“Resumption of the Machakos Talks—Responsibilities and Obligations”
There can be no denying the immense significance of the Machakos peace
process resuming in the wake of an agreement between the National
Islamic Front and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement to refrain from
offensive military activities for the duration of the negotiations, at
least through the end of the year. The commitment to cease such
hostilities creates the essential element necessary for any real
progress toward a just peace, the only peace with meaning for Sudan.
But precisely because of this extraordinarily significant development,
the responsibilities for securing the integrity of the peace process are
commensurately greater. This integrity will require the sustained,
deeply committed, and intelligently coordinated efforts of the
international community, especially those of the US, Britain, and
Norway. General Sumbeiywo and the IGAD process must be generously and conspicuously supported as offering the only road to a just peace for
Sudan. At the same time, the hundreds of thousands of civilians in the
south presently at risk from Khartoum’s interdiction of humanitarian aid
must not be abandoned in the name of a peace that is still only
possible. Indeed, the responsibilities and obligations entailed in the
resumption of the Machakos process are manifold
Eric Reeves [October 16, 2002]
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
413-585-3326
ereeves@smith.edu
October 16, 2002 would seem to be an historically important date,
marking the resumption of peace talks at Machakos (Kenya) that hold
legitimate promise of ending Sudan’s civil war—the longest and most
destructive of its kind in the world. The moral and geostrategic
imperatives of the moment coincide fully, if perhaps only briefly. For
to let this chance for peace be lost would not only cruelly betray the
people of Sudan, it would insure the indefinite continuation of this
most brutally destructive and de-stabilizing of conflicts.
The regional consequences—most conspicuously for Egypt, Eritrea,
Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya—would be significant and in every case
negative, though Egypt may believe that it gains from a Sudan that is so
weakened by war that it can do nothing to threaten Cairo’s callously
hegemonic aspirations and its tyrannically proprietary sense of riparian
rights to the Nile waters. The Khartoum regime itself, in the absence
of successful peace negotiations, will inevitably move toward greater
radicalism and a more ambitiously funded war effort against the people
of the south, especially in the oil regions.
So what do such moral and strategic imperatives dictate? What are the
responsibilities and obligations of the international community at this
critical moment?
First and foremost, the Machakos process must be publicly,
emphatically, and univocally re-endorsed by the US, Norway, Britain, and
other members of the IGAD Partners Forum (IGAD is the East African
“Intergovernmental Authority for Development”). A European Union
(EU) declaration would be especially important, given the ill-conceived
decision earlier this year by European countries to announce the
resumption of development aid to Khartoum prior to the negotiation of a
just peace. Certainly such development aid must now be made entirely
contingent upon good-faith peace efforts by the National Islamic Front.
But the question of “good-faith efforts” by Khartoum raises immediate
questions, given the past history of bad faith on the part of the
regime—even in the present Machakos talks. The withdrawal from the
talks on September 2 over the SPLA capture of Torit was clearly
expedient, with Torit serving only as a convenient pretext; we must
wonder if there will be a difference this time around. Certainly if
Khartoum’s negotiators settle into a pattern of obstructionism and
dilatory negotiating tactics, the mediators need to be prepared to say
as much. Most importantly, they need to say, if talks collapse,
precisely who is responsible and why. The same, of course, holds true
for the SPLA/M negotiators.
These are the talks that will make history—or insure that Sudan’s
history is measured by the slow and savage incrementalism of additional
lives destroyed, displaced, or scarred by suffering that is beyond
reckoning.
And yet for all the importance of these talks, we cannot forget or
allow to be diminished the present suffering and destruction that
defines life for so many in South Sudan. Khartoum is presently denying
aid to many hundreds of thousands of civilians. The total interdiction
of humanitarian medical and food assistance that began September 27 and
ended October 5 has been replaced by aid restrictions that affect an
unprecedented 61 locations, leaving innocent women, men, and children
utterly bereft of humanitarian aid. The distinguished Catholic Relief
Services called upon the international community (release of October 10,
2002),
“to ensure unrestricted access to all populations in need there. [This
call comes] in response to the Sudanese government’s continued
obstruction of humanitarian operations in the country.
“Although the government in Khartoum this week lifted parts of their
September 27 ban on U.N. humanitarian flights in southern Sudan, which
had affected an estimated 800,000 people in Eastern and Western
Equatoria, an unprecedented 61 sites in the country remain inaccessible.
In Eastern Equatoria, where Catholic Relief Services brings life-saving
support by dangerous roads to approximately 375,000 people, air relief
operations have been denied for four consecutive years.
“‘It is imperative that all obstructions to the delivery of
humanitarian aid be removed immediately in order to avoid a disaster
similar to that of the 1998 war-induced famine in which an estimated
70,000 people perished,’ said Ken Hackett, Executive Director of
Catholic Relief Services.”
With a cessation of offensive military actions on both sides, there can
no longer be any excuse for Khartoum’s not allowing full and
uncompromised flight access to all humanitarian sites that Operation
Lifeline Sudan wishes to reach. Indeed, a key provision of the
cessation of hostilities agreement calls for “unimpeded” humanitarian
access to Southern Sudan. Khartoum must be pressured by the entire
international community and by the UN to abide by this agreement, as
many humanitarian organizations have done today in an important joint
statement on this very issue in Nairobi (see below).
The US must make clear to Khartoum that the Sudan Peace Act—passed
overwhelmingly by both houses of Congress last week and sure to be
signed by President Bush—means what it says about monitoring a
commitment to reach a just peace in the next six months. The US must
make equally clear that all provisions of the bill conditional upon a
Presidential determination in this six-months time-frame will be
directed vigorously against Khartoum if the regime reneges on its
Machakos commitments.
The Europeans must make clear to Khartoum that if the regime is held
responsible in the event of a collapse of the Machakos process, then
there will be severe consequences in the arena of commercial and
economic exchange and assistance. A commitment of this sort made
now—by countries already commercially active, such as Sweden, Austria,
Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Poland, Switzerland—would be of
enormous significance in persuading Khartoum that the regime’s only
chance for survival is to remain engaged with a process that can bring
both peace and justice to the people of southern Sudan.
It would also be of great importance if the Europeans were to take
seriously their professed prohibition on military sales to Khartoum.
Alenia Marconi, for example, should immediately put on hold its sale of
a radar system to Khartoum that clearly is “dual-use”
(military/commercial), and would dramatically increase the regime’s
military abilities when deployed at Juba (evidence suggests it has
already been deployed at El Obeid, site of Khartoum’s largest and
forward most military air base in the fighting arena).
The US should further expedite the full deployment of a force to
monitor attacks on civilians, especially given the declared cessation of
offensive military actions. Certainly any further aerial bombardment by
Khartoum of targets in the south must be considered “offensive” in
nature, even if what we mean by “offensive” is simply what is manifestly
not “defensive.” What possible “defensive,” indeed what conceivable
military purpose could be served by aerial bombardment of civilian and
humanitarian targets? The bombing attacks on the hospital town of Lui
in Western Equatoria, far from any fighting, and other civilian and
humanitarian centers in the South have clearly not been “military” in an
sense of the word that discriminates between “offensive” and “defensive.”
The US State Department has been shamefully slow in seeing through to
completion the deployment of such a monitoring force. The resumption of
the Machakos talks now makes the full inauguration of this monitoring
force imperative. The State Department must declare, in the very near
term, that the force—negotiated last March—is in place, ready and
able to investigate any reported attack on civilians, anywhere in
southern Sudan
Machakos is an opportunity; it is far from a realized peace agreement.
A compelling roadmap for the negotiators has recently been provided by
the International Crisis Group (“Sudan’s Best Chance for Peace: How Not
to Lose It,” September 17, 2002). Its recommendations on resolving the
outstanding issues deserves the closest consideration by all parties and
mediators, especially on issues of power-sharing, the status of
contested areas bordering the south, wealth-sharing, and internal
security arrangements. Specific features of this exceedingly important
document will be discussed in future analyses from this source.
But for the moment, we should welcome the renewed possibilities of the
Machakos process, even as all possible pressures must be brought to bear
on the parties to negotiate in good faith and to do so as long as is
required to wrest from this singular opportunity a just peace. The
responsibilities are now as great as the opportunity; the disastrous
consequences of failure must be accepted by all as morally
unacceptable.
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PRESS RELEASE
NGOs call for Immediate Implementation of Unimpeded Access Agreement in
Sudan
Nairobi, 16 October 2002
International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in Sudan
welcome yesterday’s cessation of hostilities agreement between the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan
committing both parties to allow unimpeded humanitarian access to all
areas for all people in need in accordance with Operation Lifeline Sudan
(OLS) agreements.
The NGOs—Action Against Hunger USA, CARE, Christian Aid, CRS, SCF UK,
Tearfund—applaud the efforts of the parties to the conflict, the
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the IGAD partner
countries in successfully negotiating the agreement and prioritizing the
critical issue of humanitarian access. The landmark agreement comes as
a welcome response to calls by the Sudanese people and the international
humanitarian and donor communities for stronger guarantees for unimpeded
access in Sudan.
This agreement affirms the international principles of humanitarian
access detailed in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and in the Operation
Lifeline Sudan (OLS) Beneficiary Protocol signed by the United Nations,
the Government of Sudan, and the SPLM in December 1999. Despite these
agreements, regular flight denials and a recent flight ban have
prevented international NGOs from reaching war-affected populations in
many parts of Sudan, threatening hundreds of thousands of lives. The
ban imposed in September and October affected an estimated 800,000
people across Sudan.
Currently, 61 locations have been denied access in the monthly flight
clearances, preventing humanitarian assistance from reaching nearly
300,000 people. International NGOs call on the warring parties, IGAD,
the United Nations, and the international community to provide the
necessary guarantees and support to ensure the full and immediate
implementation of the newly signed agreement in accordance with
internationally accepted principles and agreements and a just and
lasting peace in Sudan.
Contact
Maxine Clayton, OLS NGO Steering Committee Chair
0722 635456