidence—mortality will accelerate dramatically in most of Darfur, and we may be witnesses to a genocidal toll that will exceed that for Rwanda, 13 years ago. This is failure beyond words or redemption. This is the truest meaning of “never again.”