No evidence from the UN, US, or Europeans (Part 2 of a two-part analysis)
March 31, 2005
The signs of a deteriorating humanitarian situation continue to be evident everywhere in Darfur: from acute water shortages in some of the largest camps for displaced persons (see below), to the security pull-back of UN personnel in West Darfur, to the Janjaweed shooting of a worker for the US Agency for International Development near Bulbul in South Darfur, to meningitis in North Darfur and dysentery in South Darfur, to an excessive reliance on very expensive air transport for food delivery. And at virtually every point, the food, health, and transport issues defining this vast humanitarian crisis are directly related to a lack of security.
In turn, this insecurity derives from the Khartoum regime’s refusal, despite a UN Security Council “demand,” to control the Janjaweed militia. Moreover, Khartoum refuses to stand down militarily and in fact is engaged in a large-scale military build-up in West Darfur. The insurgency movements for their part are increasingly fractured and unrealistic in their diplomatic expectations; they have also become desperate for food, fuel, and supplies, and their resulting actions often betray the people of Darfur. At the same time, diplomatic progress is non-existent: more than three months after the collapse of African Union-mediated talks in Abuja (Nigeria) there is still no date for resumed peace negotiations.
Caught in a maelstrom of violence, deprivation, and brutal destruction are more than 3 million Darfuri civilians. Almost 400,000 have already perished from violence, disease, and malnutrition in more than two years of conflict and displacement (see March 11, 2005 mortality assessment by this writer at http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=44&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0). Hundreds of thousands more will die cruel deaths in the coming months and years unless there is urgent humanitarian intervention, with all necessary military support. The tasks of such intervention are clearly far beyond the abilities and capacity of the African Union, even if it had the political will to demand of Khartoum a mandate that included civilian protection. Instead, under the cynical leadership of Nigeria, the AU remains content with a force size dramatically inadequate to the security needs of Darfur and an official mandate merely to monitor a non-existent cease-fire.
Truly meaningful international response is now so belated that it is increasingly difficult to see how the mortality total for Darfur will not eventually exceed that of the Rwandan genocide, whose grim anniversary (April 7th) is fast approaching. Last year’s tenth anniversary produced a large outpouring of commentary that linked events in Darfur to international acquiescence in the slaughter of 1994. A full year later those links are all the more conspicuous, and all the more shaming. Despite this, there are no signs that international leaders—in the UN, the US, or Europe—are willing to intervene to protect civilians in Darfur, though they are as vulnerable to famine, disease, and the Janjaweed as the Tutsis and moderate Hutus of Rwanda were vulnerable to the violence inspired by the Interahamwe.
We have failed Darfur and as has been the case for many months, the only issue is the scale of that moral failure. For though catastrophe cannot be averted, it could still be mitigated with urgent intervention (see Part 1 of this analysis: http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=46&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0).
THE U.S. EFFORT: KEEP THE ISSUE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION FROM ARISING
Shamefully, recent comments by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice give clear indication of how little the US is willing to address directly the issue of humanitarian intervention. Rice was asked by Washington Post journalists, “how many peacekeepers do you think it would take to stop the genocide in Darfur?” Rice’s response:
“SECRETARY RICE: I can’t give a number. The problem right now is that we’ve got to find a way to leverage the north-south agreement—” (Washington Post, March 25, 2005)
As critically important as the north/south agreement is, few think that it will survive unless the crisis in Darfur is addressed effectively. Nor can the north/south agreement in itself be a means for civilian protection in Darfur, or even provide diplomatic incentive for the Khartoum regime to negotiate meaningfully. On the contrary, Khartoum is convinced that the international community is so intent on preserving the north/south agreement that there will be little pressure on the regime to halt genocide in Darfur. The weak set of sanctions and nominal “arms embargo” that were part of yesterday’s UN Security Council resolution (March 30, 2005) largely confirm this cynical assessment, despite the contrived outrage by Khartoum’s UN ambassador.
But let us be clear about the meaning of Secretary Rice’s response to the Washington Post: in refusing to answer directly a very specific question about stopping genocide in Darfur, and immediately changing the subject to the north/south agreement, she makes clear that this is not so much a question for which she “can’t” provide an answer, but rather one she simply refuses to answer.
On eventually returning to the question about the force needed in Darfur, Rice declared:
“The [African Union] ceiling is 3,400 and the AU has said they’d like to go to five or six thousand. I think we ought to try to fully realize that.”
But of course a force of 6,000—especially lacking a mandate to protect civilians—is dramatically inadequate to the security needs of Darfur, and the Washington Post questioner persisted: “But hence my question. I mean, if you go to six thousand would that be enough?”
Rice’s response tells us all too much about the Bush administration’s refusal to consider humanitarian intervention, even as it becomes increasingly clear that without such intervention Mr. Bush will oversee precisely the genocide of which he declared early in his first administration: “not on my watch” (referring to a memo on the Clinton administration failure to respond to genocide in Rwanda).
“SECRETARY RICE: Well, [the AU] is a monitoring mechanism that has a chance of making a big difference as even a small monitoring mechanism has made.”
This is at once partially accurate and cynically deceptive. For the AU force is indeed merely a “monitoring mechanism,” not a means of civilian protection. The AU is tasked with “monitoring” a cease-fire that has never had any real meaning since first negotiated on April 8, 2004 and essentially reiterated November 9, 2004. But more importantly, the AU has made a significant difference only in the very few pockets in which it has been able to deploy some of the 2,200 personnel who have taken half a year to reach Darfur.
Yet again the Washington Post questioner persisted, only to be met again with deliberate obfuscation and cynicism:
“WASHINGTON POST: [Jan Egeland, UN Humanitarian Coordinator] said in December to the Financial Times that if the deterioration of humanitarian access continued, he could imagine 100,000 people dying a month, which would put the number at about six times the death toll in 2004. Does that sound like a plausible—”
“SECRETARY RICE: I just can’t judge. We spend every day trying to avoid the problem, trying to solve the problem.” (Washington Post, March 25, 2005)
But course Rice and the Bush administration must judge: judgment involving the fate of many hundreds of thousands of lives at risk cannot be deferred. If Egeland is right—if insecurity may force the withdrawal of humanitarian aid workers, and result in as many as 100,000 deaths every month—this is not a matter on which judgment can wait. The “problem,” as the Washington Post question makes perfectly clear, is one that hinges on civilian and humanitarian protection. The “problem” cannot be “avoided”: it is already upon the people of Darfur and the humanitarian workers attempting to operate under intolerable security conditions.
This is the real meaning of the near-fatal wounding of a US Agency for International Development worker by the Janjaweed near Bulbul on the road between Kass and Nyala, in an area where the Janjaweed are very reliably reported to have increased their presence in the days immediately prior to the shooting.
Nothing could be clearer than that Secretary Rice is unwilling to address directly or honestly questions about civilian security in Darfur and the importance of security for humanitarian operations. In turn, there is no willingness to speak honestly about the severe limitations of the AU force or the need for international humanitarian intervention.
Indeed, a measure of how far the Bush administration is willing to go in keeping humanitarian intervention out of policy discussions can be discerned in uncritical support for Nigeria as current AU Chair. A well-positioned and highly reliable government source reports authoritatively that the Bush administration has fulsomely and uncritically (though of course not publicly) commended the Nigerians for their Darfur “leadership.” This is not because Nigeria has led helpfully, but rather because Nigeria cleaves most insistently to the notion of “African solutions for African problems,” thereby obviating the need for the US to articulate a role in any intervention.
So long as this perverse insistence prevails—and so long as Nigeria remains insufficiently challenged by countries like Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda, Kenya, Cameroon, Mozambique, South Africa—then Darfur is well on its way to becoming a terrible measure of just how badly Africa can fail Africans.
For the painfully obvious fact cannot be too often stated in the context of ongoing ethnically-targeted human destruction in Darfur: the present AU force of 2,200 personnel, or even the contemplated 6,000 AU personnel, cannot possibly undertake the essential civilian protection tasks now so urgently evident. To suggest otherwise, as Rice attempts to do, is to allow us to see the insidious ways in which the people of Darfur will be abandoned to the Janjaweed, to famine, to indefinite life in camps that are slow killing grounds.
But there is little evidence that the UN or the Europeans are any more willing than the US to address honestly the security needs that press ever more insistently on Darfuris and humanitarian operations in Darfur. A press statement accompanying the release of a highly important new report from the UK House of Commons, International Development Committee (“Darfur, Sudan: The responsibility to protect,” March 30, 2005) declares all too accurately that the international response to Darfur has been “scandalously ineffective”:
“[This] report points to a catalogue of failings by the international community—by governments including the UK’s, by the humanitarian system and by the UN Security Council. Early warnings about the emerging crisis [in Darfur] were ignored, humanitarian agencies were slow to respond, responsibilities for helping displaced people and managing camps were unclear, and the UN suffered from an avoidable leadership vacuum in Sudan at a critical time.”
Even so, the Blair government still refuses to take a serious leadership role in addressing the various issues raised by this authoritative new report on Darfur, indeed has already responded defensively. Certainly no country or international actor is responsibly articulating the essential civilian and humanitarian protection issues that must be addressed if the world is to halt the destruction of additional hundreds of thousands of lives (the Committee Report offers a mortality figure of approximately 300,000, page 3).
Any honest enumeration of security tasks works to highlight the gross inadequacy of the currently deployed AU force, and the overall inability of the AU Peace and Security Commission—with present resources—to respond in anything like appropriate fashion:
 Provision of security to the scores of camps for displaced persons, with security perimeters that allow for the collection of firewood, food, and animal fodder;
 Securing all humanitarian corridors to and within Darfur, both by means of active patrols and accompanying security details for all convoys requesting protection;
 The opening of safe passage routes from rural areas currently beyond the reach of humanitarian operations, thereby allowing the free movement of people who have depleted food reserves;
 The dismantling of checkpoints on key road arteries, many of which are now maintained by bandits and other lawless elements;
 Provision of safe passage and protection to civilians who wish to return to their villages, or the sites of their former villages, in order to resume agriculturally productive lives.
Other key military tasks include:
 Given the conspicuous impracticability of enforcing a conventional “no-fly zone”—Chad will not permit deployment of the requisite aircraft on its territory; Khartoum’s helicopter gunships fly too low for meaningful AWACS coverage; and Antonovs are used for both military and civilian purposes, and cannot be distinguished in their purpose from the air—forces on the ground in Darfur must mechanically disable or destroy any military aircraft implicated in violations of international law, in particular attacks on civilian targets. Alternatively, Khartoum must be given an ultimatum: “Remove all military aircraft from the Darfur region or they will be destroyed on the ground by unmanned aerial military assets.”
 Most importantly, cantonment and eventual disarmament of the Janjaweed, per the “demand” of UN Security Resolution 1556 (July 30, 2004). Until the international community makes good on this singular “demand,” the Janjaweed will continue to be a savagely effective weapon of civilian terror.
Khartoum discerns all too accurately in the UN’s unwillingness to enforce this “demand” an appropriate gauge for measuring commitment to the modest sanctions regime and ineffective “arms embargo” contained in yesterday’s Security Council resolution. The resolution creates a Council Committee that is supposed to monitor the “arms embargo” (sure to be ignored by Khartoum’s most aggressive arms providers, Russia and China—who both abstained in the resolution vote). The Council Committee is also tasked with designating individuals “who impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities,” violate prior embargoes, “or are responsible for offensive military overflights”:
“Governments should freeze the funds, financial assets and economic resources of these individuals in their countries, as well as the assets of the entities those individuals own, the Council said.” (UN News Center, March 30, 2005)
But for anyone who understands the National Islamic Front (NIF), it is patently clear that these measures will simply not change genocidal calculations among the ruthless survivalists who make up this regime; nor will such measures do anything to change the behavior of the Janjaweed, most of whom are unlikely ever to learn of yesterday’s actions in New York.
Compounding the weakness of the Security Council resolution is an inexcusably expansive time-frame, reflecting a refusal to accept the urgency of the catastrophe in Darfur:
“The Council asked Secretary-General Kofi Annan, within 30 days of the approval of the resolution, to appoint for six months a four-member Panel of Experts based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to travel regularly to El-Fasher and other locations in Sudan. The Panel should report back within 90 days of the approval of the resolution and submit a final report no later than 30 days before its mandate expires.” (UN News Center, March 30, 2005)
Such leisure is at once wholly inappropriate to the critical nature of Darfur’s needs, and suggestive of how thoroughly unlikely any more urgent or vigorous response by the UN has become.
AN ICC REFERRAL AND CIVILIAN PROTECTION
Violent human destruction and genocide by attrition continue in Darfur, even as the international community refuses to talk meaningfully about an intervening force that might halt violence and improve security for humanitarian operations. For their part, some human rights groups have also found a way to avoid the central issue in Darfur, viz. civilian and humanitarian protection. For by focusing so exclusively on a referral of Darfur’s war crimes to the International Criminal Court, a few of these groups reveal themselves to believe that such referral is an end in itself, an actual means of civilian protection. A Human Rights Watch (HRW) release of March 24, 2005 is only the most unhappily revealing, with its claim that the threat of prosecution at the ICC “could immediately deter further violence in Darfur” (HRW [Brussels], “US Thwarts Justice for Darfur,” March 24, 2005).
There is simply no evidence that this is the case, and in its overstatement the HRW claim is little more than an expedient effort to achieve legitimacy for the ICC (which this writer strongly supports, including as the venue for violations of international law in Darfur). By focusing so exclusively on the issue of criminal venue—at the expense of advocacy for intervention that might truly “deter further violence in Darfur”—HRW has allowed a broader political agenda to trump real concern for the civilians of Darfur.
Moreover, there seems to be a willingness by HRW and others to ignore the basic political and diplomatic realities that govern the thinking of Khartoum’s genocidaires. For why would men such as First Vice President Ali Osman Taha, Head of Security Saleh ‘Gosh,’ Interior Minister Abdel Rahman Mohamed Hussein, and many others—already under sealed indictment for massive crimes against humanity—feel that they have anything to risk by committing further crimes in Darfur? How could their culpability possibly increase? How, then, can there be a deterrent effect?
We may be sure that only forcible extradition will ever see those most guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity in Darfur delivered to The Hague—and forcible extradition will occur only if the regime falls. Adamant comments from senior NIF officials have repeatedly (and here quite plausibly) made clear that they will allow no Sudanese to be tried abroad. Support for this position exists within both the Arab League and the AU, only encouraging Khartoum’s intransigence.
In short, there is nothing credible about HRW’s argument for deterrence; it ends by becoming another way of avoiding meaningful discussion of what will truly deter violence: robust humanitarian intervention with all necessary military support. To be sure, HRW is far from alone in refusing to offer a frank assessment of the inadequacy of the AU force, as well as the political failure of the AU to push for a clear civilian protection mandate. But in suggesting that there is an alternative means of halting the violence, in the form of an ICC referral for war crimes in Darfur, the organization actually works against the possibilities of true civilian protection.
It is finally not surprising in this context that we find greater honesty coming from some of the humanitarian organizations that are actually operating in Darfur, and attempting to save lives amidst intolerable security risks:
“Oxfam believes that by agreeing governments’ responsibilities to protect civilians, and clear criteria for UN-authorized military intervention as a last resort, the international community could make significant strides towards ending the obscene levels of civilian suffering in today’s conflict zones.
‘From Rwanda to Darfur, the United Nations system has time and again failed to mobilise the political will and funds needed to protect civilians,’ said Oxfam’s [Nicola] Reindorp. ‘Ultimately governments have the power and the responsibility to act to save lives.'” (Oxfam press release [New York], March 21, 2005)
These powerful words reflect essential truths about Darfur. Will they be heeded? It appears extremely unlikely, though there may be a slow (and no doubt exuberantly praised) increase in the size of the AU force.
Here we must recall yet again that it has required half a year to deploy 2,200 personnel–inadequately equipped and supplied—and without a civilian protection mandate. Moreover, AU administrative capacity in Addis Ababa headquarters is still clearly inadequate to this operation, as are AU logistics and transport capacity. The mooted increase in the size of the AU force (to 6,000 personnel), and the recent proposals from the UN’s Jan Pronk and Jan Egeland for an AU force only slightly larger (8,000-9000 personnel), represent a refusal to accept honestly the violent realities in Darfur—or the real scale of humanitarian need, especially in the form of increased security for humanitarian workers and operations.
HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS AND INSECURITY
Without humanitarian intervention that vastly exceeds what has been proposed by the AU or the UN (see detailed analysis by this writer at http://www.sudanreeves.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=46&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0), we must assess humanitarian conditions going forward on the basis of current capacity and the relentless increase in conflict-affected persons. Moreover, as the rainy season approaches (June through September), logistical and transport shortcomings that are even now evident will become overwhelming, and the possibilities for immensely destructive epidemics from water-borne diseases will increase dramatically in hopelessly overcrowded camps for displaced persons (who have essentially doubled in number since the start of last year’s rainy season).
The most recent (and truncated) UN Darfur Humanitarian Profile is offered as both Nos. 11 and 12 (March 1, 2005). Data in this Profile(s) reflect only accessible populations, those captured statistically primarily by UN World Food Program registrations. Using these data, the UN concludes that the number of conflict-affected persons has increased by only about 50,000 since January 1, 2005 (the date of record for Profile No. 10), to 2.45 million people. Significantly, this figure does not include the Darfuri refugee population in eastern Chad (approximately 200,000 according to the UN High Commission for Refugees); nor does it include the highly distressed populations in rural areas that are presently beyond humanitarian reach (as many as 1 million additional people).
Though we may be sure that much of this rural population is desperate for humanitarian assistance, and that food reserves are increasingly exhausted, insecurity in the form of an unconstrained Janjaweed presence makes safe passage impossible for many of these people. Creating such safe passage is one of the most urgent tasks for a humanitarian intervention force.
The static nature of the UN reporting for both “conflict-affected” persons and Internally Displaced Persons (unchanged since January 1, 2005 at approximately 1.85 million) strongly suggests the limitations of the data presented. For January was an extraordinarily violent month, with many reports from the ground suggesting displacement far greater than what is reflected in WFP registrations. A more useful guide is the authoritatively researched new House of Commons report, which speaks of a population in need of humanitarian assistance “that looks likely to rise to 4 million over the course of 2005,” page 3).
To be sure, Khartoum is blocking deployment of UN World Health Organization mortality epidemiologists; and as Profile Nos. 11/12 suggest, Khartoum is also impeding humanitarian activities:
“Increasing levels of harassment, detentions, accusations through national media outlets and others security incidents involving relief workers are placing further strains on humanitarian operations. Though responsible for the overwhelming majority of incidents, the Government of Sudan is not the only party guilty of intimidating humanitarians and denying Darfurians access to humanitarian assistance.” [The insurgency groups are here criticized] (UN Darfur Humanitarian Profile Nos.11/12, page 5)
Such deliberate obstruction and intimidation of relief efforts will not end without a robust intervening force. Indeed, as the Profile explicitly declares: “Security is currently the paramount factor limiting the delivery of humanitarian aid” (page 5). This simply will not change without humanitarian intervention, and to wish it otherwise, or prefer further “negotiations” with Khartoum, is simply to acquiesce before the genocidal ambitions of a regime that senses a ghastly victory. For within as little as another half-year, genocide by attrition will see the overwhelming majority of African populations in Darfur displaced and dispossessed, killed, or threatened with chronic food shortages.
The larger agricultural economy has collapsed (threatening all of Darfur’s populations), and food markets are experiencing exorbitant inflation that will make it impossible for increasing numbers of displaced and non-displaced persons to purchase food. Food dependency, the warehousing of human beings in large camps characterized by appalling conditions, insufficient water (see below), and gradual cultural extinction define the bleak future for as many as 4 million Darfuris. This is the outlook for Darfur without humanitarian intervention.
WATER IN DARFUR: A DIMINISHING COMMODITY
Despite many months of humanitarian deployment and effort, over 40% of the people in displaced persons camps have no access to clean water (Darfur Humanitarian Profile Nos. 11/12, page 7). In a related issue of gravest concern, approximately a third of the camp populations have no access to sanitary facilities. This latter shortcoming will have enormous consequences in the coming rainy season (June through September) when many of these camps will again become open sewers, with tremendous increases in the risk from water-borne diseases.
A shortage in clean water derives from the extraordinarily difficult circumstances of present humanitarian operations in Darfur (which is experiencing a severe drought), and the intolerable overcrowding produced by pervasive, extreme insecurity. Voice of America provides a recent account of telling problems in Kalma Camp, South Darfur:
“Aid workers say people living in the largest displaced persons camp in [Darfur] are facing serious water shortages, primarily because of a severe drought in the area. A senior program officer at the UN children’s agency, Marc Salvail, tells VOA that Kalma camp, which contains as many as 150,000 people who have fled fighting in the war-torn region, is running short of water. He says the water shortage is causing major problems in the camp. ‘You have a lot of cases of diarrhea, you have a lot of cases of skin diseases due to the fact that water is not sufficient,’ Salvail said. ‘When you do not have sufficient water, people may not use water to wash their hands after going to the toilet. People also wash less frequently. So a lot of diseases are transmitted because of this.'”
“Salvail says each person in the camp should get a minimum of 20 liters of water a day for personal use. But most people are getting 10 to 15 liters a day. He says water supplies are only catering for about 60% of the population, with the remaining 40% not having access to safe drinking water.” (VOA, March 16, 2005)
The Christian Science Monitor also recently reported on the water crisis in the camps, and the violence it has sparked among people who are getting far less water than humanly required:
“Aziz Rahman Azizi, an Afghan water-sanitation engineer working for Doctors Without Borders [said], ‘This is the middle of the dry season, and it is getting hot. These people have been getting about six liters a day. The minimum should be 10 liters,’ he says. ‘Of course [these camp residents] are frustrated; we have not expanded our water supplies since November, when there were only 80,000 people here,’ [Azizi] says. Now 150,000 inhabitants share one well, five boreholes, and 18 hand pumps that usually run dry by sunset.” (CSM [South Darfur], March 14, 2005)
Drought, severe camp overcrowding because of pervasive insecurity, Khartoum’s obstructionism, and the ongoing threat to humanitarian workers: in the extremely arid environment of Darfur this ensures that lack of adequate clean water now serves as yet another instrument of genocide by attrition, yet another means by which the regime is “deliberately inflicting on the [African tribal populations of Darfur] conditions of life calculated to bring about [their] physical destruction, in whole or in part.”
CHALLENGES OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENION
Absent international will to intervene, large-scale genocide in Darfur will proceed unchecked. Present humanitarian efforts, though heroic, are not enough; current humanitarian capacity is already overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of displaced persons, and logistical and transport difficulties will increase dramatically during the impending rainy season. Another primary planting season (late spring/early summer) will be lost, ensuring that there is no fall harvest. The size of the food-dependent population confronting humanitarian efforts for the foreseeable future will be far in excess of 2 million, even as present capacity has stalled around 1.5 million—only approximately half those in need within Darfur itself.
No successful humanitarian intervention can afford to ignore the possibility that the insurgency groups will attempt to take military advantage of any deployment of an appropriate number of troops, viz. those required for the civilian and humanitarian protection measures outlined above. But this needn’t oblige a mindless military neutrality: the mission should be defined by the needs of civilians and humanitarian operations; military responses to Khartoum’s regular military forces, the Janjaweed, and the insurgents should be proportional to their interference with this primary mission of human protection.
Nor can such intervention afford to ignore what will likely be Khartoum’s effort to retaliate for a claimed intrusion upon its “national sovereignty.” But the regime long ago surrendered any claim of national sovereignty with its obdurate refusal to protect its own civilians. As part of any humanitarian intervention, a highly robust and mobile military force, with aggressive rules of engagement, must be deployed quickly to react to any retaliatory attacks by the Janjaweed against civilians or humanitarian workers.
The ominous foreign presence in Darfur—Yemeni, Saudi, Jordanian, Iraqi—that has been reported by several authoritative sources can be expected to engage in terrorist activities and must be actively confronted. Khartoum must be put on forceful notice that it will be held accountable for not only its own military actions and interference, but those of the Janjaweed and any other non-regular military presence allied with Khartoum.
The world is choosing to skirt these challenges, relying instead on the fiction of near-term “diplomatic progress” and expedient arguments that the African Union can somehow provide adequate human security in Darfur. Such fiction and expediency, along with the dilatory proceedings at the UN, provide an all too appropriate backdrop for next week’s grim anniversary of the Rwandan genocide.
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