“The chances for peace in Sudan: assessing the Danforth mission”
John Danforth, President Bush’s special envoy for Sudan, has returned to the region as part of continuing US efforts to halt the most destructive conflict in Africa. Already his return mission has encountered disturbing military actions by Khartoum that suggest just how far the National Islamic Front regime is from good faith peace negotiations. UN personnel are reporting that Khartoum’s military forces in the Nuba Mountains have violated the regional cease-fire that has been the focus of Danforth’s most intensive efforts. Given the significance that had been attached to this limited cease-fire initiative, Khartoum’s violation is highly significant. In this immediate context, a trenchant and highly informed account of the current status of Danforth’s mission has been published by John Prendergast, formerly a senior official in the Africa Bureau of the US State Department and the National Security Council.
Eric Reeves [January 14, 2002]
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
413-585-3326
ereeves@smith.edu
Prendergast offers an incisive analysis of the key issues governing Danforth’s effort. He is detailed, measured, and persuasive in his account of the history and present requirements of a peace process for Sudan. He highlights the significant promise of the present moment, even as he cautions that success will come only if the US leads the way in crafting an effective peace process. He stresses that the important humanitarian “confidence-building measures” that have so far defined the Danforth mission are not sufficient unto themselves. Indeed, he persuasively argues that they carry significant risks if they are perceived as a substitute for the fashioning of a longer-term policy and a robust, US-led strategy for an effective peace process. His report can be found at:
http://www.csis.org/africa/ANotes/index.htm
Events of the past few days bear out some of the cautionary warnings Prendergast articulates. Ominously, special envoy Danforth was forced to omit a stop in Asmara (Eritrea) in order to fly immediately to Khartoum. The change in plans “followed reports from United Nations personnel” that Khartoum’s army has violated the Nuba Mountain cease-fire—a cease-fire that Danforth’s team had earlier negotiated with both Khartoum and the southern opposition (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan 13, 2002; from the region). Further, a “U.S. official traveling with Danforth said the Eritrean stop had been scrapped because Danforth wanted assurances immediately from Sudan’s government that the cease-fire agreement would be honored” (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan 13, 2002).
It should be recalled that at the time of Danforth’s first trip to the region, Khartoum’s forces shelled the airstrip in the Nuba Mountains to be used by Danforth and his team. Indeed, the shelling came on the very eve of Danforth’s departure for Sudan.
Almost simultaneously, the Social Communications office of the Catholic Diocese of Torit (Eastern Equatoria) has reported that on January 10, 2002 Khartoum’s Antonov bombers attacked the civilian villages of Hiyala, Murahatiha, and Tirrangore. Eight bombs were dropped on the village of Murahatiha, four on Tirrangore, and thirteen on Hiyala. Damage was considerable. These are apparently the first bombings in Eastern Equatoria this year, but there is every reason to believe there will be many more. Authoritative reports from the ground in Bahr el-Ghazal indicate that Mading Achoot, a location few kilometers from Malualkon, has also recently been bombed (January 6, 2002). The timing of these bombings, given Danforth’s presence in the region, is telling, since the ending of aerial bombardment of civilian targets was also to have been one of his four “confidence-building measures.”
As Prendergast reminds us, “No agreement has yet been reached on the issue of the bombing of civilian targets.” What this means is that Khartoum has not agreed to halt the savage aerial assaults on civilians and international relief aid—and certainly has refused to allow for international monitoring of this barbaric feature of their war efforts. (The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army of course readily agreed to this proposal: it has no military aircraft.) Prendergast rightly notes that Human Rights Watch “has developed a sensible list of requirements for a credible monitoring system.”
Tragically, there seems little likelihood of such a monitoring system being deployed. Indeed, as Prendergast also notes, Khartoum’s recent purchase of advanced MiG-29 military aircraft “will only heighten the tactical imperative of [civilian bombings].” As context, it should be recalled that the UN Special Rapporteur for Sudan, Gerhart Baum, devoted twenty paragraphs of his September 2001 report to the General Assembly to Khartoum’s “indiscriminate bombing of civilians” in the south and other marginalized areas of Sudan. He was speaking only of the period from April to July of 2001.
With respect to the third of Danforth’s “confidence-building measures,” the ending of slavery in Sudan as part of the regime’s war effort, Khartoum continues to deny that slavery exists. It does so despite voluminous and authoritative reporting by human rights groups that makes abundantly clear that slavery does exist and is a calculated part of Khartoum’s war effort.
“Abduction” seems to be the most commonly deployed euphemizing term for the appalling reality of human chattel slavery, and so it has gained considerable currency. But whatever term we use, as Prendergast bluntly notes, “reports of successive UN human rights rapporteurs spell out clear evidence of slavery [despite Khartoum’s denials].”
Indeed, Special Rapporteur Baum declares in his most recent report to the General Assembly: “The Government [of Sudan] needs to exercise all its influence on the Murahaleen who are responsible for human rights abuses such as mass killings, torture, rape and abductions [mainly in northern Bahr el-Ghazal province in the south]. The Government of the Sudan shares responsibility, because the Sudanese army tolerates these human rights abuses, integrates the Murahaleen in its military actions and in part finances, equips and deploys them” (September 2001 report to the General Assembly, Paragraph 110).
The one key topic Prendergast does not address in detail here is the issue of southern self-determination (though he does so in his important forthcoming book on Sudan, “God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan”; International Crisis Group, January 2002). A referendum on southern self-determination is the linchpin of the “Declaration of Principles,” which in turn has anchored the now moribund Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) peace process. In sharp contrast, the Libyan-Egyptian Joint Initiative (LEI) pointedly, deliberately omits any possibility for self-determination; indeed, the LEI is largely a diplomatic ploy to deny southern self-determination.
Given these realities, Prendergast is importantly right to note that:
“The absence of a peace process, which the warring parties take seriously and to which these confidence-building measure could be tied [], is a major missing element of the Danforth initiative. It ends up putting the cart before the horse, pushing on the cart before a horse has been identified. Simply building on an exhausted IGAD process and a severely problematic Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative is a poor substitute for a real process for which the United States must take some leadership and responsibility.”
At the same time, any peace process that does not address squarely the central issue of self-determination will soon find itself also consigned to the category of “severely problematic,” and will have no chance of bringing any of the representative southern constituencies to the peace table. Identifying the modalities for negotiating self-determination will require diplomatic intelligence and resourcefulness; it will also be an essential feature of any meaningful peace process.
So far Danforth has not begun to address the issue in a substantive fashion. Rather, he speaks in terms that verge on evasion:
“I think the feeling on the part of Kenya, of Egypt—of virtually everyone except some in the south of Sudan—is that if self-determination means a separate country it’s a bad idea. The goal here is not to fracture a country; it’s to provide real guarantees that people are not going to be oppressed” (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan 13, 2002).
The question that Danforth has so far not usefully answered is what positive meaning southern self-determination might have in peace negotiations. Unless the US commits itself to a peace process that will address this fundamental issue, it has little chance of success.
“The chances for peace in Sudan: assessing the Danforth mission”
John Danforth, President Bush’s special envoy for Sudan, has returned to the region as part of continuing US efforts to halt the most destructive conflict in Africa. Already his return mission has encountered disturbing military actions by Khartoum that suggest just how far the National Islamic Front regime is from good faith peace negotiations. UN personnel are reporting that Khartoum’s military forces in the Nuba Mountains have violated the regional cease-fire that has been the focus of Danforth’s most intensive efforts. Given the significance that had been attached to this limited cease-fire initiative, Khartoum’s violation is highly significant. In this immediate context, a trenchant and highly informed account of the current status of Danforth’s mission has been published by John Prendergast, formerly a senior official in the Africa Bureau of the US State Department and the National Security Council.
Eric Reeves [January 14, 2002]
Smith College ereeves@smith.edu
Northampton, MA 01063 413-585-3326
Prendergast offers an incisive analysis of the key issues governing Danforth’s effort. He is detailed, measured, and persuasive in his account of the history and present requirements of a peace process for Sudan. He highlights the significant promise of the present moment, even as he cautions that success will come only if the US leads the way in crafting an effective peace process. He stresses that the important humanitarian “confidence-building measures” that have so far defined the Danforth mission are not sufficient unto themselves. Indeed, he persuasively argues that they carry significant risks if they are perceived as a substitute for the fashioning of a longer-term policy and a robust, US-led strategy for an effective peace process. His report can be found at:
http://www.csis.org/africa/ANotes/index.htm
Events of the past few days bear out some of the cautionary warnings Prendergast articulates. Ominously, special envoy Danforth was forced to omit a stop in Asmara (Eritrea) in order to fly immediately to Khartoum. The change in plans “followed reports from United Nations personnel” that Khartoum’s army has violated the Nuba Mountain cease-fire—a cease-fire that Danforth’s team had earlier negotiated with both Khartoum and the southern opposition (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan 13, 2002; from the region). Further, a “U.S. official traveling with Danforth said the Eritrean stop had been scrapped because Danforth wanted assurances immediately from Sudan’s government that the cease-fire agreement would be honored” (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan 13, 2002).
It should be recalled that at the time of Danforth’s first trip to the region, Khartoum’s forces shelled the airstrip in the Nuba Mountains to be used by Danforth and his team. Indeed, the shelling came on the very eve of Danforth’s departure for Sudan.
Almost simultaneously, the Social Communications office of the Catholic Diocese of Torit (Eastern Equatoria) has reported that on January 10, 2002 Khartoum’s Antonov bombers attacked the civilian villages of Hiyala, Murahatiha, and Tirrangore. Eight bombs were dropped on the village of Murahatiha, four on Tirrangore, and thirteen on Hiyala. Damage was considerable. These are apparently the first bombings in Eastern Equatoria this year, but there is every reason to believe there will be many more. Authoritative reports from the ground in Bahr el-Ghazal indicate that Mading Achoot, a location few kilometers from Malualkon, has also recently been bombed (January 6, 2002). The timing of these bombings, given Danforth’s presence in the region, is telling, since the ending of aerial bombardment of civilian targets was also to have been one of his four “confidence-building measures.”
As Prendergast reminds us, “No agreement has yet been reached on the issue of the bombing of civilian targets.” What this means is that Khartoum has not agreed to halt the savage aerial assaults on civilians and international relief aid—and certainly has refused to allow for international monitoring of this barbaric feature of their war efforts. (The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army of course readily agreed to this proposal: it has no military aircraft.) Prendergast rightly notes that Human Rights Watch “has developed a sensible list of requirements for a credible monitoring system.”
Tragically, there seems little likelihood of such a monitoring system being deployed. Indeed, as Prendergast also notes, Khartoum’s recent purchase of advanced MiG-29 military aircraft “will only heighten the tactical imperative of [civilian bombings].” As context, it should be recalled that the UN Special Rapporteur for Sudan, Gerhart Baum, devoted twenty paragraphs of his September 2001 report to the General Assembly to Khartoum’s “indiscriminate bombing of civilians” in the south and other marginalized areas of Sudan. He was speaking only of the period from April to July of 2001.
With respect to the third of Danforth’s “confidence-building measures,” the ending of slavery in Sudan as part of the regime’s war effort, Khartoum continues to deny that slavery exists. It does so despite voluminous and authoritative reporting by human rights groups that makes abundantly clear that slavery does exist and is a calculated part of Khartoum’s war effort.
“Abduction” seems to be the most commonly deployed euphemizing term for the appalling reality of human chattel slavery, and so it has gained considerable currency. But whatever term we use, as Prendergast bluntly notes, “reports of successive UN human rights rapporteurs spell out clear evidence of slavery [despite Khartoum’s denials].”
Indeed, Special Rapporteur Baum declares in his most recent report to the General Assembly: “The Government [of Sudan] needs to exercise all its influence on the Murahaleen who are responsible for human rights abuses such as mass killings, torture, rape and abductions [mainly in northern Bahr el-Ghazal province in the south]. The Government of the Sudan shares responsibility, because the Sudanese army tolerates these human rights abuses, integrates the Murahaleen in its military actions and in part finances, equips and deploys them” (September 2001 report to the General Assembly, Paragraph 110).
The one key topic Prendergast does not address in detail here is the issue of southern self-determination (though he does so in his important forthcoming book on Sudan, “God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan”; International Crisis Group, January 2002). A referendum on southern self-determination is the linchpin of the “Declaration of Principles,” which in turn has anchored the now moribund Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) peace process. In sharp contrast, the Libyan-Egyptian Joint Initiative (LEI) pointedly, deliberately omits any possibility for self-determination; indeed, the LEI is largely a diplomatic ploy to deny southern self-determination.
Given these realities, Prendergast is importantly right to note that:
“The absence of a peace process, which the warring parties take seriously and to which these confidence-building measure could be tied [], is a major missing element of the Danforth initiative. It ends up putting the cart before the horse, pushing on the cart before a horse has been identified. Simply building on an exhausted IGAD process and a severely problematic Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative is a poor substitute for a real process for which the United States must take some leadership and responsibility.”
At the same time, any peace process that does not address squarely the central issue of self-determination will soon find itself also consigned to the category of “severely problematic,” and will have no chance of bringing any of the representative southern constituencies to the peace table. Identifying the modalities for negotiating self-determination will require diplomatic intelligence and resourcefulness; it will also be an essential feature of any meaningful peace process.
So far Danforth has not begun to address the issue in a substantive fashion. Rather, he speaks in terms that verge on evasion:
“I think the feeling on the part of Kenya, of Egypt—of virtually everyone except some in the south of Sudan—is that if self-determination means a separate country it’s a bad idea. The goal here is not to fracture a country; it’s to provide real guarantees that people are not going to be oppressed” (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Jan 13, 2002).
The question that Danforth has so far not usefully answered is what positive meaning southern self-determination might have in peace negotiations. Unless the US commits itself to a peace process that will address this fundamental issue, it has little chance of success.